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I. INTRODUCTION
What’s in a name? That which we call a rose
1
By any other would smell as sweet.
When William Shakespeare wrote these oft-repeated words around
2
1595, he undoubtedly would have been unaware of asbestos and mixeddust claims, or perhaps even torts, for that matter. Thus, little could he have
known that over four centuries later, crafty plaintiffs’ attorneys, eager to get
around legislation and insurance policies that would purport to limit or altogether restrict asbestos lawsuits, would lend credence to Juliet’s soliloquy
by disguising or molding asbestos cases as “mixed-dust” claims. Mixeddust claims are nothing new; indeed, they have been brought with varied
3
success since at least the early 1960s. However, because of the parallels
between the contraction of mixed-dust pneumoconiosis, which is a form of
lung disease, and asbestos exposure, and because current or pending legislation, as well as insurance exclusion policies, can impact whether and how
much a person may recover for asbestos-related illnesses, there may be a
surge in the number of asbestos-related claims brought under the rubric of
mixed-dust disease. This article will address that possibility by analyzing
whether this would be possible under both the current and likely future state
of the law, and if so, what some of the ensuing ramifications might be.
Part I of this Comment will provide a brief medical background of
mixed-dust claims, namely in terms of what they are and how they are
brought about. Included in this discussion will be an analysis of how and
where mixed-dust diseases are typically contracted, as well as some of the
varieties of the affliction and the physical effects that the diseases can have
on those affected. Also in this section is an examination of asbestosis, a
variation of pneumoconiosis that is caused by inhalation of asbestos particles.

1
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2. (William Lyon Phelps ed., Yale Univ.
Press 1923).
2
R. Moore, Romeo and Juliet: Introduction, Enotes.com, at http://www.allshakespeare.com/
romeo.php?id=830 (last visited Feb. 17, 2006). The author, being mindful of the finicky nature of the
Internet and its too-frequent ephemeral website addresses, has kept on file a copy of this Internetderived source, along with all other such sources used throughout this paper.
3
E.g., Groff v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 239 N.Y.S.2d 738 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969).
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In Part II, the current state of the law and insurance policies as it pertains to pneumoconiosis is explored. The author begins by examining some
workers’ compensation claims involving both ordinary pneumoconiosis and
mixed-dust pneumoconiosis, with an emphasis on how courts employ similar techniques in resolving such claims, including a highly deferential standard to lower tribunals’ factual determinations. The focus then shifts to
state and federal statutes dealing with both ordinary and mixed-dust pneumoconiosis, including a discussion of some features mutually shared by
these statutes. Also examined in this context is one state’s procedures for
filing pneumoconiosis-related workers’ compensation claims, as well as the
federal Black Lung Act, which establishes a compensation scheme for persons suffering from pneumoconiosis derived from inhaling coal dust.
Also in Part II is an exploration of insurance law as it applies to
mixed-dust claims, particularly through a dissection of the type of insurance
commonly secured by businesses known as a commercial general liability
policy. The discussion begins by providing background information on
some of the impetuses for insurers’ attempts to limit their liability in the
context of tort claims through pollution exclusion clauses. The author then
introduces some of the key interpretative issues that courts struggle with in
dealing with the applicability of these policies to a particular set of circumstances, including what substances qualify as “pollutants” for purposes of
pollution exclusion clauses. Following is an analysis of some of the most
prevalent doctrines that courts employ in interpreting insurance policies,
including a discussion of the similarities between how these and other types
of cases involving “ordinary” contract disputes are resolved. This is accomplished largely by examining judicial opinions dealing with the applicability of pollution exclusion clauses in particular contexts, such as environmental pollution.
Finally, Part II concludes by addressing some of Congress’ attempts at
finding a legislative solution to the asbestos litigation problem in America.
Initially, the author examines several bills that never became law, such as
the Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1998 and the Asbestos Compensation Act of 2000. The focus is then shifted to Congress’ latest attempt
at asbestos reform through the Fairness in Asbestos Resolution Act, or
FAIR Act for short. To that end, some of the bill’s key aspects that might
influence how or whether asbestos claims are filed, specifically as it relates
to a possible increase in the number of mixed-dust claims filed. Among
these is the Act’s suppression of all conflicting state and federal laws, as
well as the requirement that claimants be able to exclude substances other
than asbestos as having caused their injuries for some types of claims.
Part III predicts how today’s and tomorrow’s insurance law, particularly ever-broadening pollution exclusion clauses, as well as possible future
legislation dealing with asbestos, namely the FAIR Act, might impact the
number of mixed-dust claims filed. In connection with the insurance aspect
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of the query, special attention is given to exclusion clauses specifically
dealing with asbestos, which are becoming increasingly common, as well as
how those and other types of exclusion clauses affect the duties of insurance carriers in terms of defending or indemnifying claims. Also explored
is the interesting question of what would occur if only one of the substances
comprising a mixed-dust claim were found to be excluded under an applicable insurance policy.
As for the possible ramifications that legislation like the FAIR Act
would have on the filing of mixed-dust claims, the author addresses the
issue by focusing primarily on certain key aspects of the FAIR Act that
might influence whether and how some asbestos plaintiffs might proceed.
Among these are that the Act would serve as the only means by which persons suffering from asbestos-related ailments could file claims to receive
compensation and that some claimants whose injuries were caused or influenced by substances other than asbestos might not be eligible for recovery
under the Act.
Part IV is concerned with the role that causation could play in tort suits
or workers’ compensation claims involving mixed-dust disease. The section begins by comparing the elements of causation that might be implicated in mixed-dust tort claims to those typically encountered in traditional
toxic tort cases. Next is addressed some basic causation hurdles that
mixed-dust tort plaintiffs are likely to face, including proving that they were
exposed to toxic substances and that the exposure to those substances is
what caused their illness. The author then explores, using the Federal Rules
of Evidence as background, some of the principal evidentiary issues that
mixed-dust plaintiffs might encounter in their attempts to introduce scientific and medical evidence pertinent to their case.
Following is a discussion of some techniques and strategies a plaintiff
seeking to make out a mixed-dust claim might rely on. In conjunction with
this is an explanation of what is likely the most reliable procedure to identify potential injury-causing substances, which is conducted using a scanning electron microscope. The author then presents examples of how courts
grappling with mixed-dust claims, both in workers’ compensation and tort,
have addressed the issue of causation.
The next portion of Part IV describes ways in which legislatures,
through the creation of administrative and other alternative means of compensation, and courts, by relaxing or modifying the traditional methods of
proving one’s case in a tort claim, have made it possible for certain persons
to recover monetary relief for their injuries. An example of how legislatures have acted to facilitate recovery by those who suffer injuries in the
workplace is the passage of “presumption” statutes, which serve to either
conclusively or rebuttably establish that one or more of an injured worker’s
employers were responsible for the injuries caused. As for some of the judicial doctrines aimed at helping certain plaintiffs make out a case for re-
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covery who otherwise would have lost in court, these include the “substantial factor” test and “burden-shifting" to defendants. This segment finishes
by analyzing how and whether existing laws and doctrines originally created to deal with other areas of the law, such as “ordinary” pneumoconiosis
(as opposed to the mixed-dust kind) and asbestos cases, would impact
mixed-dust claims.
In the last section of Part IV, the author explores the feasibility and desirability of adopting alternatives to litigation as a way of dealing with
mixed-dust claims. The first of such methods discussed is the use of settlements, and to that end, the relative advantages and disadvantages of settlements are discussed. Also addressed are no-fault compensation schemes,
either statutory or judicially created, that aim to provide injured persons
with monetary relief while eliminating the need for lengthy and difficult
litigation. Some examples of such schemes employed in the past are the
National Childhood Vaccine Program Injury Act and the agreement reached
in the Agent Orange litigation.
In Part V, the conclusion, the author begins by providing a brief summary of the major points from each section. He then posits that while insurance law and possible future legislation dealing with asbestos could result in a substantial number of would-be asbestos plaintiffs choosing to file
their claims under the rubric of mixed-dust, the exact degree of this occurrence will depend on several factors, including in what direction insurance
law goes, if and to what extent the provisions of the FAIR Act or similar
legislation are passed, and how or whether courts and legislatures act to
ease some of the causation hurdles that mixed-dust claimants would face.
A. A Brief Medical Explanation of Mixed-Dust Claims

4

As its name implies, mixed-dust claims arise when a plaintiff alleges
that he has become ill from coming into contact, i.e., inhaling, two or more
5
types of particles of an airborne nature. In medical circles, this condition is
6
typically referred to as mixed-dust pneumoconiosis. One of the factors that

4
The primary purpose of this section is to provide the reader with some general medical background of mixed-dust claims. More specific information, particularly how these diseases can be diagnosed, are addressed in greater detail in connection with causation issues that mixed-dust plaintiffs are
likely to face in infra Part IV.C.
5
See DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY, Definition of Pneumoconiosis (W.B.
Saunders 2003), http://www.mercksource.com/pp/us/cns/cns_hl_dorlands.jspzQzpgzEzzSzppdocsz
SzuszSzcommonzSzdorlandszSzdorlandzSzdmd_p_25zPzhtm (last visited Feb. 26, 2006) [hereinafter
Definition of Pneumoconiosis].
6
See Barbara Barron, Dealing With Alternative Exposures: Mixed Dust Pneumoconioses, 1
MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: SILICA, May 2003, at 1, 1 [hereinafter Alternative Exposures]. Another name for
pneumoconiosis is “interstitial lung disease,” see Lawrence Martin, Pitfalls in Diagnosis of Occupational Lung Disease for Purposes of Compensation -- One Physician’s Perspective, 13 J.L. & HEALTH
49, 59 (1998-99) (using the terms interchangeably), which one source defines as “an inflammation in
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make mixed-dust disease unique from other medical conditions (and why it
7
is hard to prove) is the varied ways in which someone may develop the
condition, particularly in the workplace. Among the afflicted have been
shipyard workers (asbestos, silica, fiberglass, and miscellaneous metalbased fumes), crane operators (coal dust, silica, and asbestos), brick layers
(silica, asbestos, and cement dusts), and steel mill operators (silica, asbes8
tos, metal fumes, carbon dust, mica, graphite, and clay). But even though
mixed-dust pneumoconiosis is, by definition, caused by the inhalation of
two or more substances, the result of the disease (in terms of the impact on
the individual’s health) in most instances would not necessarily be different
from lung ailments caused by inhaling a single substance, as in either case,
the afflicted person’s diagnosis would be the same—pneumoconiosis—with
the main distinguishing factor between the two types of diseases being that
9
mixed-dust pneumoconiosis involves more than one material. Thus, some
background on “ordinary” pneumoconiosis is highly relevant to our discussion.
Pneumoconiosis is defined as a “diagnosable disease[] of the lung produced by the inhalation of dust (dust being understood to be particulate
10
matter in the solid phase, excluding living organisms).” It is a chronic
11
disease, and typically “affect[s] the lung parenchyma (the lung tissue itself
12
or the essential parts of the lung that are concerned with its function)”; in
this regard, pneumoconiosis involves not only the reaction of the lungs due
and around the tiny air sacs of the lung (alveoli) caused by an allergic reaction to inhaled organic dusts
or, less commonly, chemicals.” THE MERCK MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATION – SECOND HOME
EDITION, CHAPTER 51: ALLERGIC DISEASES OF THE LUNG (2004), http://www.
merck.com/mrkshared/mmanual_home2/sec04/ch051/ch051b.jsp (last visited Feb. 26, 2006) [hereinafter MERCK MANUAL]. Labeling all cases of mixed-dust pneumoconiosis as interstitial lung disease may
be misleading, however, as interstitial lung disease can have several different causes. See Frank Chung
& Elizabeth Dean, Pathophysiology and Cardiorespiratory Consequences of Interstitial Lung Disease –
Review and Clinical Implications: A Special Communication, 69 PHYSICAL THERAPHY 956, 956 (1989)
(stating that “[the term i]nterstitial lung disease comprises over 130 diseases”); see generally American
Lung Association, Interstitial Lung Disease and Pulmonary Fibrosis, available at
http://www.lungusa.org/site/pp.asp?c=dvLUK9O0E&b=35436 (last visited Feb. 26, 2006) [hereinafter
Pulmonary Fibrosis] (providing background information on the disease, including various ways in
which it can be caused).
7
For a general overview of the difficulties inherent in establishing causation, see infra Part IV.
8
See Mark Love & Scott Goldberg, Mixed-Dust Claims Could Be the Next Wave; Asbestos
Exclusions May Not Work in New Context, 25 NAT’L L.J., Sept. 8, 2003, at 17, 18-19; see Alternative
Exposures, supra note 6, at 2-9 (collecting pneumoconiosis cases and organizing them by substances
and places of occupational exposure).
9
See ATTORNEY’S TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE § 14-205 (3d. ed. 2003) [hereinafter ATTORNEY’S
TEXTBOOK] (stating that symptoms “are not specifically diagnostic of the particular disease”); See also
Alternative Exposures, supra note 6, at 1 (differentiating mixed-dust pneumoconiosis from ordinary
pneumoconiosis by the number of substances each consists of).
10 Alternative Exposures, supra note 6, at 1 (borrowing from PULMONARY MED. 638 (Clarence A.
Guenter ed., J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1982)).
11 See ATTORNEY’S TEXTBOOK, supra note 9.
12 Id.
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to particle inhalation, but also the subsequent alteration of the lung structure
13
and function. It should be noted that although the symptoms manifesting
from this disease can approximate ones caused by other lung diseases,
pneumoconiosis is a unique diagnosis and is to be distinguished from more
14
commonly known diseases like asthma, bronchitis, and emphysema.
15
Pneumoconiosis is most often contracted in occupational settings, since

13

See id.
See Ira Madan, Occupational Asthma and Other Respiratory Diseases; ABC of Work Related
Disorders, 313 BRITISH MED. JOURNAL 291, 292 (1996) (stating that pneumoconiosis is a “generic term
for the lodgement of any inhaled dusts in the lungs irrespective of the effects (excluding asthma and
[other lung diseases]”); Medical Centre for Occupational and Environmental Health, Occupational and
Environmental
Lung
Disease,
available
at
http://www.medicine.manchester.ac.uk/
coeh/teachinglearning/resources/lung (last visited Feb. 26, 2006) (noting that a diagnosis of pneumoconiosis “excludes diseases mainly of the airways like asthma, bronchitis and emphysema”); see MERCK
MANUAL, supra note 6, INTRODUCTION: OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISEASES, http://www.merck.
com/mmhe/sec04/ch049/ch049a.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2006) (grouping pneumoconiosis apart from
other diseases).
15 See infra note 38; infra note 40 and accompanying text. One interesting instance of occupational exposure to toxic substances that has already resulted in a plethora of mixed-dust claims is the
tragic events that occurred in Ground Zero on September 11, 2001, especially the collapsing of the
World Trade Center Towers and some nearby buildings. See generally MICHEL BRUNEAU ET AL.,
OVERVIEW
OF
DAMAGE
TO
BUILDINGS
NEAR
GROUND
ZERO
(2002),
http://mceer.buffalo.edu/publications/wtc/02-SP02Screen.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2006; on file with
author) (surveying damage caused by the terrorist attacks, particularly to the area in and surrounding
Ground Zero). Not only did almost 3,000 people die in the ensuing carnage, see Final Designs Unveiled
for WTC Memorial (Nov. 19, 2003), at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/Northeast/11/19/
attacks.memorial.ap/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2006), but the collapse of the buildings also released a great
deal of pollution and toxic materials into the air, including particles of asbestos, cement, glass, jet fuel,
and other products, see Ground Zero Workers’ Health Cloudy (Sept. 11, 2003), at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/10/earlyshow/contributors/emilysenay/main572586.shtml (last
visited Feb. 26, 2006), and thousands of people, particularly rescue workers who persisted near Ground
Zero for periods of weeks or even months after the terrorist attacks, have developed, or are at risk of
developing, several ailments ranging from “World Trade Center cough” to acid reflux disease to emphysema to asthma and even cancer. See Health Problems Plague Ground Zero Workers (Mar. 2, 2003), at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/2003-03-02-wtc-workers_x.htm (last visited Feb. 26,
2006).
In what was likely a prelude of things to come, in September of 2004 a class action lawsuit against
the construction companies charged with overseeing the removal of debris at Ground Zero was filed in
federal court in the Southern District of New York. The lawsuit purported to represent thousands of
rescue and clean-up workers who lingered for days or weeks in Ground Zero in the aftermath of the
terrorist attacks. See generally Complaint, Divirgilio v. Silverstein Properties (No. 21-MC100), available at http://www.877wtchero.com/complaint.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2006; on file with author). The
workers claim to be suffering from an array of health problems, including constant coughing, dizzy
spells, shortness of breath, loss of hearing, development of tumors, acid reflux disease, and asthma. See
id. at 14-17. In addition to seeking compensatory damages, the class also seeks to establish a medical
monitoring program. See id. at 13.
Interestingly, the complaint is replete with references to what undoubtedly would fall within the
scope of mixed dust: “The catastrophe created an immense cloud of caustic dust…”; “Residential … and
other public buildings were coated with the toxic mix of chemical dust”; “Contaminated dust from the
towers is trapped in air conditioning, heating and ventilation systems….”; “[S]afety precautions were
needed to protect the rescue workers … and anyone else exposed to the caustic dust….”; “The high
alkalinity of the WTC dust produced bronchial hyper-reactivity, persistent cough, and increased risk of
14
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that is where high and frequent doses of pollutants are more likely to occur,
but the disease may also be found with some regularity in residents of areas
16
with excessive amounts of particulate matter in the air. It must be stressed
that in order for the disease to develop, there must be exposure to high concentrations of airborne dusts, which can be either inorganic, i.e., non-living,
17
such as iron, tin, barium, asbestos, coal, and, silica, or organic, which
18
would typically involve some kind of mold. Furthermore, not everyone
that inhales particles into their lungs, even if done with significant frequency or in a heavy amount, will develop pneumoconiosis, for the human
lungs are able to rid the body of certain substances, depending on the size
19
and nature of the particles.
As one can imagine, there are many recognized forms of pneumoco20
nioses (plural of pneumoconiosis)—at least two-dozen in all, and expectedly, they are classified according to the materials that are responsible for
21
their development. Thus, among the numerous types are silicosis (silicabased), asbestosis (asbestos-based), talcosis (talc-based), graphitosis
(graphite-based), berylliosis (beryllium-based), tabacosis (tobacco-based),
asthma.”; “240 New York City firefighters … received treatment of acute respiratory symptoms caused
by inhalation of airborne smoke and dust….” Id. at 3-4. Recently, the United States Second Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that at least certain of plaintiffs’ claims could proceed. In re WTC Disaster Site,
414 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2005).
Similar lawsuits stemming from the World Trace Center disaster have been filed against other entities, including the Environmental Protection Agency, or EPA. See, e.g., http://www.911ea.org/
Current_Lawsuits.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2006) (describing such a lawsuit).
The tragic World Trade Center situation also illustrates the potential causation problems mixed-dust
plaintiffs might face, given that it would most likely be impossible to know exactly which substances
might have caused which injuries, and from where the substances originated. See New York Committee
for Occupational Safety and Health, NYCOSH Testimony at the EPA Ombudsman Investigative Hearing
on the Environmental and Public Health Impact of the World Trade Center Attack, available at
http://www.nycosh.org/WTCcatastrophe/EPAOmbudsHearingFeb23.html (last modified Jan. 19, 2006;
last visited Feb. 26, 2006) (“The variability of the contents of the World Trade Center and the massive
scale and intensity of destruction make it virtually impossible to anticipate, let alone sample, all possible
resulting contaminants.”); see generally infra Part IV.A-C (addressing some of the causation burdens
mixed-dust plaintiffs might face, including identifying and linking the alleged injury-causing substances
to a defendant).
16 See Definition of Pneumoconiosis, supra note 5.
17 See ATTORNEY’S TEXTBOOK, supra note 9.
18 See Love & Goldberg, supra note 8, at 17.
19 See id. at 18:
Particles . . . [that are] big enough [tend] to be caught in the upper airways and eliminated out
through the nose and mouth. [Very small p]articles . . . are small enough to be dealt with by the
body’s immune response . . . . Particles between these sizes can accumulate in the lungs, however,
. . . [sometimes] causing scarring. Many of the inorganic dusts, such as asbestos and silica, continue to cause scarring in the lungs long after they are inhaled.
Id.
20 See Alternative Exposures, supra note 6, at 2-7; infra note 22 and accompanying text (providing examples of substances that can cause pneumoconiosis).
21 See Definition of Pneumoconiosis, supra note 5 (stating that the various conditions “are often
named for the implicated substance”).
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22

and siderosis (iron-based). And it would be remiss to not mention the
exotic variant of pneumoconiosis known as pneumonoultramicroscopicsili23
covolcanoconiosis (very fine silica dust).
B.

Similarities Between Pneumoconiosis and
Asbestos-Related Lung Diseases

Little or no introduction to health problems wrought by asbestos is
needed, and indeed, an in-depth or abstract explanation of asbestos-related
legal or medical problems is beyond the scope of this Comment. For our
purposes, it suffices to say that asbestos is responsible for one of the worst
24
medical crises the United States has seen, and that the situation has proven
to be a significant impetus for insurers to exclude coverage for asbestos and
similar pollutants, as well as for Congress to propose legislation seeking to
25
control the rampant litigation related to asbestos claims. Primarily because of this, an examination of the similarities in medical terms between
asbestos-related diseases and pneumoconiosis is warranted.
Rather than comparing asbestos ailments in general to pneumoconiosis, it would be more fruitful to restrict the discussion of such diseases to
26
that of asbestos’ manifestation of pneumoconiosis, aptly named asbestosis.
Simply put, asbestosis is the name given to pneumoconiosis caused by the
27
inhalation of asbestos. The disease is characterized by a scarring of the
28
lungs caused by the deposit of asbestos fibers, and typical symptoms dis29
played by those suffering from asbestosis include heart failure, progres22 See generally id. (listing these and other causes of pneumoconiosis); see also text accompanying supra note 20 (noting that there are over two dozen causes of pneumoconiosis); infra note 97 (mentioning byssinosis, a type of pneumoconiosis caused by inhalation of cotton particles).
23 See Dictionary.com, What is the Longest Word in the Dictionary?,
http://dictionary.reference.com/help/faq/language/l/longestword.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
As of yet, no person has actually been diagnosed with this variation of pneumoconiosis, see id., but it
warrants mention here by virtue of the word’s dubious distinction as the longest word in the English
language. See id.
24 See generally Paul F. Rothstein, What Courts Can Do in the Face of the Never-Ending Asbestos
Crisis, 71 MISS. L.J. 1 (2001) (providing background on medical and litigation costs brought on by
asbestos).
25 These will be discussed in infra Part II.
26 Many different types of diseases other than asbestosis are known to be caused by asbestos,
including lung cancer and mesothelioma, a rare cancer of the chest and abdomen lining. See generally
American Lung Association, Asbestos, available at http://www.lungusa.org/site/pp.asp?c=
dvLUK9O0E&b=35368 (last visited Feb. 17, 2006) [hereinafter Asbestos] (describing ill affects of
asbestos). However, this Comment will focus more on asbestosis, since that condition is a type of
pneumoconiosis, see accompanying text to infra note 27, and is therefore more relevant to the discussion.
27 See Asbestos, supra note 26.
28 See id.
29 See AMERICAN COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND HEALTH, PAMPHLET ON ASBESTOS 3 (1992) (on file
with author).
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31

sively worsening dyspnea, dry-cough, and non-specific chest discom32
fort. These symptoms are not unlike those commonly associated with
33
pneumoconiosis in general, so the likeness between asbestosis and pneumoconiosis in terms of both contraction and symptoms cannot be denied.
With this brief medical background in hand, we can now proceed to
examine insurance policies and law relating to pneumoconiosis.
II. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW AND INSURANCE
In order to better appreciate the relationship between a possible future
surge in mixed-dust claims and insurance policies and legislation dealing
with asbestos and pneumoconiosis that are in existence today, an analysis of
pertinent insurance policies and laws, both federal and state, is necessary.
This, in turn, requires an examination of case law dealing with insurance
policies, particularly opinions resolving interpretive issues concerning what
is and is not covered under a policy, as well as claims filed in tort or workers’ compensation cases where the claimants alleged to be suffering from
some form of pneumoconiosis.
A.

Case Law Dealing with Pneumoconiosis

Reported cases involving claims of pneumoconiosis first appeared in
34
35
the early twentieth-century, both in state and federal courts, and, not sur36
prisingly, are still occurring today. Many of these cases, then and now, are
appeals from lower decisions that either awarded or denied workers’ compensation benefits to claimants who alleged they developed pneumoconio37
sis in the workplace. That these claimants might be correct is not surpris30 See Basil Varkey et al., Asbestosis, available at http://www.emedicine.com/med/topic171.htm
(last modified July 8, 2005; last visited Feb. 26, 2006). Dyspnea is a condition where an afflicted person
experiences difficulty in breathing, and is sometime referred to as “air hunger.” See Dictionary.com, at
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=dyspnea (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
31 See Varkey, supra note 30.
32 See id.
33 See generally Pulmonary Fibrosis, supra note 6 (providing symptoms on interstitial lung disease). As noted earlier in note 6, pneumoconiosis is sometimes referred to as interstitial lung disease.
34 E.g., Kovaliski v. Collins Co., 128 A. 288, 288 (Conn. 1925) (Workers’ compensation case
where plaintiff contracted pneumoconiosis due to “grinding,” described by the court as “the process of
removing on a revolving stone the rough surfaces and edges of axes and other tools there manufactured”).
35 E.g., Grammer v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 71 F.2d 38, 39 (10th Cir. 1934) (Wrongful
death action where plaintiff died of pneumoconiosis arising out of his employment as a cleaner of gas
oil stills). A still in this context is “[a]n apparatus for distilling liquids . . . consisting of a vessel in
which the substance is vaporized by heat and a cooling device in which the vapor is condensed.” See
Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=still (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
36 E.g., Drummond Co. v. Johnson, 886 So. 2d 825 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003).
37 E.g., supra note 34. Some plaintiffs nonetheless elect to bring the claim under a tort theory,
such as wrongful death. See, e.g., Triff v. National Bronze & Aluminum Foundry Co., 20 N.E.2d 232,
233 (Ohio 1939) (administratrix of decedent who died of silicosis sued decedent’s former employer,
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ing, as occupational lung disease is the number-one work-related illness in
38
the United States. It is also not surprising to learn that a fair number of
asbestos cases (which, as discussed earlier, share definite similarities with
39
pneumoconiosis cases as a whole, ) are also brought under workers’ com40
pensation, rather than in the torts context. One likely reason for this is that
under the workers’ compensation laws of most states, plaintiffs are generally foreclosed from pursuing claims against their employers through the
courts, but rather must rely on the applicable state’s workers’ compensation
41
42
scheme; this is commonly referred to as the “exclusive remedy” rule, and
43
a similar limitation applies to federal employees.
alleging various counts of negligence such as failure to inform workers of dangerous workplace conditions and failure to provide a safe workplace).
38 NEW YORK STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISEASE REGISTRY (2002),
http://www.health.state.ny.us/nysdoh/lung/lungreg.pdf (last modified Dec. 2002; last visited Feb. 17,
2006; on file with author).
39 See generally supra Part I.B.
40 See Deirdre A. McDonnell, Comment, Increased Risk of Disease Damages: Proportional
Recovery as an Alternative to the All or Nothing System Exemplified by Asbestos Cases, 24 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 623, 644 n.186 (1997) (noting that the majority of asbestos claims stem from persons who
were injured due to “occupational exposure”); see also Melissa A. Vallone, Note, Employer Liability for
Workplace Environmental Tobacco Smoke: Get Out of the Fog, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 811, 828 (1996)
(stating that “[starting i]n the 1950s, many asbestos plaintiffs pursued remedies through state workers’
compensation laws”). Some of the possible reasons behind a plaintiff’s choice to pursue an asbestos
claim under a workers’ compensation scheme as opposed to in tort might have to do with the expense,
time, and uncertainty that are inherently involved in lawsuits, which are alleviated somewhat under the
“no-fault” structure of most states’ workers’ compensation schemes. See Joan T.A. Gabel & Nancy R.
Mansfield, The Information Revolution and its Impact on the Employment Relationship: An Analysis of
the Cyberspace Workplace, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 301, 342 (2003) (“Workers’ compensation is a no-fault
system in which employees recover . . . [a]s long as the employee’s injury ‘arises out of and in the
course of employment . . . .’”); see Rachel Schaffer, Grabbing Them by the Balls: Legislatures, Courts,
and Team Owners Bar Non-Elite Professional Athletes From Workers’ Compensation, 8 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 623, 636-39 (2000) (providing an overview of workers’ compensation
schemes).
Nonetheless, there are drawbacks to proceeding with a claim under workers’ compensation as opposed to filing a lawsuit, chief among those being that the maximum amount recoverable under workers’
compensation would likely be much lower than the damages that might be awarded in a lawsuit. See
Sidney A. Shapiro, Economic Analysis of State Employment Law Issues Symposium: The Necessity of
OSHA, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 22, 28 (1999) (“All states have caps on damages and other limitations
that significantly restrict [the amount awarded under] workers’ compensation . . . .”). And because
employers are often immune from lawsuits stemming from work-related injuries, see infra notes 41-43
and accompanying text, persons who choose to sue for their injuries stemming from asbestos exposure
might have no choice but to go after the manufacturer(s) of the asbestos product(s) that caused the
plaintiff’s injuries, and this would not be desirable because many of these companies simply cannot
afford to pay any judgments entered against them, see infra note 306 and accompanying text.
41 See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Reker, 100 S.W.3d 756 (Ky. 2003) (after analyzing Kentucky’s Workers’ Compensation Scheme, found in sections 342.011-990 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes (2002), the court held that the plaintiff’s exclusive remedy for securing benefits for injuries sustained on the job lay within the state’s workers’ compensation scheme).
42 See, e.g., John D. Copeland, The New Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Act: Did the Pendulum
Swing Too Far?, 47 ARK. L. REV. 1, 41 (1994) (“[Under most workers’ compensation schemes,] employers are granted immunity from most employee tort claims because workers’ compensation is the
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The role of the courts in a workers’ compensation case involving a
mixed-dust claim may be gauged by examining a typical opinion such as
44
Clinchfield Coal Company v. Reed. In Clinchfield, the Virginia Court of
Appeals was faced with an appeal from the defendant, Clinchfield Coal
Company, challenging an award of medical benefits by the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission to the claimant, Farrell D. Reed, for the
45
coal workers’ pneumoconiosis he allegedly had developed from his job.
46
In affirming the award of benefits, the court first noted that a very
47
deferential standard applied in that context. The court then briefly defined
coal workers’ pneumoconiosis as “a disease of the lung that results from the
48
accumulation of coal dust in the lungs” and proceeded to examine the evi49
dence presented to the Commission. After noting that the evidence in the
record sufficiently supported the Commission’s finding that the plaintiff had
50
contracted the illness through his employment, the court turned to the decisive question before it, namely whether the plaintiff’s disease was one for
which compensation could be had under Virginia’s workers’ compensation
51
52
scheme. After analyzing the relevant statutory provision, the court recognized that the disease the plaintiff was suffering from, coal workers’ pneu-

exclusive remedy. . . . [M]ost jurisdictions [have] traditionally recognized only a few narrow exceptions
to the exclusive remedy doctrine.”); see Jennifer Moyer Gaines, Comment, Employer Liability for
Domestic Violence in the Workplace: Are Employers Walking a Tightrope Without a Safety Net?, 31 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 139, 144-48 (2000) (providing background on the “exclusivity” rule in workers’ compensation schemes).
43 See generally William R. Kraus, How “Exclusive” is “Exclusive”? The Federal Employees’
Compensation Act and Compensatory Damages in Discrimination Cases, 43 A.F. L. REV. 145 (1997)
(exploring the exclusivity rule in federal workers’ compensation laws).
44 577 S.E.2d 538 (Va. Ct. App. 2003).
45 See id. at 539.
46 Id.
47 Id. (“On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party before
the commission.”) (internal quotations omitted). The majority of courts adopt a similarly deferential
standard in workers’ compensation appeals. See, e.g., Brad A. Elward, Workers’ Compensation Reviews
and Appeals: A Review and Suggestion for Change, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 493, 517-18 (2002) (noting
that “[the m]anifest weight of the evidence [standard] is the most common standard of review in workers’ compensation appeals,” and that “so long as ‘some’ evidence is presented to support the [workers’
compensation board’s] decision, that decision must be affirmed”).
48 Clinchfield, 577 S.E.2d at 539.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 540-42.
52 Id. The court focused primarily on section 65.2-403(B) of the Virginia Code (2003), which at
the time provided in part that “[a]n employee who has an occupational disease that is covered by this
title shall be entitled to the same hospital, medical and miscellaneous benefits as an employee who has a
compensable injury by accident”).
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moconiosis, was indeed a compensable injury for the purposes of workers’
53
54
compensation, and affirmed the judgment.
The Clinchfield case is illustrative of the type of analysis courts will
undertake in reviewing workers’ compensation claims for injuries stemming
from pneumoconiosis. First, they are highly deferential to the conclusions
reached by the tribunals below, whether it be a trial court or administrative
55
body. Second, the courts will focus on interpreting and applying statutory
56
schemes to the case before it, rather than tort or other legal principles.
Finally, they will tend to engage in the difficult analysis of medical evidence and related questions only to the extent that is necessary to review
57
the lower body’s decision.
58
Sometime after cases related to “simple” pneumoconiosis appeared,
cases involving claims of mixed-dust pneumoconiosis began appearing in
various courts, with the first of these tracing back to New York courts in
59
60
1963. They continue to appear with some frequency, and as with cases
61
alleging ordinary pneumoconiosis, a good number - in fact, most - of reported opinions involving claims of mixed-dust pneumoconiosis are in the
62
form of appeals from workers’ compensation board decisions.
53 See Clinchfield, 577 S.E.2d at 541. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied in part on the
Commission’s statement that “[a]sbestosis is but one of the several occupationally-induced pneumoconioses for which workers’ compensation benefits, including medical benefits, are available." Id.
54 Id. at 543.
55 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
56 See, e.g., Kusenko v. Republic Steel Corp., 484 A.2d 374, 376 (Pa. 1984) (noting that
“[r]esolution of th[e] issue [of whether benefits should be awarded] necessarily requires an examination
of the statutory language which governs the recovery of benefits in a Workmen’s Compensation case”).
57 See, e.g., Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 572 A.2d 843, 844-45 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1990) (noting that “the referee is the ultimate factfinder in a workmen’s compensation case
and he has the sole prerogative of assessing credibility and resolving conflicts in testimony”).
58 See, e.g., supra notes 34-35 (examples of such cases).
59 Groff, 239 N.Y.S.2d 738. Groff involved an appeal by an employer of a decision by New
York’s workers’ compensation board that awarded benefits to a worker for disabilities he developed as a
result of working as a miner. Id. at 739. The plaintiff had been diagnosed with, among other things,
mixed-dust pneumoconiosis after coming into contact with gypsum and silica. Id. at 739-40. The Groff
case was mentioned in passing earlier in supra note 3 and the text accompanying it.
60 E.g., Bailey v. N. Am. Refractories Co., 95 S.W.3d 868 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001). Bailey is somewhat unusual in that it is not a workers’ compensation case; rather, certain employees of a factory that
made asbestos-containing products sued the manufacturer, alleging that the company’s negligence was
responsible for the various diseases they had contracted, among them being mixed-dust pneumoconiosis
(of which asbestos was one factor). Id. at 870. For an examination of how the Bailey court addressed
the plaintiffs’ claims, which by so doing allows one to glean some of the differences between a claim
filed in tort and one filed in workers’ compensation, see infra Part IV.D.1.
61 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
62 E.g., supra note 59 (providing an example of such a case). A search on Westlaw done on
February 26, 2006, for both federal and state cases containing the words “mix! dust pneum!” (! is a
wildcard character in Westlaw, meaning, for example, that any words beginning with “mix” would be
found) netted thirty-three cases, and most of those involved workers’ compensation claims (including
many from Pennsylvania, which is not surprising given the amount of mining that is done there.] A
similar but broader search done the same day using the words “mix!-dust" was a bit more fruitful, yield-
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Mixed-dust pneumoconiosis cases share another similarity with other
types of pneumoconiosis cases; although mixed-dust pneumoconiosis cases
are obviously not identical to those in which plaintiffs allege “ordinary”
63
pneumoconiosis, courts will, at least when dealing with workers’ compensation cases, take a comparable approach in deciding both. Illustrative of
64
this is Alston v. Chrysler Corporation, an appeal from a decision by
Michigan’s Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) in
which the court chose to adopt the magistrate’s findings that the plaintiff
was afflicted with mixed-dust pneumoconiosis and asbestos, and then went
on to find Chrysler Corporation responsible for paying the worker medical
65
66
benefits. As was the case in Clinchfield, the court in Alston began its
opinion by noting the extremely deferential standard that applies in appeals
from workers’ compensation decisions involving mixed-dust pneumoconio67
sis.
The court then proceeded to the merits of the claim by analyzing the
magistrate’s findings that the “plaintiff was disabled by a work-related dust
68
disease resulting from his exposure to asbestos.” [Oddly enough, “[t]he
magistrate did not expressly state the type of dust disease from which the
69
70
plaintiff suffered.”] As is typical in these cases, the magistrate reached
ing 48 cases. Possible reasons for there being many more mixed-dust workers’ compensation claims
than tort claims are explored in supra note 40 and accompanying text and infra note 334 and accompanying text.
63 The most glaring difference between the two is, of course, that mixed-dust pneumoconiosis
involves at least two substances, while ordinary pneumoconiosis is composed of only one. See text
accompanying supra note 5; supra note 9 and accompanying text.
64 622 N.W.2d 795 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
65 Id. at 796-97. Chrysler did not challenge the magistrate’s findings to the effect that the plaintiff
had been stricken with the diseases as a result of his work, but rather argued that it should be reimbursed
for the benefits it paid the plaintiff by the Silicosis, Dust Disease, and Logging Industry Compensation
Fund (Fund). Id. at 796. In reversing the magistrate’s ruling on this point and finding against Chrysler,
the Alston court noted that Chrysler failed to establish a prerequisite of the Fund’s reimbursement,
namely that the diseases that the plaintiff was suffering from represented “a threat to the automobile
industry,” i.e., that the potential of similar claims by workers being filed could have a crippling economic effect on the industry. Id. at 796-99.
66 The Clinchfield case was discussed in supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
67 See Alston, 622 N.W.2d at 796:
Our review of a decision of the WCAC [Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission] is limited
to whether the WCAC exceeded its authority or committed an error of law . . . . If there is any evidence supporting the WCAC’s factual findings, and if the WCAC did not misapprehend its administrative appellate role in reviewing decisions of the magistrate, then the courts must treat the
WCAC’s factual findings as conclusive. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
68
69
70

Id. at 796.
Id.
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.68 (Anderson 2005):

Before awarding compensation for disability or death due to silicosis, asbestosis, or coal miners’
pneumoconiosis, the administrator shall refer the claim to a qualified medical specialist for examination and recommendation with regard to the diagnosis, the extent of disability, the cause of
death, and other medical questions connected with the claim. (emphasis added).
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her conclusion by relying on the submitted testimony of doctors. In particular, there was evidence presented from two doctors that indicated the
plaintiff suffered from, inter alia, mixed-dust pneumoconiosis that was
likely caused by a combination of the plaintiff being exposed to asbestos in
72
the workplace and his habit of smoking. On appeal, the court summarily
adopted the magistrate’s findings on this issue, and although the correctness
73
of the magistrate’s medical findings was not the central issue in the case,
Alston is nonetheless indicative of the extreme deference that courts give to
74
lower tribunals’ decisions in workers’ compensation cases. As was alluded to earlier, the court ultimately affirmed the WCAC’s ruling that
75
Chrysler was responsible for the plaintiff’s benefits.
B.

Legislation Concerning Pneumoconiosis
1. State Laws

As of present, many states have enacted laws dealing with pneumoco76
niosis, usually in the context of workers’ compensation. These statutes
77
range from providing definitions of pneumoconiosis to listing examples of
78
compensable pneumoconiosis to creating presumptions in favor of pneu79
moconiosis victims. In terms of liability in occupational settings, although
Such a requirement is common among workers’ compensation statutes, probably because, as the
Supreme Court recognized in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), “there certainly is no reason to
think judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making [medical] decisions.”
Id. at 322-23.
71 See Alston, 622 N.W.2d at 796-97.
72 Id.
73 See supra note 65.
74 See supra notes 47, 57, 67 and accompanying text.
75 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
76 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-5-110 (2003); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1510 (2003); 820 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 310/1 (2003); IOWA CODE § 85A.12 (2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.316 (BANKS-BALDWIN
2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.531 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-72-303 (2003); N.Y. WORKERS’
COMP. LAW § 44-A (CONSOL. 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-01.1 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4123.68; 77 PA. CONST. STAT. § 411.1 (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-34-2 (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 506-303 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-513 (MICHIE 2003); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-14 (2003). Additionally,
in mid-2004 the legislature of Ohio passed a comprehensive bill regulating mixed-dust claims in several
regards, including defining what a mixed-dust claim is, establishing what a claimant must prove in order
to prevail, and detailing who may be held liable for such claims. See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2307.84-902.
77 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-5-110:
Occupational pneumoconiosis [is a] disease of the lungs caused by inhalation of minute particles
of dust over a period of time, which dust is due to causes and conditions arising out of and in the
course of the employment, without regard to whether the causes or conditions are inherent in the
employment or can be eliminated or reduced by due care on the part of the employer.
78 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1510 (listing silicosis and asbestosis as examples of occupational diseases).
79 See, e.g., N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 44-a (“The employer in whose employment an employee was last exposed to an injurious dust hazard shall be liable for the payments required by this
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there are slight variations, typically the employer who will be held liable for
compensating those who have contracted pneumoconiosis is the one in
whose employ the afflicted were last exposed to the agent(s) causing pneu80
moconiosis.
The various state statutes dealing with workers’ compensation for
pneumoconiosis typically provide for procedures on how a worker may
81
initiate a claim. An example of such a statute is section 342.316 of the
82
Kentucky Statutes, which outlines in detail the steps that a claimant seeking benefits for occupational diseases must follow. First, he must file a
“claim for resolution” that lists, among other things, the worker’s complete
work history, replete with the names and addresses of past employers and
83
the dates of employment. The employee must also provide at least one
written medical report supporting his claim, prepared by a licensed physician, “which shall be made on the basis of clinical or X-ray examination
performed in accordance with accepted medical standards and shall contain
full and complete statements of all examinations performed and the results
84
thereof.” In addition to the report, the claim must be accompanied by a
85
chest X-ray examination “and appropriate pulmonary function tests” that
86
“comply with accepted medical standards.” The statute then minutely
details the medical requirements and procedures that the examining physi87
cian must abide by.

chapter when disability or death of the employee shall be due to silicosis or other dust disease.”) This
and similar statutes creating presumptions regarding pneumoconiosis have been enacted by many states,
as well as the federal government, and are examined in further detail in infra Parts II.B.1-2, IV.E.1.a.
80 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.316(1)(a) (“The employer liable for compensation for
occupational disease [including pneumoconiosis] shall be the employer in whose employment the employee was last exposed to the hazard of the occupational disease.”); see also infra notes 399, 403 (discussing the “last injurious exposure” rule).
81 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.316; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.68; VA. CODE ANN. §
65.2-513; W. VA. CODE § 23-4-8 (2003).
82 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.316
83 Id. § 342.316 (3)(a).
84 Id.
85 Id. § 342.316 (3)(a)(2). Requiring a workers’ compensation claimant to submit this type of
evidence is not uncommon. See generally infra Part IV.D.2 (discussing workers’ compensation case
where similar requirements were imposed on the claimant).
86 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.316 (3)(b).
87 Id. § 342.316 (3)(b)(1)-(2):
Chest X-rays shall be of acceptable quality with respect to exposure and development . . . . Physicians’ reports of X-ray interpretations shall . . . classify the X-ray interpretation using the latest
ILO Classification and be accompanied by a completed copy of the latest ILO Classification report. Only interpretations by National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) certified "B" readers shall be admissible.
. . . Spirometric testing shall be conducted in accordance with the standards recommended in the
latest edition available of the "Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment" published by
the American Medical Association and the 1978 ATS epidemiology standardization project with
the exception that the predicted normal values for lung function shall not be adjusted based upon
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Assuming that the employee complies with these filing requirements,
the claim will then proceed to the next phase; the commissioner in charge of
workers’ compensation will notify the employer “and all other interested
parties” by furnishing them with a copy of the application and any other
88
materials submitted by the claimant. The claim will then be assigned to an
89
administrative law judge, and within thirty days of receiving notice of the
claim, the employer must notify the commissioner and “all parties of re90
cord” of its acceptance or denial of the claim.
If the employer denies the claim, within forty-five days of the claim
being assigned to a judge, the employer must arrange for the employee to
91
be examined by a physician of the employer’s choosing. This examination must conform to the same requirements as that of the examination report filed by the claimant, and the results of the examination must be pro92
vided to the commissioner and “all other parties.” The commissioner will
then determine if the parties’ filings are in consensus as specified by the
93
statute, and if he does so conclude, his findings will constitute fairly conclusive evidence and will be forwarded to the parties and the judge handling
94
the case. If the commissioner deems that the parties’ filings are contradictory to one another, the judge will have to weigh the evidence and make a
95
determination on the merits of the claim. Either way, unless the parties
reach a settlement beforehand, the judge’s ruling is due no later than sixty
96
days from the time of the initial hearing.
2. Federal Laws
As with state statutes, one can find federal codes and regulations dealing with pneumoconiosis, among the most prominent of which is the Black
97
Lung Benefits Act. Congress deemed it necessary to pass this legislation
the race of the subject. . . . Reports of spirometric testing shall include a description by the physician of the procedures utilized in conducting such spirometric testing and a copy of the spirometric
chart and tracings from which spirometric values submitted as evidence were taken.
88 Id. § 342.316 (4)(a).
89 Id. § 342.316 (4)(b).
90 Id. § 342.316 (4)(c).
91 Id. § 342.316 (4)(d). Giving an employee the ability to choose a physician in the context of
workers’ compensation is not uncommon. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 4601(a) (West 2004) (providing
that in workers’ compensation claims, “[if the] employee so requests, the employer shall tender the
employee one change of physician”).
92 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.316 (4)(d).
93 Id. § 342.316 (4)(f).
94 Id. § 342.316 (4)(d)-(e).
95 Id. § 342.316 (4)(e).
96 Id. § 342.316 (4)(h).
97 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-45 (2003). The current version of the Black Lung Benefits Act is the evolutionary product of Congressional action tracing back to the 1960s. See generally Eric R. Olson, Reducing the Overburden: The Doris Coal Presumption and Administrative Efficiency Under the Black Lung
Benefits Act, 99 MICH. L. REV. 696 (2000) (providing information and historical background on the Act).
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because it found that “there [we]re a significant number of coal miners . . .
who are totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis arising out of employment
in . . . coal mines . . . and that few States provide benefits for [these] coal
98
miners or their surviving dependents.” As is suggested by its name, the
focus of the Act is fairly narrow, as it applies only to pneumoconiosis
99
claims that derive from working in coal mines. Furthermore, the Act was,
and still is, intended to complement, rather than replace, states’ workers’
compensation schemes for pneumoconiosis claims, for only when a claim100
ant is not eligible for state benefits or when the state benefits are inade101
quate does the Act apply. And the Act, as with many state compensation
102
103
schemes, creates statutory presumptions that favor claimants.

For another example of federal law dealing with pneumoconiosis, the reader may wish to study
American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981), where the Supreme Court
had the opportunity to examine the validity of (and ultimately uphold) Title 29, Section 1910.1043 of
the Code of Federal Regulations (2004), which represented the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s highest threshold of tolerable occupational exposure to “cotton dust,” a substance that can lead
to a variation of pneumoconiosis known as byssinosis. More information on this condition can be found
in Donovan, 452 U.S. at 495-505.
98 30 U.S.C. § 901(a).
99 30 U.S.C. § 902(b) (“The term ‘pneumoconiosis’ [in this Act] means a chronic dust disease of
the lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising out of coal mine
employment.”).
100 See 30 U.S.C. § 931(a):
On and after January 1, 1974, any claim for benefits for death or total disability due to the pneumoconiosis shall be filed pursuant to the applicable State workmen’s compensation law, except
that during any period when miners or their surviving widows, children, parents, brothers, or sisters, as the case may be, are not covered by a State workmen’s compensation law which provides
adequate coverage for pneumoconiosis . . . .
101 30 U.S.C. § 931(b)(1):
For purposes of this section, a State workmen’s compensation law shall not be deemed to provide
adequate coverage for pneumoconiosis during any period unless it is included in the list of State
laws found by the Secretary to provide such adequate coverage during such period. The Secretary
shall, no later than October 1, 1972, publish in the Federal Register a list of State workmen’s compensation laws which provide adequate coverage for pneumoconiosis and shall revise and republish in the Federal Register such list from time to time, as may be appropriate to reflect changes in
such State laws due to legislation or judicial or administrative interpretation.
102 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
103 E.g., 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(1) (stating that “[i]f a miner who is suffering or suffered from pneumoconiosis was employed for ten years or more in one or more coal mines there shall be a rebuttable
presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose out of such employment”); 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(2) (providing
that “[i]f a deceased miner was employed for ten years or more in one or more coal mines and died from
a respirable disease there shall be rebuttable presumption that his death was due to pneumoconiosis”).
Other presumptions applicable to the Black Lung Act can be found in the Federal Code. See, e.g., 20
C.F.R. § 718.304 (2003) (establishing irrebuttable presumption that a miner’s death was due to pneumoconiosis or that a miner was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis at the time of death if certain evidence is presented or under certain situations); 20 C.F.R. § 718.305 (2003) (creating rebuttable presumption that a miner is or was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis or that his death was caused by pneumoconiosis if he was a coal miner for fifteen years or more and certain evidence, such as an X-ray,
establishes a pulmonary impairment); 20 C.F.R. § 718.306 (2003) (providing rebuttable presumption
that the survivors of a miner who was employed for 25 years or more and died prior to March 1, 1978,
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Mainly through provisions of the Federal Code, the Black Lungs Act
104
specifies, as do many state statutes, the procedures that claimants seeking
105
benefits must fulfill. The Act’s procedures have already been analyzed by
106
other commentators, and so only a cursory examination is necessary here.
The basic requirements that a claimant must comply with in order to receive
benefits under the Act, particularly in terms of what evidence of his injuries
he must present, are outlined in title 20, sections 718.201-206 of the Code
107
of Federal Regulations. Not surprisingly, a threshold matter for the eligibility of benefits is a determination that the claimant suffers from pneumo108
coniosis, and this may be achieved primarily through four means: 1) pro109
viding a chest X-ray that shows evidence of pneumoconiosis, 2) submit110
ting an autopsy or biopsy report, 3) relying on the various presumptions
111
afforded by Congress, and 4) procuring a finding by a physician “exercising sound medical judgment” that the miner suffers or has suffered from
112
pneumoconiosis.
C.

Insurance Policies Dealing with Pneumoconiosis

Analyzing the potential impact that a possible surge in mixed-dust
claims might have requires a look at the current state of insurance policies
113
and how they might serve to limit, or at least complicate, such a trend.
are entitled to the payment of benefits); see generally Olson, supra note 97 (discussing the role that
presumptions have played in the Black Lung Benefits Act).
104 See generally supra Part II.B.1 (describing the procedures a person must follow to initiate a
workers’ compensation pneumoconiosis claim in Kentucky).
105 The bulk of these are located in Title 20, Sections 718.101-307 of the Code of Federal Regulations (2003).
106 See Olson, supra note 97, at 698-700; Rita A. Massie, Student Work, Modification of Benefits
for Claimants Under the Federal Black Lung Benefits Program, 97 W. VA L. REV. 1023, 1030-37 (1995)
(both describing the process of filing claims under the Act).
107 20 C.F.R. §§ 718.201-206 (2003).
108 20 C.F.R. § 718.202. Linking the alleged cause of the plaintiff’s injury to a defendant is, unsurprisingly, an essential element of almost any type of claim, whether it be in the nature of workers’
compensation or tort. See infra notes 372-73 and accompanying text.
109 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a)(1). The X-ray must be in conformity with the requirements listed in
Title 20, Section 718.102 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
110 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(2). The autopsy or biopsy must be conducted under the procedures specified in Title 20, Section 106 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
111 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(3). The presumptions specifically referenced are Title 20, Sections
718.304-06 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and these were discussed in supra note 103.
112 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(4). The physician’s finding must “be based on objective medical evidence
such as blood-gas studies, electrocardiograms, pulmonary function studies, physical performance tests,
physical examination, and medical and work histories,” and furthermore, must “be supported by a reasoned medical opinion.” Id.
113 There are, of course, many different types of insurance policies, ranging from automobile to
property to life insurance. See generally Douglas R. Richmond, Issues and Problems in "Other Insurance," Multiple Insurance, and Self-Insurance, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1373 (1995) (discussing various types
of insurance policies and how they differ in terms of coverage and interpretation). However, given that
the majority of mixed-dust claims arise out of work-related occurrences, which in turn means that many,
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That is because today, most companies are protected by some form of in114
surance. Of course, this fact does not end, but rather begins, the question
of if and to what extent companies will be liable for mixed-dust claims, for
115
that question will naturally depend on the language of the policy. Thus,
an examination of the most common types of insurance applicable in this
context, as well as how courts have addressed these policies, is warranted.
1. The Commercial General Liability Policy (CGL)
The most widely used type of insurance policy by businesses is the
116
CGL, which are form policies developed by the Insurance Service Office
117
(ISO). These policies, as their name suggests, are broad and intended to
118
“provide[ ] insurance for businesses against responsibility for accidents,”
119
particularly for claims of bodily injury and property damage. Typically,
if not most, of the defendants will be companies, see supra note 40, the focus of this section will be on
the type of insurance policies that businesses typically carry, namely the so-called comprehensive or
commercial general liability policy (CGL), see infra note 116 and accompanying text. The titles of the
policies are misleading, for while they “suggest[ ] the expectation of maximum coverage,” Timothy
Stanton, Now You See It, Now You Don’t: Defective Liability Insurance, 25 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 109, 111
n.16 (1993), the scope of CGL policies is such that in actuality they only guard businesses against certain types of risks, see id. at 111 n.15-16.
114 See George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code Section 363(f) and Undermining the
Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235, 286 n.195 (2002) (recognizing that “most companies
carry substantial amounts of liability insurance”).
115 See, e.g., Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Fibreboard Corp., 227 Cal. Rptr. 203, 205 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986) (“The starting point [of determining an insurer’s liability], of course, is the plain meaning of the
policy language.”).
116 See, e.g., Lisa A. Small, Offensive and Defensive Insurance Coverage for Patent Infringement
Litigation: Who Will Pay?, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 707, 712 (1998) (“The most common type of
liability insurance coverage for businesses is Comprehensive (or Commercial) General Liability (‘CGL’)
insurance.”); Lee H. Ogburn, The Progression of Trigger Limitation in Maryland—Determining the
Appropriate Trigger of Coverage, Its Limitations, and Ramifications, 53 MD. L. REV. 220, 221 (1994)
(“[T]he policy that most businesses purchase to protect against claims . . . for bodily injury or property
damage [is the CGL] . . . . “); see also infra notes 118-19 and accompanying text (describing purpose of
CGL policies).
117 The ISO is a private institution that exists primarily to write standard policy forms for the
insurance industry. See Small, supra note 116, at 712. Aside from writing the actual policies, the ISO
files the policies with the various states’ insurance regulators, see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S.
764, 772 (1993), which is required by the law of many states, see Melody A. Hamel, Comment, The
1970 Pollution Exclusion in Comprehensive General Liability Policies: Reasons for Interpretations in
Favor of Coverage in 1996 and Beyond, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 1083, 1103 (1996) (stating that most states
require proposals for new policy language to be filed with and approved by the state insurance commissioner prior to inclusion of that language in policies). In addition, and somewhat expectedly, the ISO
also supplies insurance companies with useful statistical information pertaining to the industry: for
example, it collects and interprets data on the premiums charged, claims filed and paid, and defense
costs expended with respect to each form. See Hartford, 509 U.S. at 772. More information about the
ISO may be had at its website, http://www.iso.com (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
118 Harry G. Prince, Contract Interpretation in California: Plain Meaning, Parol Evidence and the
Use of the “Just Result” Principle, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 557, 592 n.195 (1998).
119 See Small, supra note 116; Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Pittsburg, 768 F. Supp. 1463, 1468 n.5
(D. Kan. 1991) (both recognizing that CGL policies are meant to insure a business against personal
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the policies will first identify the risks that are covered, and then specify
120
possible exclusions from those general areas of risk. For the purpose of
this Comment, the most noteworthy of these exclusions is the “pollution
exclusion” clause, which, significantly, may be found in virtually all CGLs
121
in existence today.
Somewhat obviously, the ISO periodically updates
122
these forms to correspond with changing times and needs; in the context
applicable here, namely what type of liability related to mixed-dust incidents is and is not covered by CGL insurance policies, the most influential
version has been, and continues to be, the one authored by the ISO in
123
1986. Because of this, the impact that the 1986 CGL policy has had, and
may have, on mixed-dust claims may be better appreciated by briefly examining the evolution over time that these “pollution exclusion” clauses have
124
undergone.
a) Reasons for the Prevalence of Pollution Exclusion Clauses and
How They Evolved Over Time. It is agreed by most that the primary reason
for today’s proliferation of pollution exclusion clauses was the "enormous
expense and exposure resulting from the ‘explosion’ of environmental litiinjury and property damage claims). But see supra note 113; infra note 125 (both noting that the actual
coverage provided by the policies can be disappointing to insureds).
120 See Prince, supra note 118, at 592 n.195.
121 See Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 123 n.1 (La. 2000) (“Some form of th[e absolute] pollution exclusion [clause] is part of the standard CGL policy purchased by almost all large and
small businesses since the mid-1980s.”); Bryan C. Devine, Recent Decision, The Standard Pollution
Exclusion Clause in Commercial General Liability Insurance Policies Bars Coverage for Personal
Injuries Resulting from On-Site Exposure to Pollutants Discharged Within a Construction Envelope:
Madison Construction Co. v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co., 38 DUQ. L. REV. 949, 958 (2000) (“By
1970, . . . pollution exclusion clauses were a standard feature of virtually all commercial general liability
policies.”).
122 See Ogburn, supra note 116, at 221 n.5 (noting that the standard CGL policy has undergone
several “significant revisions”); see Jim L. Julian & Charles L. Schlumberger, Insurance Coverage for
Environmental Clean-Up Costs Under Comprehensive General Liability Policies, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L.J. 57, 57-59 (1996) (outlining changes made by the ISO to its policies as a response to external
events).
123 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason and Pollution: Correctly Construing the "ABSOLUTE" Exclusion in Context and in Accord with Its Purpose and Party Expectations, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 5 (1998)
(noting that “[today’s] absolute pollution exclusion was drafted during the early 1980s and was incorporated into the standard form CGL in 1986”); Amanda C. Leiter, Note, Environmental Insurance: Does It
Defy the Rules?, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 259, 294 n.173 (2001) (“Significant parts of the 1986 absolute pollution exclusion, and in particular the definition of ‘pollutants’[,] . . . remain unaltered in subsequent versions of the exclusion.”).
124 For the purposes of this Comment, a brief look at the history and purpose of the CGLs’ pollution exclusion clause will suffice. However, for those seeking a more comprehensive study of the myriad changes that have occurred to pollution exclusion clauses since their origin, and the reasons for those
changes, many fine sources exist. See Richardson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 826 A.2d 310, 314-19
(D.C. Cir. 2003), vacated on other grounds by 832 A.2d 752 (2003); Leiter, supra note 123, at 280-84;
Jonathan C. Averback, Comment, Comparing the Old and the New Pollution Exclusion Clauses in
General Liability Insurance Policies: New Language—Same Results?, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 601,
604-10 (1987) (all providing background and historical information on the evolution of the “pollution
exclusion” clause in insurance policies, particularly those promulgated by the ISO).
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125

gation." Even so, the clauses trace back to well over half a century, with
126
the first significant change to them occurring in 1966. Prior to then, CGL
policies provided coverage for bodily injury or property damage caused by
127
"accidents." To complicate things, however, what constituted an accident
was not defined in the policies, which led to much confusion and, ulti128
mately, litigation. Tired of this, in 1966 the ISO replaced the “accident”
trigger with that of the “occurrence” trigger, with “occurrence” being defined as “an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which
results, during the policy period, in bodily injury and property damage that
129
was neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.”
Much to the dismay of the ISO, insurance companies, and insureds, the

125 Weaver v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 674 A.2d 975, 977 (N.H. 1996) (quoting Vantage Dev. Corp.
v. American Environment Technologies Corp., 598 A.2d 948, 953 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991)). It
might seem elementary that insurance companies would try to limit their responsibility to defend or
indemnify claims filed against their insureds, but the extent of the companies’ efforts in the pollution
exclusion context is such that one court had this to say of one insurance carrier who contended that its
policy did not cover asbestos-related risks: “In plain language, [the insurance carrier here] has adopted
the unholy mantra, ‘we collect premiums; we do not pay claims.’” Owens-Illinois v. United Ins. Co.,
625 A.2d 1, 17 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993). And perhaps it is more than just a mere coincidence
that it was in 1986, the same year that the “absolute” pollution exclusion clause was created and that the
“insurance crisis” began, see infra notes 138-139 and accompanying text, that these general insurance
policies became known as “commercial,” rather than “comprehensive,” general liability policies (which,
incidentally, is how they are still referred to as today). See Thomas K. Bick & Lisa G. Youngblood, The
Pollution Exclusion Saga Continues: Does it Apply to Indoor Releases?, 5 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 119, 124
(1997) (noting that 1986 “marked a change in the name of the liability policy from a comprehensive
general liability policy to a commercial general liability policy”); Kenneth S. Abraham, The Rise and
Fall of Commercial Liability Insurance, 87 VA. L. REV. 85, 89 (2001) (deducing that the 1986 name
change of CGL policies from comprehensive to commercial “can only be assumed [to have been] an
effort to eliminate the disadvantage that insurers faced in litigation over whether there was coverage
under a ‘comprehensive’ policy’”).
126 See American States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 79-80 (Ill. 1997) (stating that “in
response [to various events,] the insurance industry [significantly] revised the CGL policy in 1966”).
127 See Center for Creative Studies v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 871 F. Supp. 941, 943 n.3 (E.D.
Mich. 1994) (explaining how CGL policies went from being “accident-based” to “occurrence-based” in
1966).
128 See id. at 944 (“The biggest interpretation issue to date has been over what the terms ‘sudden’
and ‘accidental’ [in CGL policies] mean.”). The courts certainly did their part in ensuring uncertainty as
to the meaning of “accident,” for the word took vastly different connotations depending on which court
was deciding the issue. See E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through the
Looking Glass, 74 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1243 (1986) (“The courts ignored the insurers’ intentions by formulating a variety of definitions for the word ‘accident.’”). For example, some courts took the clause at
face value and precluded coverage for losses that were foreseeable because, they reasoned, something
that is foreseeable could not have happened “accidentally,” i.e., suddenly. See id. Other courts took an
opposite approach and concluded that just because something was foreseeable did not mean it could not
be “accidental,” and in support of their stance, would cite to negligent acts as an example; these were
“accidental” in the sense that they were not done with intent, but could still be deemed foreseeable. See
id.
129 Morton Int’l v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 849 (N.J. 1993).
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1966 change did not entirely eliminate the confusion over under which cir130
cumstances the pollution exclusion clause applied.
At around the same time of the 1966 revision, Congress passed sub131
stantial amendments to the Clean Air Act, which had the effect, inter alia,
of imposing greater economic burdens on insurance underwriters, particu132
larly those providing standard-form CGL policies. These burdens were
increased yet further by contemporaneous and well-publicized environ133
mental disasters, such as Times Beach and Love Canal. Mainly because
of these events, in 1970 the ISO promulgated the first “true” pollution ex134
clusion clause, which, in pertinent part, provided:
[This policy shall not apply to bodily injury or property damage] arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors,
soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land,
the atmosphere or any watercourse or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is
135
sudden and accidental.

130 See Koloms, 687 N.E.2d at 80 (“Despite [the 1966] changes, courts continued to construe the
policy to cover damages resulting from long-term, gradual exposure to environmental pollution.”); see
Sharon M. Murphy, Note, The "Sudden and Accidental" Exception to the Pollution Exclusion Clause in
Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies: The Gordian Knot of Environmental Liability, 45
VAND. L. REV. 161, 165-67 (1992) (describing the reasons for the 1966 revision, and how the change did
not have the intended effect the insurance industry had hoped for).
131 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2003).
132 See Pittsburg, 768 F. Supp. at 1469 n.8 (recognizing that “sweeping legislation” passed by
Congress, including the Clean Air Act, led to an increase in the adoption of pollution exclusion clauses
by insurers).
133 See Aetna Life, 871 F. Supp. at 941 (noting that the Times Beach and Love Canal incidents
served as an impetus for the adoption of pollution exclusion clauses). In Love Canal, which is located
near Niagara Falls, New York, a public school and residential subdivisions were unwittingly built in the
1950s on top of reclaimed land that had previously been used by Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corporation as a dumpsite for chemical wastes. See Jill E. Evans, Challenging the Racism in Environmental
Racism: Redefining the Concept of Intent, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1219, 1237 n.86 (1998). Public authorities
later discovered that the town’s water supply had been contaminated by the chemicals, resulting in the
ultimate evacuation of hundreds of families and an almost complete devaluation of the area’s property
value. See id.
A similarly disastrous situation occurred in Times Beach, Missouri, where in 1971, a waste oil
dealer sprayed contaminated oil on Times Beach’s dirt roads in an extremely misguided attempt to keep
the dust down. See id. at 1237 n.87. Times Beach residents were unaware of the danger for years, even
though virtually all households in the area started experiencing somewhat rare health problems. See id.
In 1982, the government, aware of the potentially deadly consequences, recommended a property buyout of the area, and since then, all of Times Beach’s residents, numbering over 2000 in all, have moved
out. See id.
134 See Koloms, 687 N.E.2d at 81 (explaining that “the insurance industry drafting organizations
began in 1970 the process of drafting and securing regulatory approval for the standard pollutionexclusion clause," and that “[t]he result of these efforts was the addition of an [early pollution exclusion
clause] to the standard-form CGL policy in 1970”).
135 Devine, supra note 121, at 959 n.74 (emphasis added).
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As will be explained shortly, the ISO’s attempt to reduce confusion
over the pollution exclusion clause’s applicability to particular factual situations by adding the phrase “sudden and accidental” was not as successful as
the organization would have hoped.
b) Interpretative Issues Associated With Pollution Exclusion
Clauses. Somewhat predictably, the next intensely debated issue over the
next decade or so pertaining to pollution exclusion clauses was the meaning
136
of “sudden and accidental,” leading one commentator to describe this
issue as one of “the most hotly litigated insurance coverage questions of the
137
late 1980’s." Partly because of this, in 1986 (the exact year that the “in138
surance crisis” peaked) the ISO felt compelled to yet again change its
pollution exclusion clause, this time to a version that was to be dubbed the
139
“absolute” pollution exclusion clause:
It is agreed that this policy does not apply to personal injury or property damage arising out of the contamination of the environment by
pollutants introduced at any time into or upon land, the atmosphere or
any watercourse or body of water or aquifer. This exclusion applies
whether or not the contamination is introduced into the environment
intentionally or accidentally or gradually or suddenly and whether or
not the insured or any other person or organization is responsible for
140
the contamination.

136 See Koloms, 687 N.E.2d at 80 (“During the next 13 years, various courts labored over the exact
meaning of the words ‘sudden and accidental.’”).
137 JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS: LAW AND STRATEGY FOR
INSURERS AND POLICYHOLDERS 825 (1994). Much of the litigation focused on whether the word "sudden" should be given a strictly temporal meaning, i.e., whether in order for the exception to apply, the
discharge of pollution had to have been “abrupt.” See Koloms, 687 N.E.2d at 80-81.
138 See Kathleen E. Payne, Linking Tort Reform to Fairness and Moral Values, 1995 DET. C.L.
REV. 1207, 1220 (1995) (“The year 1986 is viewed as the peak of the insurance crisis, a time when the
cost of liability insurance skyrocketed and the availability of coverage for some products and services
disappeared altogether.”); see generally Richard N. Clarke et al., Perspectives on the Insurance Crisis:
Sources of the Crisis in Liability Insurance: An Economic Analysis, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 367 (1988) (providing background information on the insurance crisis and some of its possible causes). But see Peter A.
Lefkin, Perspectives on the Insurance Crisis: Shattering Some Myths on the Insurance Liability Crisis:
A Comment on the Article by Clarke, Warren-Boulton, Smith, and Simon, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 417 (1988)
(questioning the existence of an “insurance crisis,” at least as to the full extent claimed by insurers).
139 See Koloms, 687 N.E.2d at 81 (“[Around 1985,] insurance companies responded [to the confusion over ‘sudden and accidental’ by drafting a new version of the [pollution] exclusion [clause], which .
. . is now commonly known as the ‘absolute pollution exclusion.’”).
140 Amy Timmer, Are They Lying Now or Were They Lying Then? The Insurance Industry’s Ambiguous Pollution Exclusion: Why the Insurer, and not the Innocent Insured, Should Pay for Pollution
Caused by Prior Landowners, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 355, 375 n.72 (1994). As noted earlier, these and
other forms of insurance are updated every so often, see supra note 122 and accompanying text, so
naturally, variations of the “absolute” exclusion language exist. For example, another fairly common
version provides that “[t]his insurance does not apply to . . . [b]odily [i]njury or [p]roperty [d]amage
arising out of the actual, alleged, or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants at or
from premises you own, rent or occupy.” Bick, supra note 125, at 124. However, the original “abso-
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While one might think that the 1986 pollution exclusion clause would
have provided a “rock solid” defense for insurers, one feature of the clause,
141
that being its definition of the term “pollutant,” served to allow insurers’
liability and confusion over the clause to live on. Today’s standard definition characterizes “pollutant” as “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
142
chemicals, and waste.” Furthermore, some policies include more specific
pollution exclusion clauses that focus on a type or class of pollutants, in
143
particular asbestos. For instance, the court in Highlands Insurance Com144
pany v. Celotex Corporation was charged with determining whether asbestos exclusion policies applied only to asbestosis, or to all asbestos145
146
related diseases. One of the policies at issue provided that “[t]his policy shall not apply to any liability arising out of ASBESTOSIS and related
147
diseases arising out of asbestos products." The court ultimately concluded
that this policy was meant to exclude all asbestos-related diseases, partly by
148
relying on the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

lute” clause quoted in the full text above continues to form the basis for the ones existing today. See
supra note 123 and accompanying text (stating as much).
141 William Goldfarb et al., Unsafe Sewage Sludge or Beneficial Biosolids?: Liability, Planning,
and Management Issues Regarding the Land Application of Sewage Treatment Residuals, 26 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 687, 757 (1999).
142 Id.
143 See, e.g., Walter G. Wright, Jr. & Stephanie M. Irby, The Transactional Challenges Posed by
Mold: Risk Management and Allocation Issues, 56 ARK. L. REV. 295, 354 n.366 (2003) (stating that
“[m]any policies exclude coverage for indoor contaminants such as asbestos, lead-based paint, and
mold”); Redmond v. State Farm Ins. Co., 728 A.2d 1202, 1204 (D.C. 1999) (noting that “State Farm [, a
prominent insurance company,] ha[s] excluded lead paint coverage since August 24, 1987”). Further
support lies in the fact that it has traditionally been difficult, if not impossible, to obtain insurance for
certain substances such as asbestos. See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d
1178, 1202 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that “no coverage was available for asbestos claims after 1985”);
Nicholas J. Guiliano, Comment, The Sudden and Accidental Exception to the Pollution Exclusion Solution?, 13 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 261, 280 (1994) (“[T]oday[,] virtually no one can obtain pollution
insurance at any price.”).
Interestingly, some courts have actually suggested that insurance companies should (or at least
could) be a bit more detailed and careful in the drafting of their pollution exclusion clauses in order to
increase the clauses’ effectiveness. See, e.g., Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 667 A.2d 617, 624 n.3 (Md.
1995) (“To be sure that lead paint poisoning claims were excluded from coverage, Allstate [an insurance
company] could have included a provision . . . explicitly excluding such claims.”).
144 Highlands Ins. Co. v. Celotex Corp., 743 F. Supp. 28 (D. D.C. 1990).
145 Id. at 29.
146 There were actually fourteen different exclusion clauses before the court that had been issued
from several different insurance companies, but all of the clauses were similar to one another. See id. at
30-31.
147 Id. at 30 n.12.
148 See id. at 32-33. The collateral estoppel doctrine essentially acts to prohibit parties from relitigating issues that were already decided by a court or administrative body. See Jerald D. Stubbs,
Fighting Fraud Illustrated: The Robins AFB Case, 38 A.F. L. REV. 141, 168 (1994) (“The doctrine of
collateral estoppel precludes relitigating issues of fact or law actually litigated and determined in a prior
lawsuit . . . . The effect of collateral estoppel attaches not only to judicial proceedings, but also to ad-
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Similarly, in In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation, it fell to the
court to determine whether an insurance carrier that had issued a policy
expressly excluding asbestos from coverage was entitled to summary judgment on the issue of being liable to the plaintiffs’ claims of injuries stem150
ming from exposure to asbestos. The policy at hand, which was issued by
151
United National Insurance Company (“United”), provided in part that
“[the] insurance does not apply to any liability arising out of . . . ingesting
or prolonged physical exposure to asbestos or goods of products containing
asbestos [, or t]he manufacture, sale, storage or disposal of asbestos or
152
goods or products containing asbestos.” The court found that the policy’s
“clear and unambiguous” language precluded United from being liable to
153
the plaintiffs.
As these last two cases help to demonstrate, the meaning of pollutant
154
has and continues to be heavily litigated, and as will be shown later, this
155
may prove to be one of the key issues in mixed-dust cases.
In summary, the most obvious effect, as well as the intent of insurers,
behind the creation the “absolute” pollution exclusion clauses (which re156
mains the standard today), as well the more specific pollution exclusion
ministrative proceedings if certain conditions are met.”). Virtually all courts use the doctrine in one way
or another. See Eugene R. Anderson & Nadia V. Holober, Preventing Inconsistencies in Litigation with
a Spotlight on Insurance Coverage Litigation: The Doctrines of Judicial Estoppel, Equitable Estoppel,
Quasi-Estoppel, Collateral Estoppel, "MEND the Hold," "FRAUD on the Court" and Judicial and
Evidentiary Admissions, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 589, 680 (1997-98) (“Most courts and the Restatement,
Second, of Judgments apply collateral estoppel [when the proper conditions are met] . . . . “).
149 In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 96-968, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13383 (E.D. La. Sept. 2,
1997).
150 See id. at *3-5. There were actually three unique policies issued from three different carriers at
issue, see id., but only the policy dealing with asbestos merits attention here.
151 Id. at *30. United is an insurance carrier based out of Pennsylvania and handles many different
types of policies.
See Pa. Ins. Dep’t, Company Information, available at
http://www.insurance.state.pa.us/cgi/gfsearch.pl?level=2&item=gf1581 (last modified Feb. 10, 2006;
last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
152 In re Asbestos Prods., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13383 at *30-31.
153 See id. at *31-32.
154 See Kurt C. Schultheis, Sullins v. Allstate: Lead Paint and the Growing Ambiguity of the Pollution Exclusion Clause, 27 U. BALT. L. REV. 475, 493-94 (1998) (noting that “the pivotal issue current
courts often face [when dealing with CGLs] revolves around defining pollutants” and that
“[c]onsiderable debate surrounds the legally operative meaning of the word [pollutant]"); see also infra
note 159 (discussing issues related to the precise scope of pollution exclusion clauses).
155 See generally infra Parts II.C.1.e, III.A.2-4 (analyzing the key issue of what constitutes a
pollutant within the meaning of pollution exclusion clauses, and how courts’ interpretation of the word
might impact the filing of mixed-dust claims).
156 See supra note 123 and accompanying text. Not only does the language of the 1986 “absolute”
clause provide the basis for today’s pollution exclusion clauses, see id., but it also replaced prior versions upon and since its release, see, e.g., Mark G. Cooper, Survey, Annual Survey of Michigan Law,
June 1, 1999–May 31, 2000: Insurance Law, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 601, 645 n.286 (2001) (stating that the
“sudden and accidental exclusion has now nearly universally been replaced by the . . . ‘absolute pollution’ exclusion [clause].”); see also supra note 139 and accompanying text (noting that the absolute
pollution exclusion clause continues to play a tremendous role in insurance policies today).
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of the type just examined, was to eliminate any exceptions to the pollution
157
While the
exclusion by removing the “sudden and accidental” proviso.
fairly straightforward language of the “absolute” pollution exclusion clause
did not prove to be the “elixir” that insurers had hoped, it did serve to alle158
viate litigation concerning the clauses somewhat. But given that history
is a great predictor of the future, the precise application and meaning of
today’s policies, as was the case with the 1986 and other versions, will
likely continue to be a source of much dispute and confusion in the
159
160
courts. Since the 1986 revision remains the standard today, it is necessary to examine under what circumstances courts have upheld the use of
such clauses, and how they have been interpreted. This, in turn, requires a
look into general principles of insurance policy interpretation.
c) Legal Principles Pertaining to Insurance Interpretation. At the
outset, it must be noted that insurance policies, generally speaking, are considered to be normal contracts, and thus are interpreted as any other con161
tract would be. As one court has noted, “[t]he goal of interpreting an insurance policy is to ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the
162
language of the written instrument.” This means that courts tend to uphold insurance clauses as valid without regard to whether they are “fair” or
163
not.
The Alabama Supreme Court recognized the majority rule when it
157

See, e.g., Weaver, 674 A.2d at 977.
See Leiter, supra note 123, at 293-97 (listing interpretative issues in CGL policies that were
eliminated or reduced by the adoption of the absolute pollution exclusion clause).
159 See, e.g., Bick, supra note 125, at 119 (noting that “[a] new universe of debate is on the rise,
namely, the application of . . . the ‘absolute’ pollution exclusions to indoor releases of pollutants”);
Leiter, supra note 123, at 295 (“[T]he [1986] revised pollution exclusion is not as absolute as the insurance industry no doubt hoped. Several terms remain ambiguous, including the all-important terms ‘discharge, dispersal, release or escape,’ and ‘pollutants.’”); see also text accompanying supra note 141;
supra note 154 and accompanying text (stating that interpretative issues pertaining to pollution exclusion clauses, such as the meaning of “pollutant,” remain a problem).
160 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
161 See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Zen Design Group, Ltd., 329 F.3d 546, 553 (6th Cir. 2003) (“In
general, interpretation of insurance policies is governed by the same principles used to interpret ordinary
contracts.”).
162 Riccio v. American Republic Ins. Co., 683 A.2d 1226, 1231 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (internal
quotations omitted). This is buttressed by the “general rule that an insurance company has the right to
limit the coverage of a policy issued by it and when it has done so, the plain language of the limitation
must be respected.” Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Fibreboard Corp., 227 Cal. Rptr. 203, 205 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986).
163 See, e.g., Tate v. Allstate Ins. Co., 692 So. 2d 822, 824 (Ala. 1997) (“[A c]ourt must not rewrite
[an insurance] policy so as to include or exclude coverage that was not intended.”). Of course, this does
not mean that courts will blindly “rubber stamp” any insurance policy without regard to its content. In
particular, if a court deems that an insurance policy is contrary to public policy, which has been described as “a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry
you,” Story v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 156 So. 101, 103 (Fla. 1934), then the policy will be declared void, and thus unenforceable. See, e.g., Burt v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 187 U.S. 362 (1902)
(declaring life insurance policy procured by a man after he was convicted and sentenced to be executed
to be against public policy, as his beneficiaries would benefit from his committing crimes); Tate, 692 So.
158
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wrote that “[i]t is a GENERALLY accepted principle that if there is no ambiguity in an INSURANCE POLICY, a court is bound to enforce the policy as
164
written and cannot ignore express provisions of the contract.” One court
stated this more bluntly:
A court may not "rewrite" an insurance contract, or construe clear and
unambiguous language to mean other than what it says. An insured
will not be heard to complain that his reasonable expectations were
165
frustrated by policy terms which are clear and unambiguous.
Although the preceding method of interpreting insurance agreements,
166
which is typically referred to as “four corners” or formalistic approach,
167
represents the majority rule, another widely used and competing system
exists, known as the “reasonable expectations” (sometimes referred to as
168
the “functional”) approach. As its name suggests, under the “reasonable

2d 822 (holding that insurance providing coverage for award of punitive damages was contrary to public
policy, as honoring it would have thwarted the rationale of punitive damages).
Even so, courts are usually reticent to strike down insurance contracts on public policy grounds.
See, e.g., T.H.E. Ins. Co. v. DeMutis, No. 98-1683, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1561, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
17, 1999) (“Generally[,] insurance companies are free to decide what risks to undertake and what risks
to reject. The power of courts to formulate pronouncements of public policy is sharply restricted; otherwise they would become judicial legislatures rather than instrumentalities for the interpretation of law.”)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
164 Tate, 692 So. 2d at 824.
165 Riccio, 683 A.2d at 1231 (internal citations omitted); accord Fibreboard, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 205
(“In reviewing the terms of an insurance policy, courts must interpret the words according to their plain
meaning . . . and will not adopt a strained or absurd interpretation in order to create an ambiguity where
none exists.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
166 See, e.g., Collins v. Farmers Ins. Co., 822 P.2d 1146, 1159 (Or. 1991):
Under [this] approach, the court looks to the “four corners” of the insurance policy . . . [and t]he
insured is held to have read and to have understood the clear language of the policy. Extrinsic evidence relating to the insurance contract may [only] be examined for the purpose of determining the
parties’ intention to an objective analysis of the "four corners" of the contract.
Id. at 1159 (internal citations omitted); see generally Keith A. Rowley, Contract Construction and
Interpretation: From the "Four Corners" to Parol Evidence (and Everything in Between), 69 MISS. L.J.
73 (1999) (providing background on the various interpretative techniques that courts employ when
dealing with contracts, including the “four corners” approach).
167 See, e.g., Duff Supply Co. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6383, No. 968481, at *12-13 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 1997) (describing the “four corners” test in the context of insurance
interpretation and stating that “[it] is the majority rule”).
168 See, e.g., Collins, 822 P.2d at 1159 (“Two competing decisional approaches to interpreting
insurance contracts have evolved [, including] the ‘functional’ or ‘reasonable expectation’ approach.”);
see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Domtar Baby: Misplaced Notions of Equitable Apportionment Create a
Thicket of Potential Unfairness for Insurance Policyholders, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 769, 848 (1999)
(noting that “Minnesota, like many [other] states, has adopted in [some] form the ‘reasonable expectations’ approach [in interpreting CGL policies]”). Significantly, comment e to section 211 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) seems to endorse the “reasonable expectation” method in interpreting insurance contracts, as it provides that “[a]part from government regulation, courts in construing
and applying a standardized contract [including insurance policies] seek to effectuate the reasonable
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expectation” method, “objectively reasonable expectations of applicants
and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will
be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would
169
have negated those expectations.” It could thus be said that the “reasonable expectations” doctrine is more of a results-oriented, rather than a true
170
interpretive, approach. Essentially, courts that have adopted the “reasonable expectations” approach will go out of their way, even “bend over
171
backward,” to find coverage for insureds, even though neither the policy
172
nor the insurer intended for the coverage to exist.

expectations of the average member of the public who accepts it.” See also id. cmt. e, illus. 4 (suggesting that policy-holder should be provided coverage under policy “without regard to his knowledge or
understanding of the quoted language at the time of contracting”). Even so, some courts, such as the
Florida Supreme Court, adamantly oppose the doctrine:
We decline to adopt the doctrine of reasonable expectations . . . . To apply the doctrine to an unambiguous provision would be to rewrite the contract and the basis upon which the premiums are
charged . . . . [Furthermore, c]onstruing insurance policies upon a determination as to whether the
insured’s subjective expectations are reasonable can only lead to uncertainty and unnecessary litigation . . . . [We also note that] after more than twenty years of attention to the doctrine in various
forms by different courts, there is still great uncertainty as to the theoretical underpinnings of the
doctrine, its scope, and the details of its application.
Deni Assocs. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So. 2d 1135, 1140 (1998); see also Peter Nash
Swisher, Symposium Introduction, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1998) (stating that “a number of . . . commentators have been critical of the [doctrine], and [many] courts have expressly rejected [it]”).
169 Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions: Part I, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 961, 967 (1970). The formal birth of the “reasonable expectations” doctrine has been attributed
to then-professor of law (now Judge) Keeton’s influential article on the subject. See Swisher, supra note
168, at 1-8 (describing the origins of the controversial approach).
170 See Swisher, supra note 168, at 5 (describing the doctrine as being “result-oriented” as opposed
to the “more traditional [f]ormalistic insurance contract analysis”). It should also be noted that there are
several variations to the approach, and the Arizona Supreme Court had an occasion to note some of the
more common ones:
1) Where the contract terms, although not ambiguous to the court, cannot be understood by the
reasonably intelligent consumer who might check on his or her rights, the court will interpret them
in light of the objective, reasonable expectations of the average insured.
2) Where the insured did not receive full and adequate notice of the term in question, and the provision is either unusual or unexpected, or one that emasculates apparent coverage.
3) Where some activity which [sic] can be reasonably attributed to the insurer would create an objective impression of coverage in the mind of a reasonable insured.
4) Where some activity reasonably attributable to the insurer has induced a particular insured reasonably to believe that he has coverage, although such coverage is expressly and unambiguously
denied by the policy.
Gordinier v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 742 P.2d 277, 283-85 (1987) (internal citations omitted).
171 Tracey Cordes, Who Gets the Bill?: Determining Insurers’ Duty to Defend and Indemnify
Against Hazardous Waste Clean-up Costs Under General Liability Policies, 18 ENVTL. L. 931, 951
(1988).
172 See generally Stephen J. Ware, Comment, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461 (1989) (questioning the motives and correctness of the approach, and providing
examples of how courts seemingly ignore express language in policies in their quests to find insurers
liable for coverage). For anyone seeking more material on the controversy regarding the reasonable
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Returning now to the majority rule, a corollary of the “four corners”
approach is that “[a] policy is not made ambiguous by the fact that the par173
And especially important for our
ties interpret the policy differently.”
purposes is that the rule applies equally to exclusion clauses found within
insurance policies, i.e., as long as they are unambiguous and do not violate
public policy, they will be upheld by courts employing the majority ap174
proach.
In particular, many courts have upheld the “absolute” pollution
175
exclusion clauses, such as the 1986 ISO one. According to one commen176
tator, at least two reasons exist for this: First, pollution exclusion clauses
are necessary for insurance companies to be able to “continue to serve their
177
function of providing economic stability to their insureds;” Second, the
absence of the clauses might lead to intentional or careless pollution by
insureds, because they would know that their insurer(s) would be obligated
178
to defend them in any action related to pollutants. But at least one more
reason exists: Placing the financial responsibility for pollution that may
occur gradually over time on the insured makes sense, since the insured is
the party that is in the most advantageous situation to guard against such
179
pollution.
Although the preceding makes it apparent that insurance contracts, including pollution exclusion clauses, are, for the most part, upheld as written
by the courts, the general rule is tempered by the constructive principle
expectations doctrine, one excellent source to consult is Swisher, supra note 168 (providing general
information on the doctrine and listing many law review articles and pieces both advocating and disparaging its use).
173 Tate, 692 So. 2d at 824.
174 See, e.g., DeMutis, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1561, at *7 (“Explicit and unambiguous exclusions
contained in insurance policies will be upheld.”); Knight v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 92-2244, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3760, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 24, 1993) (“When [they are] clear and unambiguous, [insurance]
exclusions are upheld.”).
175 See, e.g., Alcolac, Inc. v. California Union Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1546, 1549 (D. Md. 1989)
(“This pollution exclusion [clause] is just what it purports to be—absolute—and the Court perceives no
reason why [the insurer] should be denied the benefit of its bargain with [the insured], as reflected in the
insurance contract.”) (emphasis added); see also Schultheis, supra note 154, at 493 (noting that “[c]ourts
tend to uphold and enforce pollution exclusion clauses”). The 1986 clause is reproduced in the text
accompanying supra note 140.
176 See Schultheis, supra note 154, at 493 (stating that courts principally rely on “two [unique]
public policy rationales” to uphold pollution exclusion clauses).
177 Id.; see also Nancer Ballard & Peter M. Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy of the Comprehensive General Liability Pollution Exclusion, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 610, 628 (1990) (stating that
“[f]rom a public and regulatory point of view, CGL insurance is designed to promote business stability”).
178 See Schultheis, supra note 154, at 493. This concern was shared by the Supreme Court of
North Carolina: “Relaxed vigilance is even more likely where the insured knows that the intentional
deposit of toxic material in his dumpsters, so long as it is unexpected, affords him coverage. In this case,
it pays the insured to keep his head in the sand.” Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins.
Co., 340 S.E.2d 374, 381 (1986).
179 See Peerless, 340 S.E.2d at 381 (noting that the insured is “the party with the most control over
the circumstances most likely to cause the pollution”).

73

138

FIU Law Review

[1:107

180

known as contra proferentum that courts often employ when interpreting
181
contracts. Essentially, this doctrine holds that any ambiguities in a document are to be construed against the drafter, which in this context are obvi182
ously insurance companies. The rationale most often cited for this principle is that since it is the drafting party that is in the most advantageous
position to secure favorable terms for it and to reduce confusing language in
the document that could be construed against the party’s interests, common
sense and fairness dictate that any ambiguities should be resolved in favor
183
of the non-drafting party. Because insurance policies, including even the
so-called “absolute” pollution exclusion clauses, are often deemed ambigu184
ous, the contra proferentum principle is one of great importance in insurance law. Indeed, one authority has labeled it "the most familiar expres185
sion in the reports of insurance cases,” and virtually every state recog186
nizes the principle.
Having examined in general terms some of the contract law principles
that apply to the interpretation of insurance policies, we can now examine
how courts have actually used these principles in resolving some of the
more common issues that arise in connection with CGL policies, including
187
the prevalent pollution exclusion clauses.

180 In Latin, literally “against the offeror.” Klapp v. United Ins. Group Agency, Inc., 663 N.W.2d
447, 455 n.12 (Mich. 2003).
181 See, e.g., In re Celotex Corp., 196 B.R. 973, 1003 n.210 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (Labeling the maxim
as “the most prominent rule of construction in insurance law”).
182 See Gregory T. Lawrence, Note, Sheets v. Brethren Mutual: Maryland’s High Court Misconstrues CGL to Cover Excluded Economic Loss Caused by Negligent Misrepresentation, 27 U. BALT. L.
REV. 189, 194 n.24 (1997) (describing the contra proferentum doctrine, particularly in the context of
insurance policy interpretation).
183 See generally David S. Miller, Note, Insurance as Contract: The Argument for Abandoning the
Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1849 (1988) (providing background on the creation and reasons
for the contra proferentum doctrine). The use of contra proferentum in the context of insurance policies
is also sometimes justified on the ground that insurance policies essentially amount to contracts of
adhesion, thus placing courts in the unenviable position of having to “police” the policies to prevent
unfairness. See Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255, 1260 (N.J. 1992) (“[B]ecause
insurance policies are adhesion contracts, courts must assume a particularly vigilant role in ensuring
their conformity to public policy and principles of fairness.”); see Ware, supra note 172, at 1463-66
(listing factors applicable to insurance policies that are seen by courts as indicia of adhesion contracts,
and describing how courts have dealt with the problem).
184 See, e.g., supra notes 154, 159 and accompanying text.
185 2 GEORGE COUCH ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 15:74, 334 (rev. ed. 1984); see also note
182 and accompanying text (noting that many courts rely on the doctrine when called on to interpret
insurance policies).
186 See, e.g., Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 538-39 (9th Cir. 1990) (“According to the law of California and, indeed, every other state as well as the District of Columbia, ambiguities in insurance contracts must be construed against the insurer.”).
187 Addressing every possible contemporary interpretative issue stemming from pollution exclusion (and there are possibly hundreds of them, see Leiter, supra note 123, at 283 n.120 (recognizing that
“more than 800 disputes relating to pollution exclusion clauses in CGL policies have been litigated since
1970”)) is neither possible nor necessary for the purposes of this Comment. Rather, certain key issues
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d) Determining the Applicability of Pollution Exclusion Clauses to
Particular Factual Situations. As a preliminary matter, and contrary to
what many might think, most cases involving pollution exclusion clauses
188
do not hinge on the overall validity of the clauses; rather, courts are typically asked to resolve narrower issues, perhaps chief among which is the
189
applicability of a clause to the fact pattern before it. Probably the threshold issue that must be decided is whether the CGL policy in question is
190
“occurrence-based” or “claims-made,” for this may single-handedly determine whether and to what extent the insured will be provided coverage
191
under the CGL. Under an occurrence-based policy, the policy that was in
effect at the time of the event that gave rise to the claim will control, re192
gardless of when the insured posts its claim with the insurance carrier.
Thus, for example, if a coal miner who between the years of 1975-1977 was
exposed to pneumoconiosis-developing agents and who develops an illness
several years later sues his employer in 1988, and the company then seeks
indemnification or other assistance from the insurance carrier, the policy
that would determine the extent, if any, of the carrier’s responsibility would
be the one(s) in place between 1975-1977, the time of when the event that
led to the claim took place.
In contrast, under a claims-based structure, the policy that was in effect at the time the insured files its claims with the carrier will determine
193
what coverage, if any, exists. This, of course, is desirable from the insurance companies’ point of view in the context of pollution exclusion clauses,
for the more recent the CGL policy is, the less likely it is that the insured
194
will be provided coverage.
So, to vary slightly our previous example
involving the miner, if the mining company’s insurance policy was a
claims-made one, then the controlling policy would have been the one in
place in 1988. This might very well preclude the carrier from being liable,
as 1986 marked the year when the insurance industry began adopting the
that seem to be litigated fairly frequently will be discussed in order to demonstrate, and possibly predict,
how courts might resolve pollution exclusion cases.
188 See Schultheis, supra note 154, at 493 (“Litigation concerning the current pollution exclusion
clause focuses less on the clause’s general validity or whether the facts supporting the underlying claim
meet the definition of an occurrence.”).
189 See, e.g., supra notes 154, 159 and accompanying text (providing examples of issues courts
must resolve in the context of pollution exclusion clauses).
190 See Julian, supra note 122, at 60 (“Determining the applicable policy begins by ascertaining
whether the CGL policy is a claims made policy or an occurrence policy.”).
191 See id. (“This first step of determining [whether] the applicable policy [is based on the occurrence or claims made trigger] can be critical to evaluating the case for coverage.”).
192 See id. Determining the exact time of the occurrence is not always so simple. See id. at 61.
193 See id. at 60.
194 See generally Part II.C.1.a (explaining various changes that CGL policies have undergone,
including the reasons for them and how they have lessened insurers’ liability); see also Hartford, 509
U.S. at 770-78 (describing interests of insurance companies and some of the tactics used to accomplish
them).
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195

Incidentally, the most prevalent
“absolute” pollution exclusion clauses.
196
type of policy today is “claims-made,” which has done wonders from the
insurance carriers’ point of view to cut down on their liability towards in197
sureds. This decrease in liability was magnified by the insurance companies’ successful insistence on the inclusion of a retroactive provision that
198
transformed former occurrence-based policies into claims-made ones.
e) The Meaning of “Pollutant” Within Pollution Exclusion Clauses.
Another important and oft-litigated interpretative issue associated with pol199
lution exclusion clauses is the meaning of “pollutant,” for this may very
well determine whether the clause will serve to spare the insurer from li200
201
ability. Although the word is typically defined in CGL policies, courts
nonetheless often find themselves faced with the task of determining
202
whether a specific type of pollutant is covered under a CGL. One substance whose status as a pollutant has spawned considerable dispute is lead
203
paint, but among the many other materials that have been alleged by in204
surance companies to be pollutants are carpet dye used in a private home,

195

See supra notes 123, 125, 156 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Julian, supra note 122, at 59 (“Prior to the 1980s, most CGL policies were [occurrence-based]. Since then, virtually all CGL policies take the [claims-made] form.”); Ian Ayres and Peter
Siegelman, The Economics of the Insurance Antitrust Suits: Toward an Exclusionary Theory, 63 TUL. L.
REV. 971, 974 (1989) (“New CGL forms are written on a claims-made rather than an occurrence basis.”).
197 See Ayres, supra note 196, at 976 (“The move to a claims-made form . . . eliminated the insured’s coverage for prospective claims made after the expiration of a current policy, the so-called long
tail risk.”); Julian, supra note 122, at 59 (“[E]stablishing an earlier occurrence policy as the applicable
policy is more likely to result in coverage than under a later claims made policy.”); see generally Hartford, 509 U.S. 764 (describing the insurance industry’s motivations for changing policies from being
occurrence-based to claims-made, and the effects of this change).
198 Ayres, supra note 196, at 975:
196

The movement to the claims-made form by itself would not have eliminated insurers’ liability for
[all] past injuries . . . . To eliminate their responsibility for these past risks, however, insurance
companies changed the CGL forms to include a retroactive provision. This provision ended insurance companies’ liability for injuries that occurred before a certain date, typically the start of the
policy term.
Id.; see also Hartford, 509 U.S. at 771 (“[T]he [insurance industry] wanted the ‘claims-made’ policy to
have a ‘retroactive date’ provision, which would further restrict coverage to claims based on incidents
that occurred after a certain date.”).
199 See supra notes 154, 159 and accompanying text.
200 See Schultheis, supra note 154, at 494 (“[T]he pivotal issue current courts often face revolves
around defining pollutants because once something is deemed a pollutant, coverage is barred by the
absolute pollution exclusion clause.”); see also infra notes 213-17 (describing case where the court
concluded that insurance carrier was not liable on a suit alleging injuries caused by exposure to lead
paint after finding that lead was a “pollutant” within the meaning of the carrier’s insurance policy).
201 See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 154, 159 and accompanying text.
203 See Schultheis, supra note 154 (analyzing cases that involved the issue of whether lead paint
was a “pollutant” under insurance policies).
204 Regent Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 835 F. Supp. 579 (D. Kan. 1993).
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205

flooring material used in a chicken processing plant, sand that blew from
206
a construction site, and carbon monoxide expelled from a residential
207
bathroom heater.
As explained earlier, courts will apply general principles of contract
208
interpretation when analyzing insurance policies, and pollution exclusion
209
Accordingly, when required to interpret the
clauses are no exception.
definition of pollutant in a CGL policy, the first step courts take is to deter210
mine whether the policy is ambiguous. As it turns out, courts addressing
the issue often find ambiguity in the language of CGL policies, particularly
211
as to the meaning of pollutant. However, when a court finds that no ambiguity in the policy exists and that the policy’s pollutant definition encom212
passes the substance in question, the insurance company will prevail.
This was precisely the case in St. Leger v. American Fire & Casualty Insur213
ance Company, where the court had to determine whether lead paint was
214
The court
a pollutant under the applicable pollution exclusion clause.
found that the pollution exclusion clause was not ambiguous, and that the
215
clause’s definition of pollutant included lead paint. In support of its conclusion, the court found persuasive another opinion in which the court had
216
The St.
found that “lead is a chemical that irritates and contaminates."
Leger decision was based on several additional factors, including that ingestion of dust in homes containing lead released by lead paint is the most
common cause of lead poisoning in children and that Congress has identi-

205

West American Ins. Co. v. Tufco Flooring East, Inc., 409 S.E.2d 692 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991).
Molton, Allen & Williams, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 95 (Ala. 1977).
207 Thompson v. Temple, 580 So. 2d 1133 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
208 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
209 See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 28 F. Supp. 2d 440, 445 (E.D. Mich. 1998)
(court noting that “[t]he general rules of contract construction dictate[d]” its construction of the pollution exclusion clause in question).
210 See, e.g., id. at 444 (“If a contract is clear and unambiguous, the court must enforce the contract
as written, according to its plain meaning, without looking to extrinsic evidence. It is improper for the
court to ignore the plain meaning of the policy’s language in favor of a technical or strained construction.”) (internal citations omitted); see also supra notes 163-165 and accompanying text (recognizing
this tendency by the courts).
211 See supra notes 154, 158-59, 187-88 and accompanying text (addressing some interpretative
issues that arise in connection with CGL policies).
212 See, e.g., Schultheis, supra note 154, at 486-87 (“From the policy alone, the court must determine what acts by the insured entitle the insured to the duty to defend. If the policy’s terms are unambiguous, the inquiry ends.”); see also supra notes 164-65, 212, and accompanying text (noting that courts
typically uphold unambiguous insurance policies and other contracts as written).
213 870 F. Supp. 641 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
214 See id. at 642-43. A pollution exclusion clause virtually identical to the one at issue in the case
is reproduced in supra note 140.
215 St. Leger, 870 F. Supp. at 643.
216 See id. at 643. The case relied on by the court was Kaytes v. Imperial Casualty & Indemnity
Company, No. 93-1573, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21256 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 1994).
206
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fied lead as a pollutant in the context of ambient air quality under the Clean
217
Air Act.
In contrast, when a court charged with interpreting the meaning of pollutant in a pollution exclusion clause finds the term to be ambiguous, it will
undergo a much more extensive analysis, namely through the admittance of
218
One substance whose status as a “pollutant” seems
extrinsic evidence.
rife with ambiguity, and which is particularly relevant to this Comment, is
219
asbestos.
The courts seem to be torn on this issue, with some conclu220
sively finding that asbestos falls within the pollution exclusion clause,
221
and others reaching the opposite conclusion. However, regardless of the
substance at issue, courts tend to take a similar approach in determining the
meaning of a pollution exclusion clause when the clause is said to be am222
biguous, and illustrative of such an approach is Owens-Corning Fiberglas
223
Corporation v. Allstate Insurance Company.
In Owens-Corning, the
224
court, faced with determining whether asbestos fibers were a pollutant,
217 St. Leger, 870 F. Supp. at 643. For more information on the Clean Air Act, see supra notes
131-32 and accompanying text.
218 See, e.g., Alabama Plating Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 690 So. 2d 331, 335 (Ala.
1996) (“Given th[e] ambiguity in the ‘pollution exclusion [clause],’ we look to extrinsic evidence of the
drafter’s intent.”); Schultheis, supra note 154, at 487 (“Only when the relevant portion of the insurance
policy is ambiguous, must the court attempt to construe the meaning of the policy. In doing so, the court
may look to extrinsic evidence proffered by the insurer or the insured.”). The prerequisite of finding
ambiguity before consulting extrinsic evidence is well established, for courts are loath to “create ambiguity where none exists.” See Schilberg Integrated Metals Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 819 A.2d 773, 794
(Conn. 2003); see also supra notes 212 and accompanying text (stating that if a court interpreting a
contract deems the document to be unambiguous, its duty ends).
219 See, e.g., Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 74 Ohio Misc. 2d 144, 149 (Ohio
Ct. Com. Pl. 1993) [discussed in infra notes 223-239 and accompanying text] (“It . . . is far from certain
whether asbestos constitutes an ‘irritant,’ ‘contaminant,’ or ‘pollutant’ within the meaning of the [pollution] exclusion.”); see also Sylvia Pena-Alfaro, Comment, The Toxic Mold Terrifying Texas: Mold’s
Hold on the Insurance Industry, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 541, 564 (2003) (identifying asbestos as “the most
litigated . . . among the indoor air pollutants that cause infirmities”).
220 See, e.g., American States Ins. Co. v. Zippro Constr. Co., 455 S.E.2d 133, 135 (Ga. Ct. App.
1995) (“There is little question that asbestos constitutes a pollutant as unambiguously defined in the
exclusion.”); see also supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text; infra note 237 and accompanying text
(instances where asbestos was deemed to be a “pollutant”).
221 See, e.g., Maryland Cas. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 794 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1991):

[The court] find[s] the language of the provision ambiguous at least with regard to asbestos . . . .
[N]othing in the provision suggests that asbestos falls within its terms. One would not usually associate asbestos with the substances listed in the exclusion, namely, smoke, fumes or waste. Those
substances bear a closer relation to industrial pollution, the usual subject of the ordinary pollution
exclusion.
Id. at 1229 (internal citations omitted); see also supra note 219 (recognizing the confusion surrounding
asbestos’ status as a pollutant within the meaning of pollution exclusion clauses).
222 See, e.g., supra notes 161, 186, 218 and accompanying text (providing examples of uniformity
in courts’ approach to analyzing insurance contracts).
223 74 Ohio Misc. 2d 144.
224 See id. at 147. The definition of pollutant that was at issue was similar to the ones found in the
text accompanying supra notes 135 and 142.

2006]

Mixed Dust Claims—The Next Asbestos

143

commenced its task by analyzing whether the pollution exclusion clause
225
was ambiguous. The court answered this question in the affirmative after
noting in part that first, asbestos was not defined anywhere in the exclusion,
and second, that it was not undisputed that asbestos was to be considered a
226
pollutant within the meaning of the policy.
The court then recalled the
227
principle of contra proferentum before moving on with its analysis. Initially, the court very briefly discussed the pollution exclusion clauses’ historical background, and noted that they were created mainly due to insurers’
228
concerns over “environmentally related losses and liabilities.”
Next, the court turned to the main question before it, namely whether
asbestos should be considered a “pollutant” under the clause as a matter of
229
law. The court recognized that many other decisions had classified asbestos as pollutants, but ultimately did not find these to be terribly persuasive
230
because, in the court’s opinion, they were not on point. For instance, one
of those decisions had dealt not with pollution exclusion clauses, but rather
with the question of whether asbestos was a pollutant under the purview of
231
a federal act. Another of the decisions had primarily focused on “whether
the manner in which the material was released affected the applicability of
232
the pollution exclusion.”

225 See Owens-Corning, 74 Ohio Misc. 2d at 148 (“Initially, [we note that] if the terms of a contract are definite and certain, construction is unnecessary, and the court must apply the plain meaning of
the contract . . . .”). As mentioned earlier, determining whether a contract or insurance policy is ambiguous is almost always the first step courts take in their analyses. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
226 See Owens-Corning, 74 Ohio Misc. 2d at 149.
227 Id. at 149 ("A contract of insurance prepared by an insurer and in language selected by the
insurer must be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer if the language
used is doubtful, uncertain or ambiguous.") (quoting Am. Fin. Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 239
N.E.2d 33, 35 (Ohio 1968)).
228 Owens-Corning, 74 Ohio Misc. 2d at 150 (emphasis in original). The court additionally noted
that “[i]t . . . would appear that general product liability matters were not a chief concern.” See also
supra note 125 and accompanying text (mentioning the prominent role that environmental pollution
played in the proliferation of pollution exclusion clauses).
229 See Owens-Corning, 74 Ohio Misc. 2d at 150-52.
230 See id.
231 See id. at 50. That opinion was United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1205 (E.D. Pa.
1989), and the act at issue there was the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, see id. at 1206, which is currently codified in Title 42, Sections 9601-9675 of the United
States Code (2004). For readers who wish to explore this act further, which was mainly passed to address the problem of hazardous waste sites, see Martin A. McCrory, Who’s on First: CERCLA Cost
Recovery, Contribution, and Protection, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 3, 4 (1999), a good starting point would be
Payson R. Peabody, Comment, Taming CERCLA: A Proposal to Resolve the Trustee “Owner” Liability
Quandary, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 405 (1994), which explains, among other things, why the act was
passed and the procedures it sets for filing claims against offenders.
232 Owens-Corning, 74 Ohio Misc. 2d at 151. That case was Hydro Systems, Inc. v. Continental
Insurance Company, 717 F. Supp. 700 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
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Then, the Owens-Corning court turned to authorities that had reached
233
the opposite conclusion, i.e., that did find asbestos to be a pollutant. The
court began by noting that “plentiful authority” demonstrated that the pollution exclusion clauses were created mainly to limit liability relating to toxic
waste causing environmental damage, rather than “ordinary” damage like
234
For example, the court quoted with approval
bodily injury to persons.
235
Continental Casualty Company v. Rapid-American Corporation, which
had found that the pollution exclusion clauses at issue did not apply to the
plaintiffs’ actions because “[t]he underlying complaints before us do not
allege environmental pollution of land, a water course, or the atmosphere,
236
but simply bodily injury sustained by an ultimate user of a product."
The Owens-Corning court then acknowledged that some opinions had
explicitly classified asbestos as a pollutant within the meaning of pollution
237
exclusion clauses, but dismissed these as unpersuasive because they
238
“[we]re [not] supported by [either] case law [or] a compelling rationale.”
The court proceeded to conclude that asbestos could not be categorized as a
239
pollutant within the meaning of the exclusion.
f) Pollution Exclusion Clauses Relating to Environmental Pollution. One final issue related to pollution exclusion clauses that comes up
fairly often, and is thus worth addressing here, is the applicability of such
240
clauses to incidents that are not related to environmental pollution. As

233

See Owens-Corning, 74 Ohio Misc. 2d at 152.
See id. at 151-52; see generally supra notes 125, 129, 131-34, 228 and accompanying text
(describing some of the events that led up to the adoption of pollution exclusion clauses by the insurance
industry).
235 581 N.Y.S.2d 669 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
236 Id. at 670.
237 See Owens-Corning, 74 Ohio Misc. 2d at 152. One of those cases was Great Northern Insurance Company v. Benjamin Franklin Federal Savings and Loan Association, 793 F. Supp. 259 (D. Or.
1990), where the court found that “asbestos is a solid irritant,” id. at 263, and that asbestos “is . . . a
contaminant within the meaning of the policy," id. at 264.
238 See Owens-Corning, 74 Ohio Misc. 2d at 153.
239 See id. at 158. The Owens-Corning court had to decide other issues, most of which are tangential to this Comment. One of those was whether the manner in which the asbestos was released was
relevant to interpreting the pollution exclusion clause, see id. at 152-55, which the court ultimately
found that it was not, see id. at 154. Another such issue was whether the asbestos had been released into
the “atmosphere” (which was one of the elements of the pollution exclusion clause), see id. at 154-56,
and after relying in part on a dictionary definition of atmosphere, id. at 155, the court concluded that the
asbestos fibers in the case at bar had not been released into the atmosphere, see id. at 156.
240 See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 123:
234

The most interesting current controversy over the [applicability] of [pollution exclusion clauses]
involves circumstances in which an individual is injured by exposure to a toxic substance in a nonenvironmental setting. Clearly, most circumstances in which a known pollutant discharged into the
environment results in injury to exposed individuals fall squarely under the absolute exclusion.
When an individual is injured in a more routine exposure to a toxic substance, however, some
courts find that the resulting losses fall outside the scope of the exclusion.
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noted earlier, it is widely accepted that the original purpose of pollution
exclusion clauses, including that of the “absolute” clause, was to curtail
insurance carriers’ liability for damages arising out of pollution or other
241
environmentally related disasters. Somewhat expectedly, the courts are in
disagreement on this issue: while the majority of them tend to uphold the
242
clause in all applicable contexts, some courts have reached the opposite
243
result.
An opinion illustrative of the majority position is Assicurazioni Gen244
erali, S.p.A. v. Neil, where the court was faced with the question of
whether a pollution exclusion clause precluded an insurance carrier from
being liable to a claim filed against a hotel by former guests who had alleg245
edly suffered from carbon monoxide poisoning during their stay.
The
plaintiffs argued that the exclusion clause had been intended to eliminate
coverage only for injuries arising out of environmental pollution, and not
from the type of incident they alleged (carbon monoxide poisoning inside
246
of a hotel). Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that carbon monoxide was
247
not a “pollutant” within the meaning of the policy. In rejecting the plaintiffs’ contention, the court found that the language of the policy was “quite
expansive . . . [and] exclude[d] from coverage the contamination of any
environment by pollutants that are introduced at any time, anywhere, in any
248
The court also found to be of significance other language of the
way."
policy that defined “contamination” as “any injurious condition arising out
of the presence of pollutants, whether permanent or transient in any envi249
ronment." Based on the preceding language and the policy’s definition of
pollutant, the court concluded that carbon monoxide, the substance allegId. at 295; see also supra note 159 and accompanying text (noting that the exact applicability of pollution exclusion clauses is often the source of debate and confusion). This issue was also addressed by the
court in Owens-Corning, 74 Ohio Misc. 2d 144, which was discussed in supra Part II.C.1.e.
241 See text accompanying supra note 234.
242 See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 123, at 296 n.188; see also supra notes 163-65 and accompanying
text (noting that most courts will give effect to the plain meaning of clearly written contracts, including
insurance policies).
243 See, e.g., Sullins, 667 A.2d at 623 (“It appears . . . that the insurance industry intended the
pollution exclusion to apply only to environmental pollution. That supports our conclusion that [the
pollution exclusion clause] . . . before us [does] not encompass[ ] lead paint, a product used legally and
intentionally.”) (emphasis in original); see also supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text (describing
case where court found that the plaintiffs’ complaints were not of the type for which the pollution exclusion clauses at issue had been drafted).
244 160 F.3d 997 (4th Cir. 1998).
245 See id. at 999.
246 See id. at 1000-01.
247 See id. at 1000. The policy defined pollutants as “smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, sounds,
alkalies, chemicals, liquids, solids, gases, thermal pollutants and all other irritants or contaminations,”
id. at 999-1000, which closely resembles the standard definition found in typical policies, see, e.g.,
supra note 224.
248 See Assicurazioni, 160 F.3d at 1000 (emphasis added).
249 Id. (emphasis added).

77

146

FIU Law Review

[1:107

edly responsible for causing plaintiffs’ injuries, “plainly f[ell] within th[e]
250
policy . . . . “
As mentioned earlier, however, not every court agrees with the major251
ity approach. According to one commentator, decisions reaching an opposite conclusion from that adopted by the Assicurazioni court, i.e., that
standard pollution exclusion clauses found in CGLs apply only to claims
stemming from environmental or similar pollution-related events, and not to
those involving “ordinary” personal injury or property damage, generally
252
fall into two somewhat related categories. The first of these stems from a
sense of public policy or fairness, where courts are tempted to curtail the
reach of the pollution exclusion clauses in order to avoid potentially inequi253
table or absurd results, while the second occurs when courts rely on the
“reasonable expectations” doctrine to construe the policies as applying only
254
to “traditional” environmental pollution.
One case exemplifying the first category is Westchester Fire Insurance
255
Company v. Pittsburg, in which the court had to determine whether an
insurance company had a duty to defend a city against a lawsuit filed by
some of the city’s residents who claimed to have suffered injuries as a result
256
of chemicals being sprayed by one of the city’s vehicles. The case hinged
on whether the substance that had injured the plaintiffs was a “pollutant”
257
within the meaning of the policy at issue.
In ruling against the insurance company, the court stated that it was being asked by the insurance company “to stretch the definition of ‘pollutant’
beyond what a reasonable person placed in the position of the insured
258
would have understood the word to mean." The court further noted that
the insurance company’s proposed definition of pollutants would include
259
“any substance or chemical that allegedly causes injury to any person,”
and that this construction was unacceptable because “there is virtually no
substance or chemical in existence that would not irritate or damage some

250

Id.
See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
252 See Leiter, supra note 123, at 296-97.
253 See id. at 295-96. That some courts have taken this stance is hardly surprising, as it has been
said that “[t]he comprehensiveness of the absolute pollution exclusion almost defies belief.” Id.; see
also supra note 125 (addressing the burgeoning scope of pollution exclusion clauses).
254 See Leiter, supra note 123, at 296. As mentioned earlier, the reasonable expectations doctrine
is widely used by courts in interpreting insurance policies. See, e.g., supra note 168 and accompanying
text.
255 768 F. Supp. 1463. See supra note 119 (mentioning the Pittsburg case).
256 See Pittsburg, 768 F. Supp. at 1465.
257 See id. at 1465-66, 1469. The definition of pollutant at issue, id. at 1469, was similar to those
previously analyzed, see, e.g., supra note 247.
258 Pittsburg, 768 F. Supp. at 1470.
259 Id.
251
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260

person or property.” The court ultimately construed the term pollutant as
“not merely any substance that may cause harm . . . , but rather [as] a toxic
or particularly harmful material [that] is recognized as such in industry or
261
by governmental regulators.”
Illustrative of the second category is Nautilus Insurance Company v.
262
Jabar. In Jabar, an insurance company maintained that it had no duty to
defend a roofing company from a lawsuit brought by a woman who was
allegedly injured after being exposed to fumes from the roofing company’s
products at her place of employment, for the claim, the company argued,
263
fell within the language of the insured’s pollution exclusion clause.
Initially, the court found that the “total pollution exclusion clause is
ambiguous . . . because an ordinarily intelligent insured could reasonably
interpret the pollution exclusion clause as applying only to environmental
264
pollution.”
This conclusion was based in part on the court’s reasoning
that certain terms found in the pollution exclusion clause, such as discharge,
dispersal, release, and escape, were considered “terms of art” in environmental law, and that such terms usually refer to damage or injury resulting
265
According to the court, this had two effrom environmental pollution.
fects: first, the insured, a roofing company, could not have been reasonably
expected to think that its insurance policy would not have provided protec266
tion against the type of suit it was facing. Second, adopting the insurance
company’s proposed interpretation of the policy would be unfair to the insured, as this “would [have] render[ed] the [insurance] policy virtually
267
meaningless to [the roofing company.]”

260 Id. The court’s concern over the expansive breadth of pollution exclusion clauses was shared
by the justices deciding Pipefitters Welfare Educational Fund v. Westchester Fire Insurance Company,
976 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1992), which involved an issue similar to that found in Pittsburg. In interpreting
the pollution exclusion language, the Pipefitters court noted that “[w]ithout some limiting principle, the
pollution exclusion clause would extend far beyond its intended scope, and lead to some absurd results,”
id. at 1043, and that “[in order t]o redress this problem, courts have taken a common sense approach
when determining the scope of [the policies],” id.; see also supra note 125 (commenting on the seemingly ever-widening exclusionary nature of the clauses).
261 Pittsburg, 768 F. Supp. at 1460. In reaching its conclusion, the court seemed to rely in part on
the contra proferentum doctrine, because in construing the policy against the carrier, the court noted that
the company “failed to define the limitations of its pollution exclusion clause in clear and explicit
terms.” Id. at 1471. It will be recalled that courts often invoke this doctrine when an insurance policy
or contract is deemed to be ambiguous. See, e.g., supra notes 181, 186-87 and accompanying text.
262 188 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 1999).
263 See id. at 28. Predictably, the policy’s language was similar to that found in policies addressed
earlier. See, e.g., supra note 257.
264 Jabar, 188 F.3d at 30.
265 See id.
266 Id. at 30 (“[I]t is entirely reasonable that an ordinarily intelligent insured would understand this
provision to exclude coverage only for injuries caused by traditional environmental pollution.”).
267 Id. Ironically, it is likely that this is precisely what the insurance company wanted. See supra
note 125.
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The court also found ambiguity in the policy’s definition of “pollutIn the course of deciding the issue, the court noted that adopting
ant.”
“[a] purely literal interpretation of this language, without regard to the fact
pattern alleged in the underlying complaint, would surely stretch the in269
tended meaning of the policy exclusion.”
Thus, the court stated that it
“agree[d] with those courts which have restricted the exclusion’s scope to
270
only those hazards traditionally associated with environmental pollution,”
in part because “[i]t seems far more reasonable that a policyholder would
understand the exclusion as being limited to irritants and contaminants
271
commonly thought of as environmental pollutants . . . . “ Relying on this
272
reasoning and on the contra proferentum principle, the court ultimately
273
ruled in favor of the insured.
The above discussion should serve to demonstrate the extent of insurance law’s potential influence on the number of mixed-dust claims filed.
The focus of the Comment will now turn to proposed federal legislation, in
particular the Fairness in Asbestos Resolution Act, that could have a similar,
or perhaps even more pronounced, impact on the filing of mixed-dust
claims.
268

D.

Potential Federal Legislation Dealing With Asbestos
1. Previous Failed Attempts by Congress to Pass
Asbestos Legislation

The number of mixed-dust pneumoconiosis claims filed might also be
influenced by Congressional efforts to deal with asbestos. In light of the
274
"elephantine" problem of asbestos, Congress has tried numerous times,
268 See Jabar, 188 F.3d at 30. It is not uncommon, of course, for courts to find ambiguity in the
word “pollutant” within the meaning of pollution exclusion clauses. See, e.g., supra notes 155, 160 and
accompanying text.
269 Jabar, 188 F.3d at 30. In connection with this point, the court approvingly quoted Pittsburg,
768 F. Supp. 1463, and Pipefitters, 976 F.2d 1037, which were discussed earlier in supra notes 255-61
and accompanying text.
270 Jabar, 188 F.3d at 31.
271 Id. (quoting Regional Bank of Colorado, N.A. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 35 F.3d 494,
498 (10th Cir. 1994)).
272 Jabar, 188 F.3d at 31 (“It is a well-settled principle . . . that if the language of an insurance
policy is ambiguous, it will be construed against the insurer in favor of coverage.”) (internal citations
and quotations omitted). As further proof of its prevalence, contra proferentum was also used by the
court in the previous case examined, Pittsburg. See supra note 261.
273 Jabar, 188 F.3d at 31.
274 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999). In Ortiz, the Court had to determine
whether the lower courts had properly granted class certification to plaintiffs suing a manufacturer for
asbestos-related injuries. See id. at 821. This particular class was founded upon a “limited fund” settlement, meaning that the aggregate of the claims outweighed the assets available under the fund. See
id. at 821, 828-30, 834. The Court ultimately reversed the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the
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albeit unsuccessfully, to pass legislation dealing with the issue. The first
major attempt at this came in 1998 through the “Fairness in Asbestos Com276
pensation Act of 1998,” whose objective was to “establish legal standards
and procedures for the fair, prompt, inexpensive, and efficient resolution of
personal injury claims arising out of asbestos exposure, and for other pur277
poses.”
The bill was sent to, and considered by, the Committee on the
278
Judiciary of both the House and Senate, but ultimately nothing came of it.
The following year, a new session of Congress, the 106th, considered a new
variation of the 1998 proposed act entitled the “Asbestos Compensation Act
279
280
of 2000,” but the bill never went beyond the floor of the House.
Somewhat curiously, the next attempt by Congress to pass legislation aimed
case to district court, in part because it found that some class members’ needs had not been given adequate consideration. See id. at 830-32. In his brief concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist lamented “the massive impact [that] asbestos-related claims [have had] on the federal courts,” id. at 865,
and stated that “the elephantine mass of asbestos cases . . . cries out for a legislative solution,” id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). Other courts and commentators share Justice Rehnquist’s sentiments about the asbestos situation. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314,
1327 (5th Cir. 1985) (“There is no doubt that a desperate need exists for federal legislation in the field of
asbestos litigation.”); Robin Jones, Comment, Searching for Solutions to the Problems Caused by the
"Elephantine Mass" of Asbestos Litigation, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 549, 565 (2001) (“Congress should act
to create a commission to regulate the diagnosis of asbestos-related diseases.”).
275 See Georgene Vairo, Remedies for Victims of Terrorism, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1265, 1291
(2002) (“There have been [many] bills proposed in Congress to deal with the asbestos litigation.”);
Kenneth S. Rivlin & Jamaica D. Potts, Not so Fast: The Sealed Air Asbestos Settlement and Methods of
Risk Management in the Acquisition of Companies With Asbestos Liabilities, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 626,
643 (2003) (“For at least 15 years, Congress has reviewed asbestos legislation but has not adopted
substantial reform except in the area of bankruptcy.”); see generally Mary S. Lyman & Letitia Chambers, Asbestos Litigation: A History of Congressional Consideration 1977 to 2000, 18 MEALEY’S LITIG.
REP.:ASBESTOS, Sept. 17, 2003 (providing historical background information on Congress’ past failed
attempts to legislate asbestos).
276 Virtually identical versions of the bill were introduced in both the Senate and the House of the
105th Congress. The Senate bill was S. 2546, while the House version was H.R. 3905. For more information on S. 2546, see Jennifer S. Ray, Products Liability Update: Legislative Update - A Return to
Modest Proposals, Findlaw.com, at http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Jan/1/130852.html (last visited Feb.
26, 2006), while more information about H.R. 3905 may be found in George F. Sanderson, III, Note,
Congressional Involvement in Class Action Reform: A Survey of Legislative Proposals Past and Present,
2 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 315, 320 (1998-99).
277 Congress, Bill Summary & Status for the 105th Congress for S. 2546, at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d105:SN02546:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 20,
2006) [hereinafter Status of S. 2546]. The aspirations of the House version, H.R. 3905, were identical to
those of S. 2546. Congress, Bill Summary & Status for the 105th Congress for H.R. 3905, at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d105:HR03905:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 20,
2006) [hereinafter Status of H.R. 3905].
278 See Status of S. 2546, supra note 277; Status of H.R. 3905, supra note 277.
279 H.R. 1283 (1999). When it was introduced in the House, the bill was unimaginatively named
the “Fairness in Asbestos Compensation of 1999,” but its title was changed by the time it was reported.
See Congress, Bill Summary & Status for the 106th Congress for H.R. 1283, at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c106:H.R.1283: (last visited Feb. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Status of
H.R. 1283] (listing two different bills under H.R. 1283); see Jones, supra note 274, at 549-50, 554-56
(describing purposes and procedures of the proposed Act).
280 See Status of H.R. 1283, supra note 279.
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at curbing the problem of asbestos litigation did not occur until earlier in
281
2003, when several different bills were proposed; among these are the
282
Asbestos Claims Criteria and Compensation Act of 2003, the Asbestos
283
Compensation Fairness Act of 2003, and the Fairness in Asbestos Injury
284
Resolution Act of 2003, or “FAIR Act of 2003” for short.
2. The FAIR Act
More recently, the Senate had occasion to consider the FAIR Act of
285
2004. In an oversimplified summary, the Act would create an administrative division called the Office of Asbestos Disease Compensation within the
Department of Labor that would be responsible for processing both existing
and future claims involving asbestos-related injuries. Under the nonadversarial, no-fault scheme of the Act, a claimant would have to prove an
entitlement to compensation under a preponderance of evidence standard,
and any claims would be paid out from the so-called Asbestos Injury
Claims Resolution Fund, which would be bankrolled by companies and
insurers, that the Act would create. The Act would also establish the Advisory Committee on Asbestos Disease Compensation that would be responsible for, among other things, streamlining the filing and claims processing
procedures and establishing benchmarks to ensure the quality and integrity
of the compensation program.

281 This does not mean that no type of asbestos legislation was considered during that period. For
example, in 2001, the House of the 107th Congress considered (but never passed) bill H.R. 1412, whose
purpose was to exempt asbestos settlement funds from federal taxes. See Congress, Bill Summary &
Status
for
the
107th
Congress
of
H.R.
1412,
at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d107:HR01412:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 20, 2006). And in 2002, the
Senate of the 107th Congress pondered a (doomed) bill, S. 2641, that would have eliminated, to the
extent that was possible, any products containing asbestos. See Congress, Bill Summary & Status for
the
107th
Congress
of
S.
2641,
at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:
SN02641:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
282 S. 413, 108th Cong. For a summary of the bill and other information, see Congress, Bill Summary & Status for the 108th Congress of S. 413, at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d108:SN00413:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
283 H.R. 1586, 108th Cong. Further information about the bill may be found at Congress, Bill
Summary & Status for the 108th Congress of H.R. 1586, at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d108:HR01586:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
284 S. 1125, 108th Cong. See Congress, Bill Summary & Status for the 108th Congress of S. 1125,
at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:SN01125:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 20,
2006) [hereinafter Status of S. 1125]. The FAIR Act of 2003 was approved by the Senate Judiciary
Committee and sent to the full Senate for a vote, but the bill failed to pass. See Anthony J. Sebok, The
New Asbestos Bill, Part One: Why It Is Imperative That It Pass, FindLaw.com (July 14, 2003), at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20030714.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2006) (“On July 10, the Senate
Judiciary Committee voted to send a modified version of FAIR to the full Senate.”); Status of S. 1125.
285 S. 2290, 108th Cong.
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As with Congress’ previous efforts to enact major asbestos-related leg286
islation, the FAIR Act of 2004 failed to pass. Even so, the Act, along with
the other past attempts, evinces Congress’ determination to legislatively
solve, or at least diminish, the “asbestos crisis.” And because the FAIR Act
garnered a lot of attention, even though it did not pass it is likely a good
indication of the sort of legislation Congress might one day enact to deal
with asbestos. Thus, it is worth examining a few key aspects of the Act
287
that, as will be addressed in greater detail later, could have a pronounced
impact on mixed-dust claims.
The first of these is the Act’s preemption of all other federal and state
288
laws that would conflict with it.
Relatedly, the Act would also render
void “[a]ny agreement, understanding, or undertaking … with respect to the
treatment of any asbestos claim that requires future performance by any
289
party….”
As if these features were not enough to establish the Act’s
prominence in the realm of asbestos claims, the Act goes on to expressly
foreclose the possibility of pursuing asbestos-related claims in other ven290
ues. Furthermore, any existing asbestos claims, except for those in which
a plaintiff is seeking to enforce an already-entered judgment from which no
291
more appeals may be had, are preempted by the act. Thus, the preemptive
nature of the Act would likely impact the number of mixed-dust claims
292
brought in the future.
The other significant part of the Act that merits attention here is that
depending on the type of disease alleged, the claimant must, as part of establishing his claim, demonstrate that his disease was not caused by substances other than asbestos. Specifically, claimants alleged to be suffering

286 See Congress, Bill Summary & Status for the 108th Congress of S. 2290, at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:SN02290:@@@D&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 20,
2006).
287 See generally infra Part III.B (discussing how the FAIR Act, if it were to become law, might
lead to an increase in the number of mixed-dust claims filed).
288 S. 2290 § 403(a) (“The provisions of this Act shall supersede any and all Federal and State laws
insofar as they may relate to any asbestos claim . . . .”).
289 Id. § 403(b)(1); see also id. § 403(b)(2) (“Any such agreement, understanding, or undertaking
by any such person or affiliated group shall be of no force or effect, and no person shall have any rights
or claims with respect to any of the foregoing.”).
290 Id. § 403(c) (“The remedies provided under this Act shall be the exclusive remedy for any
asbestos claim . . . under any Federal or State law.”); see also id. § 403(d)(1) (“No asbestos claim . . .
may be pursued and no pending asbestos claim may be maintained in any Federal or State court, except
for enforcement of claims for which an order or judgment has been duly entered by a court that is no
longer subject to any appeal or judicial review before the date of enactment of this Act.”).
291 Id. § 403(d)(3) (“Any action asserting an asbestos claim . . . in any Federal or State court,
except actions for which an order or judgment has been duly entered by a court that is no longer subject
to any appeal or judicial review before the date of enactment of this Act, is preempted by this Act.”).
292 See generally infra Part III.B (analyzing the potential that this feature of the FAIR Act might
have on the filing of mixed-dust claims).
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from non-malignant Level III, non-malignant Level IV, and non295
malignant Level V asbestos diseases must all provide medical documentation “excluding other more likely causes of [his or her] pulmonary condi296
Just as with the Act’s preemptive character just examined, it is
tion.”
likely that this aspect of the Act would affect the filing of mixed-dust
297
claims.
III. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF INSURANCE POLICY EXCLUSIONS AND
ASBESTOS LEGISLATION SIMILAR TO THE FAIR ACT ON THE NUMBER OF
MIXED-DUST CLAIMS FILED
As suggested by the earlier discussion, the current state of insurance
policies, especially as they apply to claims alleging injuries related to asbestos exposure, might lead to an increase in the number of asbestos lawsuits
filed under the rubric of mixed-dust claims. The passing of legislation dealing with asbestos claims, such as the FAIR Act, might have a similar effect
on asbestos claims being filed as mixed-dust ones. This section will first
analyze in further detail why some would-be asbestos plaintiffs might be
motivated to file mixed-dust claims instead, and will then examine some
problems that they might face in their attempts.
A.

How Insurance Law as It Currently Stands Can Affect Asbestos Claims
1.

Policies Containing Specific Asbestos Exclusion Clauses

For plaintiffs who are considering filing lawsuits alleging injury
caused by asbestos exposure, the most formidable obstacle before them
from an insurance standpoint, even more so than the generic “absolute”
298
pollution exclusion clause, is policies that specifically exclude asbestos
299
from coverage.
As was noted earlier, aside from the pervasiveness of
300
pollution exclusion clauses in general, it is becoming increasingly more
common for insurance companies to include language in their policies that
301
excludes from coverage specific substances, and particularly relevant to
this Comment are those policies that single out asbestos.

293

See S. 2290 § 121(d)(3).
See id. § 121(d)(4).
295 See id. § 121(d)(5).
296 See id. §§ 121(d)(3)(D)(ii), 121(d)(4)(D)(ii), 121(d)(5)(D)(ii). Expectedly, an evidentiary
requirement that is common to all claims under the Act is a showing of “exposure” to asbestos. See id. §
121(d) (categorizing the different levels of compensable diseases).
297 See generally infra Part III.B (discussing this possibility in more detail).
298 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
299 See, e.g., supra notes 147, 152 and accompanying text.
300 See supra notes 123, 125, 156 and accompanying text.
301 See, e.g., supra notes 143, 147, 152 and accompanying text.
294
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It is, of course, difficult to predict in a vacuum how or whether a par302
ticular insurance policy might apply to any given set of facts, especially
303
since the language of insurance policies frequently change. Even so, because it is likely that a policy specifically excluding asbestos from coverage
304
305
would be declared enforceable and, obviously, applicable to asbestos,
there would be an obvious incentive for a plaintiff that is considering filing
a personal injury claim to try to get around such an exclusion, possibly by
simply not alleging asbestos as an injury-causing agent in the complaint, so
that the insurance carrier(s), as well as the defendant(s), might be held liable. This is because many firms are either on the brink of or have already
306
declared bankruptcy as a result of asbestos litigation, and so even if a
plaintiff were to win a judgment for his asbestos-related injuries, he might
not be able to collect any money from the defendant(s) directly.

302 See, e.g., Consumers County Mut. Ins. Co v. PW & Sons Trucking Inc., 307 F.3d 362, 365 (5th
Cir. 2002) (stating that “[w]hen interpreting an insurance policy, [the court] . . . cannot simply consider
its terms in the abstract [, but r]ather [should] consider the policy as a whole”) (internal citations and
quotations omitted); see Donald A. Winslow, Tax Avoidance and the Definition of Insurance: The Continuing Examination of Captive Insurance Companies, 40 CASE W. RES. 79, 104-05 (1990) (describing
case where a court “consider[ed] all the facts and circumstances in determining whether . . . insurance
[existed]”). This is so, notwithstanding that “[m]ost CGL policies are virtually identical[, since they are
based on] standard forms [that are] traditionally drafted by insurance industry trade associations.” Brian
S. Rudick, Comment, The Pollution Exclusion Clause in Pennsylvania: Revisiting Techalloy v. Reliance, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 885, 891 (1995). See also supra notes 117, 156 and accompanying text (noting
the characteristic uniformity among CGL policies).
303 See, e.g., supra note 122 and accompanying text.
304 See, e.g., Pittston Co. Ultramar Am. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 124 F.3d 508, 520 (3d Cir. 1997)
(“[W]hen the terms of an insurance contract are clear, it is the function of a court to enforce it as written
and not [to] make a better contract for either of the parties.”); see also supra notes 163-65, 175, 242 and
accompanying text (recognizing that courts typically enforce policies without modifying them). But see
supra note 163 (noting that courts do have the power to render certain insurance policies void on the
ground that they are contrary to public policy).
305 Because courts generally will uphold insurance policies that are written clearly, see, e.g., supra
note 165 and accompanying text, it is almost inconceivable that a court would find a policy explicitly
excluding asbestos from coverage to be inapplicable to a claim alleging injuries stemming from asbestos
exposure. See, e.g., Fibreboard, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 205 (“The insurance [policies] eliminated coverage
for asbestos-related injuries arising from exposure . . . [, and w]hen a policy of insurance in plain language excludes a particular peril from coverage that language must be respected."); supra notes 149-53
(similar case); cf. Carey Canada, Inc. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 940 F.2d 1548 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding
possible ambiguity in the term “asbestosis” as used in a policy’s exclusion clause, and remanding case
for a determination as to whether the term encompassed just asbestosis, or all asbestos-related diseases);
supra notes 144-48 (discussing similar issue of ambiguity as to the term asbestosis).
306 See Rivlin, supra note 275, at 642-43 (describing the bankruptcy of companies vis-à-vis the
asbestos problem); see also H. Ward Classen, An Investigation into the Statute of Limitations and Product Identification in Asbestos Litigation, 30 HOW. L.J. 1, 21 (1987) (noting that “many asbestos manufacturers c[ould] no longer afford to pay [asbestos] claims” in as early as 1987). Because of this, many
asbestos plaintiffs have taken to suing smaller or local companies or defendants, even those who might
only have been tangentially linked to the plaintiffs’ injuries, such as a hardware store that at one point
might have sold a product containing asbestos or an independent contractor that possibly used asbestoscontaining material in his work. See Love & Goldberg, supra note 8, at 18.
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Possible Duties That Insurers Might Have in Relation to
Mixed-Dust Claims Filed

This last point leads to the related issue of what it would mean for the
parties involved in an asbestos or mixed-dust lawsuit if it were determined,
as a preliminary matter, that the exclusion clause in an insurance policy did
not alleviate the carrier from any responsibility in the suit; in other words,
the insurance company would not be “let off the hook,” although how and
for what the insurer might be held liable would naturally depend on the
outcome of the case. Of course, it is hard to predict the exact nature and
extent of an insurance company’s liability in any given case, since this
would depend on what the policy provided and the facts of the case. Even
so, one analyzing in general terms the duties of an insurance carrier under
307
the typical business CGL policy that could be implicated in a claim alleging diseases caused by asbestos or mixed-dust might find two distinct categories, those being to defend the claim and to indemnify the insured defen308
dant from any adverse judgments against it.
To determine whether either duty exists, a separate analysis for each
309
type is required, and this process can be complex in asbestos-related
310
cases. A detailed examination of the exact contours of the analyses is not
307
308

See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Schultheis, supra note 154, at 476, 479-80:

Insurers owe their insureds two contractual duties—the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify .
. . . Pollution exclusion clauses attempt to limit or eliminate the[se duties] . . . against claims involving pollution. [However, w]hen the . . . pollution exclusion clause [is deemed to] not apply, . .
. the insurer may have a duty to defend and indemnify the insured.
Id.
309 See, e.g., Enron Oil Trading & Transp. Co. v. Underwriters of Lloyd’s of London, 47 F. Supp.
2d 1152, 1160-61 (D. Mon. 1996) (“It is well settled that the duty to indemnify is not necessarily coextensive with the duty to defend. On the contrary, an insurer’s duty to defend is conceptually distinct
from and legally independent of its duty to indemnify . . . .”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
310 See, e.g., Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and Political Issues Raised by Asbestos
Litigation (Part 2 of 2), 36 VAND. L. REV. 573, 709-10 (1983) (“Ascertaining which, if any, insurance
companies has incurred the duty to defend and indemnify an asbestos manufacturer is difficult because
many different insurers may have insured a manufacturer during the progress of a claimant’s asbestosrelated disease.”). An issue that was alluded to earlier in supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text,
and which is probably the single most complicated aspect of determining an insurer’s duty, is whether
the injury or incident at the heart of the plaintiff’s claim occurred during the coverage period, or whether
the policy was “triggered.” See generally James M. Fischer, Insurance Coverage for Mass Exposure
Tort Claims: The Debate Over the Appropriate Trigger Rule, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 625 (1997) (describing
the issue of triggering vis-à-vis insurance policies and the inherent difficulties related thereto, especially
as it applies to exposure claims filed in tort). For our purposes, it is enough to say that courts have
adopted several types of tests to determine if and when an insurance policy was triggered, including the
“manifestation theory,” which looks at the time the victim became aware of the problem, the “injury in
fact theory," which asks when actual damage or physical injury occurred, the “exposure theory,” which
focuses on the time that the victim was first exposed to the injury-causing agents, and the "continuous"
or "multiple" trigger theory, which contemplates exposure at several different spans of time. See Inland
Waters Pollution Control v. Ins. Co., 997 F.2d 172, 183 (6th Cir. 1991) (describing the above tests). As
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needed here, and is best left to be addressed by other sources. It suffices
to say that the duty to defend, as its name suggests, imposes an obligation
on the insurance carrier to provide legal representation to a defendant being
312
sued, while the duty to indemnify makes the insurer responsible for the
actual judgment entered against a defendant that falls within the coverage
313
Since in most cases, defending against a lawsuit would
of the policy.
probably be cheaper than paying the entire resulting judgment, it is perhaps
not surprising that a duty to defend is much more likely to be found than a
314
duty to indemnify. A further difference between the two duties is at what
point their existence is determined; the decision regarding a duty to defend
is made at the beginning of the lawsuit, while the one regarding a duty to
315
indemnify is made after a verdict or other decision is reached.
As it relates to this Comment, the practical effect of how courts determine whether there is a duty to indemnify or defend is that, at a minimum,
an insurance carrier who has issued a CGL would likely be obligated to
defend an insured who is being sued for injuries stemming from asbestos or
316
other similar pollutants, notwithstanding that the policy might contain a
might be expected, the appropriateness of each type of test depends on which of the various trigger
manifestations is provided for in the policy at hand. See, e.g., YWCA v. Allstate Ins. Co., 275 F.3d
1145, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Examination of the language in the [i]nsurers’ policies indicates the
appropriateness of applying a [certain] trigger.”). It is not a mere coincidence that most of today’s CGL
policies are of the “claims-made” variety. See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text (documenting
insurers’ interests in issuing claims-made policies and some of their attempts to accomplish that goal).
311 See Schultheis, supra note 154, at 479-89 (describing how some courts determine whether
there is a duty to defend); Enron Oil Trading, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 1160-61 (explaining process to impose a
duty to indemnify on an insurer, and how it differs from the one used to find a duty to defend).
312 See generally Susan Randall, Redefining the Insurer’s Duty to Defend, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 221
(1996-97) (describing duty to defend and raising typical questions that arise in association with it).
313 See Cyprus Amax Minerals Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 74 P.3d 294, 299-302 (Colo. 2003)
(explaining duty to indemnify and some common issues related to it).
314 See, e.g., Ethicon, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 737 F. Supp. 1320, 1330 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(“[T]he duty to indemnify is far narrower than the duty to defend.”); see also Cyprus, 74 P.3d at 299
(“Because the duty to defend encompasses any potential claims raised by the facts and the duty to indemnify relates to the actual liability imposed, this court has considered the duty to defend to be a
broader concept than the duty to indemnify.”); Burt Rigid Box, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., 302
F.3d 83, 97 (2d Cir. 2002) (“An insurer’s duty to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify . . . .
Indeed, an insurer has a duty to defend even if . . . the claim may be meritless or not covered [by the
policy].”).
315 See Ethicon, 737 F. Supp. at 1330, where the court, in deciding whether an insurance provider
was liable for indemnifying its insured, stated:
Whereas an insurer’s duty to defend is viewed from the beginning of a lawsuit, the duty to indemnify is decided after the completion of litigation. It is a retrospective, rather than a prospective, determination. The [c]ourt must . . . determine whether the injury found, and the cause of action decided, fit within the insurance policy at issue. . . . [For example, i]n the instant case, the [c]ourt
must decide if the findings of the . . . jury, which resulted in a total verdict of almost $12 million
for [the defendant in the original action], arose from the type of injury covered by the [insurance]
policies.
316 This is not only because courts tend to liberally find a duty to defend, see supra note 314 and
accompanying text, but also because exactly what constitutes a pollutant within the meaning of a policy
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318

specific or generic pollution exclusion. Whether the insurance carrier
would ultimately have to indemnify any adverse judgments entered against
319
the insured is harder to predict, but even if the insurer’s duty were limited
to defending the claim, this would still, of course, be helpful to a defendant.
In addition, the plaintiff may be further prejudiced if only a duty to defend,
and not to indemnify, is found, because the defendant(s) in the case might
320
not be able to pay a judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
3. Applicability of Pollution Exclusion Clauses to Mixed-Dust
Claims Alleging Asbestos
Another interesting question that is raised in conjunction with the applicability of pollution exclusions to mixed-dust claims is what would happen if asbestos were only one of several substances alleged by the plaintiff
to have caused his injuries. Such a scenario is hardly only an academic
point, for mixed-dust claims, by definition, involve the allegation of at least
321
two injury-causing substances, and there is a good chance that asbestos
322
could be one of those substances. It is hard to predict what courts faced
with such a situation would do, but two outcomes are likely, depending on
the details of the insurance policy: if the policy contained exclusionary lan323
guage dealing specifically with asbestos, it is probable that courts would
find that an allegation of asbestos in the complaint would be enough to trigger the policy’s exclusion clause, and hence the insurance carrier would be
devoid of liability. It is also possible, although unlikely, that the plaintiff
might be allowed to proceed with his claim after having been given a
chance to modify the complaint to eliminate any references to asbestos.

is a question that comes up frequently, and one that courts often struggle to answer. See, e.g., supra
notes 154, 159 and accompanying text. But see Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Ropka, 536 A.2d
1214, 1218 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (“It is generally true that an insurer has no duty to defend a cause
of action against an insured if that cause of action asserts liability on the part of the insured that comes
within an exclusion in the insurance policy.”); Leiter, supra note 123, at 296 (“The many cases in which
courts find the absolute pollution exclusion to be clear and unambiguous far outnumber the few in which
courts choose . . . to grant coverage for the insured.”).
317 See, e.g., supra note 143 and accompanying text.
318 See, e.g., supra note 140 and accompanying text.
319 See supra note 314 and accompanying (noting that courts are more willing to find a duty to
defend than to indemnify).
320 See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
321 See text accompanying supra note 5.
322 See, e.g., Mark A. Koppel, Case Notes, Gilliam v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories: An Introduction to Fear-of-Disease Damages in Arkansas, 48 ARK. L. REV. 555, 567 (1995) (“Possibly the most
common examples of toxic tort litigation are the asbestos cases. It has been estimated that the potential
number of lawsuits arising from work-related asbestos exposure could be in the millions.”); see also
supra note 219 and accompanying text (noting the prominent role that asbestos plays in litigation involving pollution exclusion clauses).
323 See, e.g., text accompanying supra note 152.
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If, however, the policy only has a general pollution exclusion clause,
predicting the outcome would be harder, for one of two things would be
possible, depending on whether asbestos were deemed by the court to be a
325
“pollutant” within the meaning of the clause: if the court found that asbestos is indeed a pollutant, then, as explained above, the pollution exclusion clause would most likely shield the insurance carrier from liability,
unless the plaintiff were given the opportunity to proceed with his claim
sans the asbestos allegation; if the court reached the opposite conclusion,
however, then the extent, if any, of the insurance carrier’s liability would
likely depend on whether the other injury-causing substances alleged by the
plaintiff were classified as pollutants within the meaning of the pollution
326
exclusion clause.
4.

Effect of Pollution Exclusion Clauses on Mixed-Dust Claims
Alleging at Least One Pollutant Within the Meaning of the
Clause

A similar dilemma would arise in a situation where a plaintiff alleges
that his injuries were caused by several substances, and a court were to find
that only one or some of the substances listed in the complaint were “pollutants” within the meaning of the policy’s pollution exclusion clause at
issue. For instance, if a plaintiff alleged that he was suffering from mixeddust pneumoconiosis caused by asbestos, talc, lead paint, and beryllium,
and a court were to conclude that only asbestos and beryllium were pollutants, it is unlikely that the court would dismiss the plaintiff’s suit, since
presumably he could still make a prima facie case with the other substances
not falling within the purview of the pollution exclusion clause (talc and
lead paint in this hypothetical case); rather, the court would probably allow
the plaintiff the opportunity to modify his complaint accordingly.
B.

Possible Ramifications of Legislation Like the FAIR Act
Being Passed
327

As mentioned earlier, Congress did not enact the FAIR Act of 2004.
328
Even so, given the high number of similar past attempts and the opinion
324

See, e.g., supra note 140 and accompanying text.
The reader may recall that a disagreement exists among many courts as to whether asbestos
should be qualified as a pollutant under pollution exclusion clauses. See, e.g., supra notes 219-21 and
accompanying text.
326 See, e.g., supra note 212 and accompanying text (noting that an insurer’s liability is often
determined by the court’s interpretation of the word “pollutant” in the policy’s pollution exclusion
clause).
327 See text accompanying supra note 286.
328 See generally supra Part II.D.1 (discussing failed asbestos legislation proposals).
325
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of many influential persons like Chief Justice William Rehnquist that the
asbestos situation as it stands can only be remedied through a legislative
329
solution, it is not far-fetched to think that some form of legislation relating to asbestos claims will one day be passed by Congress. Furthermore,
because the aim of such legislation would be to prevent persons from filing
asbestos-related lawsuits, a corresponding increase in the number of asbestos claims filed under the rubric of mixed-dust is possible.
This may be illustrated by using the FAIR Act of 2004 as an example.
Had the Act passed, an increase in mixed-dust claims might have resulted
because the Act would have served as the exclusive means for persons suffering from asbestos-related ailments to receive compensation, since the Act
would prohibit any asbestos claims from being filed in state or federal
330
courts.
Furthermore, the Act would have negated almost all settlements
331
and claims related to asbestos that are already in existence. Simply put, if
the FAIR Act or similar legislation were to pass, a plaintiff suffering from
332
asbestos-related ailments who, for whatever reason, wanted to bring his
claim in the form of a tort lawsuit in the court system rather than as an administrative claim would have had to either forego his claim altogether, or
somehow shape his claim in such a way as to fall out of the legislation’s
scope. That is where mixed-dust claims come in.
As explained earlier, one of the things that a claimant must do to receive compensation for certain diseases under the FAIR Act is to establish
333
that his injures were caused either exclusively or heavily by asbestos.
The significance of this is that some plaintiffs whose injuries were at least
partly caused by substances other than asbestos would probably not be eligible to apply for compensation under the FAIR Act, and so would look
toward filing their claims elsewhere, that is, in the courts. This means that
someone who is contemplating filing a lawsuit to recover damages for his
asbestos-related afflictions should at least consider the possibility of mold329

See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 290-91 and accompanying text.
331 See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
332 One such reason might be a belief that the amount available for recovery would be lower than
in a lawsuit. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division, BMWE Legislative
Issues – 108th Congress (2004), available at http://www.bmwewash.org/Legislative%20Issues/
2004%20-%2003-04%20Legis%20Issues.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2006) (describing the FAIR Act of
2004 as a “partisan measure that fails to provide asbestos disease victims fair and certain compensation”). This would be particularly true if mixed-dust lawsuits were considered to be in the nature of
either products liability or toxic tort claims, as they likely would be, see, e.g., infra note 405; infra note
401 and accompanying text, because damage awards in products liability cases and toxic tort cases are
notoriously large. See, e.g., Neil Vidmar, The American Civil Jury for Auslander (Foreigners), 13 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT’L L. 95, 112 (2003) (“[P]roducts liability verdicts [routinely] involve very large
awards.”); Scott A. Steiner, The Case Management Order: Use and Efficacy in Complex Litigation and
the Toxic Tort, 6 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENV. L. & POL’Y 71, 77 (1999) (“Damages in toxic tort cases are
renowned for their enormity.”).
333 See supra notes 293-96 and accompanying text.
330
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ing his complaint to allege diseases other than asbestos as the cause of his
injuries so as to escape the purview of the FAIR Act. In other words, limitations like those in the FAIR Act on what types of injury-causing substances are compensable might lead to a corollary increase in the number of
asbestos claims filed under the rubric of mixed-dust. Conversely, if legislation like the FAIR Act were to indeed become law, it is likely that some
would-be mixed-dust and asbestos plaintiffs would find the no-fault scheme
334
or other features to be attractive, and for that reason might mold their
claims accordingly so as to ensure eligibility under the Act, meaning that
the only injury-causing substance alleged would be asbestos.
IV. CAUSATION ISSUES IN MIXED-DUST CLAIMS
The preceding discussion on the potential impact that insurance law
and future asbestos legislation may have on the number of mixed-dust
claims filed would not be complete without addressing the role that the allimportant issue of causation would play in such cases. Having said that, an
exhaustive look at every facet of the problem is not needed here; rather, this
section will first address what are likely to be some of the most prominent
causation issues associated with mixed-dust cases, and will then conclude
by offering some possible solutions to those issues.
A.

Basic Causation Issues Applicable to Mixed-Dust Claims

At its most basic, causation in the tort realm simply refers to the general requirement that in order for a plaintiff to recover damages, he must
establish to the satisfaction of the court that his injuries were a result of the
335
defendant’s actions. Naturally, the difficulty of meeting this requirement
334 See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing positive and negative aspects of filing
workers’ compensation claims as opposed to suing in tort). In fact, some attorneys always favor settling
their cases. See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Some Settlement Effects of Preclusion, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 21, 32
(1993) (“Because settling saves litigation costs, risk-neutral parties normally will prefer to settle the case
for an amount [that is likely to be accepted by both sides].”); see also footnotes 497-502 and accompanying text (noting possible advantages to settling disputes instead of litigating them).
335 See, e.g., Buckner v. Sam’s Club, 75 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 1996):

To establish a prima facie [negligence] case, [the plaintiffs] had to present admissible evidence
that [the defendant] owed [the plaintiff] a duty, that the duty was breached, and that the breach
proximately caused [her] injury. Causation, therefore, is essential, and [it] means, at a minimum,
causation in fact—that is, that the harm would not have occurred “but for” the defendants’ conduct.
Id. at 294 (internal citations and quotations omitted). There is also the matter of the plaintiff having to
establish “proximate” or “legal” causation, which is a normative inquiry that asks whether the defendant
should be held, rather than was, responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries. See, e.g., Lawrence R. Liebesman & Steven G. Davison, Takings of Wildlife Under the Endangered Species Act After Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 5 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 137, 157 (1995) (stating
that “proximate causation depends to a great extent on considerations of the fairness of imposing liability for remote consequences"). To the extent that this concerns which parties should, as opposed to
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depends on the type and facts of the case the plaintiff alleges, and mixeddust claims are no exception to this rule, for two reasons.
First, because mixed-dust claims, by definition, involve the allegation
337
of at least two injury-causing substances, it would be hard, if not impossible, for some plaintiffs to convincingly establish which and to what extent
particular substances caused his injuries, not to mention the difficulty in
proving that a specific defendant or defendants was the source of origin of
338
the substances. Illustrative of this is In Re Liquidation of Midland Insur339
ance Company. In Midland, a former manufacturer of asbestos sought to
340
be indemnified by an insurance company against asbestos-related claims,
and although the case was ultimately remanded for further factual develop341
ment, the court, in the course of its opinion, addressed the inherent difficulty that belies diagnosing and tracing asbestos diseases, and in part noted
that “[various] factors combine to make it impossible, as a practical matter,
to determine which exposure or exposures to asbestos dust caused the dis342
ease.” It is likely that the problem presented in Midland would only be
made worse in mixed-dust claims, since a plaintiff in such a situation would
have to contend with tracing the exposure of not just one substance, but at
343
least two.
Second, most mixed-dust claims could be likened to other “toxic tort”
344
cases, and satisfying the causation requirement in toxic tort cases has

those who could, be held responsible for mixed-dust claims, however, such considerations are beyond
the scope of this Comment.
336 See, e.g., In re Ethyl Corp., 975 S.W.2d 606, 616 (Tex. 1998) (stating that “[the type of] evidence [that would be required] regarding causation [in an asbestos case] would vary depending on the
length of exposure and the dates of exposure”); see also Ramona L. Paetzold, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: Can it be Sex-Related for Purposes of Title VII, 1 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL’Y J. 25, 47 (1997)
(noting that “[the d]ifficulty in establishing the causation nexus for sexual harassment varies depending
on the type of conduct that is alleged to be harassing”).
337 See text accompanying supra note 5.
338 See Love & Golberg, supra note 8, at 17 (“[W]ith the many different dusts known to cause lung
disease found in industrial and commercial workplaces, it is . . . improbable that a physician will be able
to discern which portion of [the lung] scarring is caused by which source.”).
339 709 N.Y.S.2d 24 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
340 See id. at 27.
341 See id. at 39.
342 Id. at 30.
343 See text accompanying supra note 5.
344 See, e.g., Jones v. Nathan Trotter & Co., 615 N.Y.S.2d 162 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); Loupe v.
Avondale Shipyards, 470 So. 2d 336 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (both involving mixed-dust claims in which
the plaintiff alleged that he was exposed to “toxic” substances). That the substances alleged in a mixeddust claim may be either organic or inorganic, see supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text, are of little
import, for either type can serve as the basis for a toxic tort claim. See, e.g., Castellow v. Chevron USA,
97 F. Supp. 2d 780 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (toxic tort claim in which plaintiff alleged that benzene, an inorganic substance, was responsible for causing decedent’s leukemia); Roche v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 278 F.
Supp. 2d 744 (E.D. Va. 2003) (toxic tort case where plaintiffs sued the company that owned their apartment, alleging that they had become sick as a result of being exposed to mold, an organic substance).
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345

An exhaustive analysis of toxic tort cases is
always been challenging.
unwarranted here, but in an oversimplified manner it can be said that these
346
cases, which are of a relatively modern origin, involve situations in which
a plaintiff suffers harm after being exposed to a toxic substance and sues the
manufacturer of the substance or the person or company responsible for the
347
exposure having taken place.
Among the most prominent examples of
toxic tort cases are those involving asbestos, silicone breast implants, to348
bacco, Agent Orange, and formaldehyde, as well as the relatively new
349
“wave” of toxic mold cases. As was alluded to earlier, the hardest obsta350
cle to overcome for toxic tort plaintiffs is that of proving causation. This
is most likely due to a combination of several characteristics that distinguish toxic tort cases from other tort cases, among those being the complex
345 See, e.g., Scott Richardson, Comment, Attorney General’s Warning: Legislation May Now be
Hazardous to Tobacco Companies’ Health, 28 AKRON L. REV. 291, 295 (1995) (“One of the largest
problems with toxic tort cases has been the ability to prove actual causation.”); M. Neil Browne et al.,
The Epistemological Role of Expert Witnesses and Toxic Torts, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 2 (1998) (“[P]roving
causation is often a heavy burden for a toxic tort plaintiff.”); Janet V. Siegel, Negotiating for Environmental Justice: Turning Polluters into “Good Neighbors” Through Collaborative Bargaining, 10
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 147, 168 (2002) (“[A] significant challenge for toxic tort plaintiffs is establishing
causation.”); infra note 350 and accompanying text; see generally Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating
General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117
(1997); Laurie Alberts, Comment, Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation: “Which Way Do We Go, Judge?,”
10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 147 (2002) (both advocating the adoption of alternative causation models in toxic
tort cases, in light of the difficulties plaintiffs in those case often face).
346 See, e.g., Robert F. Blomquist, Book Review, Bottomless Pit: Toxic Trials, The American Legal
Profession, and Popular Perceptions of the Law, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 954 n.5 (1996) (reviewing
JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995) (“Toxic tort law is of relatively recent vintage in American
law.”).
347 See Ann Taylor, Comment, Public Health Funds: The Next Step in the Evolution of Tort Law,
21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 753, 756 (1994) (“Toxic torts are the legal actions arising when a person is
exposed to toxic substances and harm results.”). For more information on toxic tort cases in general, the
reader may wish to consult Allan Kanner, Toxic Tort Litigation in a Regulatory World, 41 WASHBURN
L.J. 535 (2002) and Steiner, supra note 332, which are both excellent sources of guidance on the topic.
348 See Browne, supra note 345, at 2. Many of these cases are brought under a theory of product
liability. See id. at 3 n.14 (noting that “[t]oxic tort cases are usually brought under theories of negligence, strict products liability and nuisance, trespass, or liability for abnormally dangerous activities”);
Robert F. Blomquist, Emerging Themes and Dilemmas in American Toxic Tort Law, 1988-91: A LegalHistorical and Philosophical Exegesis, 18 S. ILL. U. L. J. 1, 25 (1993) (recognizing that “[t]oxic tort
liability theory has definite antecedents in product liability law of the 1960s”).
349 See, e.g., Pena-Alfaro, supra note 219, at 544 (realizing a “recent surge in [toxic] mold-related
claims”); see generally Kristin A. Grant, Note, Toxic Mold: What Insurers Can Do to Abate the Influx of
Litigation and Convince the American Homeowner That, When it Comes to Mold Coverage, They Can
Still Be Fun Guys, 38 NEW ENG.L. REV. 141 (2003) (providing information on what toxic mold is and
the magnitude of the problem concerning toxic mold litigation); D. Chris Harkins, Comment, The Writing is on the Wall . . . And Inside it: The Recent Explosion of Toxic Mold Litigation and the Insurance
Industry Response, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1101 (2002) (tracing the history of toxic mold and commenting on the increasing number of toxic mold claims).
350 See supra note 345 and accompanying text; see also Carey C. Jordan, Comment, Medical
Monitoring in Toxic Tort Cases: Another Windfall for Texas Plaintiffs?, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 473, 479
(1996) (“[C]ausation usually presents the tallest hurdle in a toxic tort action because the plaintiff cannot
establish a straightforward cause and effect relationship.”).
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351

etiology of the diseases, the inadequacy of scientific data on toxic exposure and its impact on humans, and the often-long latency between expo352
sure and manifestations of sickness.
In any event, in order for a toxic tort plaintiff to satisfy his burden as it
relates to causation, he must, at a minimum, prove both that he was exposed
to a toxic substance and that the exposure caused the injury he seeks com353
pensation for.
The first of these prongs can be thought of as “general”
causation, because the question asked at this stage is whether the substance(s) in question could have caused the injuries alleged by the plain354
tiff. In contrast, the second part of the analysis, commonly referred to as
“specific” causation, is concerned with whether the exposure to the sub355
stance(s) in fact caused the plaintiff’s injury. Almost invariably, the way
a plaintiff would go about proving causation in these circumstances is to
present expert testimony or other scientific data, typically in the form of
356
357
epidemiological or other scientific studies, that support his position.
351 The study of etiology in this context refers to the determination of a disease’s cause or origin,
typically accomplished via a medical diagnosis. See Steven A. Heimberg, Comment, Status of the
Emergency Room Psychotherapist: Privacy Rites, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1316, 1317 n.10 (1983).
352 See Taylor, supra note 347, at 757-61 (discussing latency issues in toxic tort cases and how
complicated the act of proving causation can be). For a more detailed analysis of these issues, see
Jordan, supra note 350, at 479-80 (etiology); Gary E. Marchant, Genetics in the Courtroom: Genetics
and Toxic Torts, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 949, 972-76 (2001) (exposure); and Jesse R. Lee, Medical
Monitoring Damages: Issues Concerning the Administration of Medical Monitoring Programs, 20 AM.
J. L. AND MED. 251, 256-57 (1994) (latency).
353 See Mandi L. Williams, Note, The History of Daubert and Its Effect on Toxic Tort Class Action
Certification, 22 REV. LITIG. 181, 195 (2003).
354 See id.; see also Jeffry D. Cutler, Implications of Strict Scrutiny of Scientific Evidence: Does
Daubert Deal a Death Blow to Toxic Tort Plaintiffs?, 10 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 189, 198 (1995).
355 See Williams, supra note 353, at 195; Cutler, supra note 354, at 198.
356 Epidemiology is a branch of medicine that is concerned with “the study of the causes, distribution, and control of disease in populations.”
Dictionary.com,
http://dictionary.reference.
com/search?r=2&q=epidemiology (last visited Dec. 29, 2003). The discipline is statistical in nature, as
its purpose is to “track and compare large groups of individuals over extended periods of time.” Lars
Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical
Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 386 (2002). Thus, for purposes of establishing causation, these
studies are considered circumstantial, as opposed to direct, evidence, since they do not concern the
individual plaintiff, but rather only allow the fact-finder, based on the statistical information, to infer a
link between a toxic substance and the plaintiff’s injury. See Michael C. McCarthy, Note, “Helpful” or
“Reasonably Reliable”? Analyzing the Expert Witness’s Methodology Under Federal Rules of Evidence
702 and 703, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 350, 363 (1992) (“[E]pidemiological studies only provide indirect
support [to establishing causation], often supplying the basis from which to infer an affirmative answer
to th[e] question [of whether a specific substance caused plaintiff’s injury].”).
Other types of studies commonly used by plaintiffs in toxic tort cases include results of animal
testing, in vitro experiments, molecular analysis, and case studies. See Cutler, supra note 354, at 199205 (describing these tests); see also infra notes 356-57 and accompanying text (discussing how causation is typically established in toxic tort suits).
357 See, e.g., Browne, supra note 345, at 71 (“[E]xpert testimony will virtually always be needed in
toxic tort cases.”); Williams, supra note 353, at 195 (“In typical toxic tort suits, establishing causation
depends on information from expert testimony, including epidemiological studies, case studies, animal
studies, and pharmacological studies.”).
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Possible Evidentiary Burdens to Proving Causation
in Mixed-Dust Claims

Being of a scientific nature, the introduction of these types of evidence
raises another complex issue, namely whether the evidence satisfy the requirements of admissibility under the rules of evidence of the various states
358
and of the Federal system. It is not necessary to fully address this topic
359
here, but a brief summary of the major issues that come up in this context,
360
using the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) as a model, would be informative. The sine qua non of admissibility of all evidence, whether scientific or not, is its relevancy to the case at hand; simply put, if evidence is not
361
relevant, it cannot be admitted. Relevancy is defined as “having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
362
without the evidence.” As this language suggests, the relevancy standard
363
is extremely easy to satisfy, and this is consistent with the Federal Rules

358 See Alberts, supra note 345, at 41 (noting that “[t]he admissibility standards enumerated by the
Federal Rules of Evidence with respect to scientific evidence and the cases that interpret such rules are
applicable in toxic tort litigation”); Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 14 P.3d 1170 (Kan. 2000) (subjecting expert testimony in toxic tort case to the admissibility standard of the Kansas rules of evidence); see
generally Leslie A. Lunney, Protecting Juries From Themselves: Restricting the Admission of Expert
Testimony in Toxic Tort Cases, 48 SMU L. REV. 103 (1994) (discussing evidentiary rule issues in connection with toxic tort cases).
359 Some sources that extensively discuss the problems of admissibility of scientific testimony in
toxic tort cases are Lunney, supra note 358; Richardson, supra note 345; Jean Macchiaroli Eggen,
Clinical Medical Evidence of Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: Into the Crucible of Daubert, 38 HOUS. L.
REV. 369 (2001); and Wendy S. Neal, Case Note, General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997):
The Future of Scientific Evidence in Toxic Tort Litigation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 881 (1999).
360 This is because “most, if not all, state evidentiary rules are based upon, or directly derived
from, the Federal Rules of Evidence.” J. Allan Cobb, Evidentiary Issues Concerning Online "Sting"
Operations: A Hypothetical Based Analysis Regarding Authentication, Identification, and Admissibility
of Online Conversations—A Novel Test for the Application of Old Rules to New Crimes, 39 BRANDEIS
L.J. 785, 788 n.21 (2001). See also James F. Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing and Those Who Acquiesce in Witness Intimidation: A Reach Exceeding Its Grasp and Other Problems with Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(6), 51 DRAKE L. REV. 459, 500 n.268 (2003) (“Forty-one states have adopted rules of
evidence primarily based upon the Federal Rules of Evidence.”).
361 FED. R. EVID. 402 (“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which [sic] is not relevant is not admissible.”).
See also Jill Witkowski, Note, Can Juries Really Believe What They See? New Foundational Requirements for the Authentication of Digital Images, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 267, 273 (2002) (“[Under] the
Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence must first be relevant before it is admissible.”).
362 FED. R. EVID. 401.
363 See Joan L. Larsen, Comment, Of Propensity, Prejudice, and Plain Meaning: The Accused’s
Use of Exculpatory Specific Acts Evidence and the Need to Amend Rule 404(b), 87 NW. U.L. REV. 651,
654 (1993) (“Relevance . . . is relatively easy to clear given the liberal standards established by the
Federal Rules of Evidence.”).
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of Evidence’s skewed approach as a whole towards admissibility of evi364
dence.
Assuming that the proposed evidence is found to be relevant in a toxic
tort case, there is still the matter of satisfying the requirements applicable to
scientific evidence set forth in Rule 702, which embodies a three-pronged
365
test. Under Rule 702, evidence of a scientific nature may only be admitted if: 1) it is based upon sufficient facts or data, 2) it is the product of reliable principles and methods, and 3) the principles and methods were ap366
plied reliably to the facts of the case. This test is essentially a codification of the seminal Supreme Court case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma367
ceuticals, which itself replaced the long-standing Frye standard for the

364 See Eli P. Mazur, Note, Rational Expectations of Lenience: Implicit Plea Agreements and the
Prosecutor’s Role as a Minister of Justice, 51 DUKE L.J. 1333, 1350 (2002) (noting that “the Federal
Rules of Evidence have a ‘liberal thrust’ favoring the admission of relevant evidence”). This does not
mean, of course, that any piece of evidence will be admitted automatically if it is found to be relevant,
for even highly relevant evidence may be excluded if, for instance, it is being offered for an improper
purpose or if the court determines that the evidence would do more harm than good. See FED. R. EVID.
403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”); see also Timothy B.
Henseler, Comment, A Critical Look at the Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in the Wake of Daubert:
The Lie Detector Fails the Test, 46 CATH. U.L. REV. 1247, 1291 n.286 (1997) (recognizing that
“[e]xcludable evidence may in fact be highly relevant”) (emphasis added).
365 FED. R. EVID. 702:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1)
the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the
facts of the case.
Id.
366 Id. See generally Gregory Todd Jones & Reidar Hagtvedt, Sample Date as Evidence: Meeting
the Requirements of Daubert and the Recently Amended Federal Rules of Evidence, 18 GA. ST. U.L.
REV. 721 (2002) (analyzing Rule 702 in depth).
367 See Paul S. Miller & Bert W. Rein, “Gatekeeping” Agency Reliance on Scientific and Technical Materials After Daubert: Ensuring Relevance and Reliability in the Administrative Process, 17
TOURO L. REV. 297, 298 (2000) (“[T]he principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Daubert and its
progeny [are] now codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 702.”). In Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), two
minor children who were born with birth defects, along with their parents, brought suit against Merrell
Dow, the manufacturer of the anti-nausea prescription drug Bendectin, alleging that the birth defects
resulted from the mothers’ ingestion of Bendectin during their pregnancies. See id. at 582. The defendant moved for summary judgment, and in support of its motion produced an affidavit by an expert who
had concluded that no evidence showing that Bendectin caused birth defects existed. See id. The plaintiffs countered by presenting contrary testimony from no less than eight experts who, based on experiments and research conducted, claimed to have found a link between Bendectin and birth defects. See
id. at 583.
The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment because it determined that
the expert testimony submitted by the plaintiffs did not pass the then-prevailing Frye test of admissibility, i.e., the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the evidence was generally accepted by the scientific
community, and so it could not be considered by the court. See id. at 583-84. The Ninth Circuit Court
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368

admissibility of scientific evidence. Again, a detailed examination of the
369
mechanics of Rule 702 is not necessary here.
Rather, it suffices to say
that any person considering filing a mixed-dust claim should be aware of
the Rules’ limitations on the admissibility of evidence, particularly as they
apply to scientific evidence, as it is likely that much of the evidence pre370
sented in support of a mixed-dust claim would be of such a nature.

of Appeals, also citing to Frye, affirmed the lower court’s ruling. See id. at 584. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuit Courts of Appeal as to whether the Frye standard of general acceptance was the appropriate one for admissibility of scientific evidence. See id. at
585.
In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court, after examining the language of Rule 702 and its drafting
history, concluded that Rule 702 had superseded Frye’s “rigid ‘general acceptance’ requirement [, which
was] at odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal Rules and their ‘general approach of relaxing the
traditional barriers to ‘opinion’ testimony.’” Id. at 587-89. The Court then outlined the factors that a
district court should consider, along with the requirements of Rule 702, when deciding the admissibility
of scientific evidence, among which were 1) whether the evidence has been, or could be, tested, 2)
whether the evidence has been subject to peer review and publication, 3) the known or potential rate of
error associated with the data, 4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the accuracy of
the evidence, and 5) to what degree the evidence enjoys general acceptance in the scientific community.
See id. at 593-94.
An abundance of authority on Daubert and its implications exist. See generally Stan Kitzinger,
Note, The Supreme Court Waves Good-Bye to Frye: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 58
ALB. L. REV. 575 (1994) (providing some background information on the case, as well as a dissection of
the opinion); David G. Owen, A Decade of Daubert, 80 DENV. U.L. REV. 345 (2002) (tracking Daubert’s
influence on later-decided cases, and in particular on district courts’ “gate-keeper” role); William L.
Anderson et al., Daubert’s Backwash: Litigation-Generated Science, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 619 (2001)
(positing that Daubert has spawned “litigation-generated” science, i.e., scientific evidence that is
achieved by tailoring data to meet the needs of its proponent).
368 See Audrey Rogers, Prosecutorial Use of Expert Testimony in Domestic Violence Cases: from
Recantation to Refusal to Testify, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 67, 75 n.29 (1998) (“Daubert rejected the
seventy-year-old Frye test of admissibility of expert testimony.”). The Frye test, whose name hails from
the 1923 United States District of Columbia Court of Appeals decision in Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013, was the prevailing standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence in federal courts for nearly
seventy years before being rejected by the Supreme Court in Daubert. See supra note 362 and accompanying text. The crux of the Frye test was that in order for scientific evidence to be admitted, the party
offering it had to establish to the satisfaction of the court that the evidence was “generally accepted” as
reliable by the scientific community. See Ryan McDonald, Note, Juries and Crime Labs: Correcting the
Weak Links in the DNA Chain, 24 AM. J. L. AND MED. 345, 359 (1998); supra note 367.
Although no longer used by the federal courts, many states to this day employ the Frye test. See,
e.g., Robin Jean Davis, Admitting Expert Testimony in Federal Courts and Its Impact on West Virginia
Jurisprudence, 104 W. VA L. REV. 485, 494 n.35 (2002) (“[T]he Frye test is still used today by many
state courts as the basis for admitting expert testimony.”).
Interestingly, the influential Frye opinion is only a few pages long, and contains no citations to
other cases or any other authority. See Frye, 293 F. 1013. For more information on the Frye case, see
Lisa Gonzalez, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: The History and Demise of Frye v. United
States, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 371 (1993) and Andrew R. Stolfi, Note, Why Illinois Should Abandon
Frye’s General Acceptance Standard for the Admission of Novel Scientific Evidence, 78 CHI.-KENT. L.
REV. 861 (2003).
369 See supra notes 365-66 and accompanying text.
370 This is because most mixed-dust claims would be considered toxic tort cases, see supra note
344 and accompanying text, and scientific evidence is almost always needed to be presented in those
types of cases in order for a plaintiff to prevail, see supra notes 356-57 and accompanying text.
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C. Ways to Prove Causation in Mixed-Dust Claims
Returning now to the issue of how a toxic tort plaintiff would go about
proving causation, it would be fruitful to examine the types of evidence a
plaintiff alleging a mixed-dust claim could present. Aside from possibly
relying on the same type of evidence frequently used in other toxic tort
371
cases, such as epidemiological data or case studies, a mixed-dust plaintiff’s case-in-chief would likely hinge on an expert being able to successfully diagnose the different substances responsible for the plaintiff’s ail372
ments, for without that diagnosis, it would not be possible to link the al373
leged substances to any particular defendants.
The exact mechanics of
374
that process is complex, and because a detailed analysis of it here would
be neither necessary nor helpful, a summary will be presented instead.
The way that a diagnosis of mixed-dust disease, i.e., of a disease re375
sulting from at least two substances, is made is through the use of a device known as a scanning electron microscope, which is powerful enough to
376
be able to analyze the atomic particles of the plaintiff’s lung tissue.
Based on the results of the microscope’s analysis, qualified technicians
would first identify the substances found, and then would prepare a report
377
quantifying the substances’ presence per cubic centimeter of lung tissue.
A pathologist would then mine the report for scientific data, as well as

371

See supra notes 356-57 and accompanying text.
See Raphael Metzger, Silicosis or Mixed Dust Pneumoconiosis? Diagnosis and Etiology by
Scanning Electron Microscopy, 11 MEALEY’S EMERGING TOXIC TORTS: THE PLAINTIFFS’ PERSPECTIVE,
Oct. 4, 2002, at 25, 26 [hereinafter Mealey’s Diagnosis] (stating that a “[mixed-dust] diagnosis is essentially a pathologic diagnosis that is dependent on the identification and quantification of [certain] particulates in the patient’s lung tissue”).
373 It will be recalled that by definition, mixed-dust claims always involve at least two substances,
see text accompanying supra note 5, so it would be crucial for a plaintiff attempting to make such a case
to produce a diagnosis that differentiates between the various substances so that each substance could be
linked to the appropriate defendant(s). Linking the cause(s) of the plaintiff’s injury to the actions of a
defendant is, of course, needed to satisfy the “specific” causation requirement in toxic tort cases. See
text accompanying supra note 355; cf. Part IV.E.2 (describing how some courts have eased causation
requirements for plaintiffs in certain cases, including by shifting the burden to defendants to exculpate
themselves from being responsible for plaintiff’s injuries rather than requiring the plaintiff to identify
which defendants caused his injuries, when doing so would be unfair or unduly restrictive to the plaintiff).
374 See generally Mealey’s Diagnosis, supra note 372 (describing step-by-step how a diagnosis of
mixed-dust would be made). For further reading, see K. HONMA, PATHOLOGY OF NON-ASBESTOS
PNEUMOCONIOSIS
(SILICOSIS
AND
MIXED
DUST
PNEUMOCONIOSIS)
(1999),
http://www.conganat.org/seap/revista/v32-n3/97.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2006; on file with author);
Martha
L.
Warnock,
Case
Study
of
Pneumoconiosis,
at
http://pathhsw5m54.
ucsf.edu/case20/discussion20.html (last modified Oct. 1, 1998; last visited Dec. 27, 2003); and Alternative Exposures, supra note 6.
375 See text accompanying supra note 5.
376 See Mealey’s Diagnosis, supra note 372, at 26.
377 See id.
372
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compare the amounts listed in the report to those found in the lungs of dis378
ease-free persons that are of similar age and sex to the plaintiff.
Assuming that the procedures of the test were followed and that the
data culled from the test was not corrupted, there is a fair chance that an
accurate diagnosis of mixed-dust, if indeed the plaintiff is suffering from
379
It is also possible to diagnose mixed-dust
the condition, can be made.
pneumoconiosis using simpler, more crude techniques than employing a
scanning electron microscope, such as less sophisticated microscopy technology or an examination of tissue slides, but such techniques are not as
380
accurate and can lead to incorrect results.
For example, if scanning microscope technology is not possible or
available because of monetary costs or logistical concerns, it is still theoretically possible to yield an accurate diagnosis of mixed-dust pneumoconiosis by using a combination of the patient’s exposure history and an
381
analysis of the patient’s chest X-rays and pathology material.
In the
hands of a trained and skilled pathologist, such a technique might allow for
the correct separation and identification of the substances at issue because
some of their unique characteristics, particularly their shape and size, would
382
likely show up on the X-rays. Even so, this technique is hardly foolproof,
383
and an inaccurate diagnosis through its use should always be a concern.
The use of a scanning electron microscope affords mixed-dust plaintiffs another advantage apart from more accurate diagnoses; it may also
384
make it easier for a plaintiff to trace the etiology of the disease.
This
might be feasible because an accurate and complete identification and quantification of the particles found in a plaintiff’s lung tissue would go a long
way towards associating the particles with the materials that they came

378

See id.
See id. at 25-27. Despite the accuracy of the scanning electron microscope, there is no guarantee that a complete and successful diagnosis of mixed-dust disease will always be possible. See, e.g.,
supra note 338 and accompanying text; see generally Part IV (addressing some of the causation problems mixed-dust plaintiffs might face).
380 See Mealey’s Diagnosis, supra note 372, at 26. One fairly frequent example of a misdiagnosis
occurs when mixed-dust disease is mistaken for silicosis, most likely due to the fact that the appearance
of silica is often confused with that of other substances. See id. Silicosis is a lung disease associated
with the inhalation of silica particles, see text accompanying supra note 22, and is one of the most
prevalent occupational lung diseases, see DEMOSTHENES BOUROS ET AL., ASSOCIATION OF
MALIGNANCY WITH DISEASES CAUSING INTERSTITIAL PULMONARY CHANGES (2002),
http://www.chestjournal.org/cgi/reprint/121/4/1278.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2006; on file with author)
(identifying silicosis as a “common occupational lung disease”).
381 See Love & Goldberg, supra note 8, at 18.
382 See id.
383 See id.; see also supra notes 379-80 and accompanying text.
384 See Mealey’s Diagnosis, supra note 372, at 26-27; see also supra note 351 and accompanying
text (addressing etiology).
379
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As menfrom, and perhaps even the manufacturers of such materials.
386
tioned earlier, this is crucial if the plaintiff is to make a successful case.
D.

How Courts Have Handled Causation Issues in Mixed-Dust Claims

Having introduced a few ways through which a mixed-dust plaintiff
could establish causation, at this point it would be useful to see how courts
faced with mixed-dust claims have handled causation issues. As mentioned
earlier, one can find reported mixed-dust cases in the nature of both tort and
387
workers’ compensation.
As can be expected, given that most workers’
388
compensation cases operate on a no-fault basis, the level of causation that
needs to be established in mixed-dust tort cases, as opposed to mixed-dust
workers’ compensation claims, is different.
1.

Example of a Mixed-Dust Tort Case Dealing With Causation

One can gleam what type of causation mixed-dust tort plaintiffs might
be faced with by examining Bailey v. North American Refractories Com389
390
pany, one of the few mixed-dust tort cases reported. In Bailey, employees of a manufacturer of asbestos products sued the company, alleging that
exposure to toxic substances during their employment had caused them
391
mixed-dust pneumoconiosis, among other things. The court ruled that in
order for the employees to prevail in their suits, they had to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that their exposure to the substances were a
385 See Mealey’s Diagnosis, supra note 372, at 26. One powerful example of this technology’s
potential is demonstrated by an episode where a pathologist who was asked to make a mixed-dust diagnosis was able to opine, after examining a subject’s lung tissue slide with a scanning electron, that the
subject had at one point come into contact with cadmium-containing red paint, presumably at the subject’s workplace. See id. at 27. The pathologist came to this conclusion after the microscope analysis
revealed a single particle of cadmium, along with an unidentified element. See id. The subject’s occupational history, which had not been known to the pathologist, confirmed that the subject had performed
auto bodywork for years, including by being involved in the process of sanding paint onto red sports
cars, which likely explains the presence of cadmium (found in paint) and the unidentified element (from
the sanding process). See id.
386 See, e.g., supra notes 372-73 and accompanying text (addressing the issue of linking injurycausing substances to defendants).
387 See, e.g., supra notes 59, 60 (examples of mixed-dust workers’ compensation and tort claims,
respectively).
388 See supra note 40.
389 95 S.W.3d 868. Bailey was mentioned in supra note 60.
390 See id.; supra note 62 and accompanying text. Although not expressly stated in the opinion,
the plaintiffs’ case was essentially one based on a products liability theory, as they alleged that “products
manufactured by either [of the defendants] exposed [them] to asbestos, thus causing asbestos-related
illnesses [including mixed-dust pneumoconiosis].” Bailey, 95 S.W.3d at 870. This is not surprising, as
a great portion of personal injury asbestos-related lawsuits are categorized as products liability actions.
See, e.g., Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1214 (Cal. 1997) (“Most asbestos personal
injury actions are tried on a products liability theory.”). The same could be said for other types of toxic
tort lawsuits. See supra note 438.
391 See supra note 60.
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392

“substantial factor” in the forming of their diseases. In reaching its deci393
sion, the court declined to adopt the “fiber-drift”
or “frequency394
regularity-proximity” causation tests that were advocated by plaintiffs
395
and the defendant, respectively, reasoning that adopting either test as a
matter of law would infringe upon the jury’s prerogative to decide whether
396
the manufacturer was indeed liable for plaintiffs’ injuries.
2.

Example of a Workers’ Compensation Claim Involving
Mixed-Dust

Somewhat in contrast to Bailey is Songer, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compen397
sation Appeal Board, a workers’ compensation case in which an industrial
bricklayer alleged that he had been rendered permanently disabled from
mixed-dust pneumoconiosis as a result of workplace exposure to several
398
substances, including asbestos and silica.
On an appeal by one of the
399
claimant’s former employers, the court affirmed an award of workers’
compensation benefits to the claimant, based primarily on the testimony of
a doctor who had diagnosed the claimant as suffering from mixed-dust disease after conducting an examination, pulmonary function studies, and X400
rays on the claimant. In other words, in affirming the award of benefits to

392 See Bailey, 95 S.W.3d at 871. Incidentally, this is the standard of causation that has been
adopted by section 431 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), which provides in part that “ [t]he
actor’s negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if . . . his conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm”).
393 The fiber-drift theory states that the particles of certain substances, once released in the air, can
remain airborne for long periods of time and thus travel substantial distances. See Bailey, 95 S.W.3d at
872; see also Jackson v. Anchor Packing Co., 994 F.2d 1295, 1300 n.6 (8th Cir. 1993) (explaining fiberdrift theory).
394 Under the frequency-regularity-proximity test, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he was in
close proximity to a specific substance on a regular basis and over an extended period of time. See
Bailey, 95 S.W.3d at 872; see generally Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir.
1986) (asbestos case in which the court discusses and adopts the test).
395 See Bailey, 95 S.W.3d at 872-73.
396 See id.
397 613 A.2d 658 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
398 See id. at 658.
399 The main issue before the court was which of the claimant’s former employers, Songer, Inc. or
Pneumatic Concrete Corporation, should be held liable for the employee’s compensation. See id. at 659660. Songer, the claimant’s most recent employer, argued that Pneumatic should be the one responsible
because that is where the claimant had worked the longest, and therefore had presumably been more
exposed to injurious substances there than at Songer. See id. at 659-62. The court ultimately sided with
Songer, declining to adopt the “last injurious exposure” rule propounded by Pneumatic, and ruled that
Pneumatic was the company liable for the claimant’s award. See id. at 661-62. The “last injurious
exposure” rule is not uncommon in workers’ compensation scheme, and is mentioned elsewhere in this
Comment. See supra note 80 and accompanying text; infra notes 403 (discussing the rule).
400 See Songer, 613 A.2d at 659. That is typical of the level of proof required in workers’ compensation cases. See, e.g., Hartman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 462 So. 2d 1310, 1312 (La. Ct. App.
1985):
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the claimant, the Songer court practically took at face value plaintiff’s and
his doctor’s testimony, and as will be elaborated shortly, this is not atypical
in workers’ compensation claims.
E.

Facilitating the Obstacle of Establishing Causation in Mixed-Dust
Claims
1.

How Congress and Some States Have Eased the Causation
Standard in Workers’ Compensation Claims

Songer is an example of how the legislatures and courts have facilitated claimants’ burden of proving causation in workers’ compensation
cases. Had Songer been filed as a toxic tort case instead, the claimant
would have had to link, by a preponderance of the evidence, the substances
401
allegedly responsible for his injuries to a specific defendant. But because
this was a workers’ compensation claim, the claimant had no such burden.
Rather, he had the benefit of title 77, section 411 of the Pennsylvania Statutes, which provided in part at the time:
The employer liable for compensation [for certain workplace diseases]
shall be the employer in whose employment the employe [sic] was last
exposed for a period of not less than one year to the hazard of the occupational disease claimed. In the event the employe [sic] did not
work in an exposure at least one year for any employer during the
three hundred week period prior to disability or death, the employer
liable for the compensation shall be that employer giving the longest
period of employment in which the employe [sic] was exposed to the
402
hazards of the disease claimed.
Statutes of this sort undoubtedly make it easier for claimants to be
awarded benefits, for their practical effect is to ensure that there will always
be at least one employer who can be found liable for a claimant’s compen-

The next question [in this workers’ compensation case] is whether [the claimant] proved that his
lungs were impaired. His case was basically the testimony of . . . his treating physician . . . to the
effect that he suffers from "mixed dust pneumoconiosis” . . . . We find this testimony, together with
[the claimant’s] subjective complaints of tiredness and shortness of breath, sufficient to constitute
a prima facia case of impairment of the lungs.
Id. at 1312; see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.316, described in supra Part II.B.1, and the Black Lung
Benefits Act, analyzed in supra Part II.B.2 (both imposing similar requirements of medical evidence on
claimants seeking workers’ compensation benefits).
401 See text accompanying supra note 355.
402 Songer, 613 A.2d at 660. The current version of the statute may be found in Title 77, Section
411 of the Pennsylvania Statutes (2003).
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sation. Perhaps that is why similar statutes have been enacted in many
403
other states.
a) Applicability of Existing Pneumoconiosis Statutes to Mixed-Dust
Claims. In addition to statutes like the one examined above, both states and
the federal government have enacted several other types of presumptions
intended to facilitate the recovery of workers’ compensation awards for
pneumoconiosis injuries that arguably would be applicable to claims in404
volving mixed-dust disease.
This is only arguable, rather than certain,
because it is hard to predict the impact that such statutes would have on
mixed-dust claims, whether they are in the form of a tort lawsuit or a workers’ compensation claim, given that, by their terms, the statutes seem to deal
only with “ordinary” pneumoconiosis, as opposed to mixed-dust pneumo405
coniosis. Of course, if it turned out, whether by court decision or some
other way, that any existing statutes were deemed to not apply to mixeddust claims, the legislature of the various states or Congress could either
pass new laws or modify the existing ones so as to correct the problem.
Thus, the passing of statutes creating presumptions applicable to mixeddust claims is one way in which the potential difficulties of proving causa406
tion in such cases, particularly those filed in tort, could be alleviated.
2.

How Courts Have Relaxed the Method of Proving Causation in
Certain Types of Lawsuits

Another way that the problem of establishing causation in mixed-dust
lawsuits might be lessened is through the adoption of alternative methods to
403 See, e.g., N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 44-a (“The employer in whose employment an employee was last exposed to an injurious dust hazard shall be liable for the payments required by this
chapter when disability or death of the employee shall be due to silicosis or other dust disease.”); see
also D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1510; MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-72-303; VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-403(B); W. VA.
CODE § 23-4-8c (2003) (all containing similar provisions); supra note 80 and accompanying text; supra
note 399 (discussing the “last injurious exposure” rule).
404 Many states have enacted presumptions applicable to workers’ compensation programs. E.g.,
N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 47 (CONSOL. 2003) (providing that exposures to certain diseases are
presumed to be harmful); 77 P.S. § 413 (2003) (creating presumption that certain disabilities arise during
a person’s course of employment); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-302 (2003) (stating that persons suffering
from certain diseases are presumed to be “totally disabled,” a designation that affects how much benefits
they are entitled to receive); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-8c (2003) (providing that deceased persons who were
exposed to certain substances for a period of at least ten out of the fifteen years preceding his death are
presumed to have been suffering from a chronic respiratory disability at time of death). As for examples
of similar presumptions found in the federal code, see supra note 103 (outlining presumptions applicable to pneumoconiosis derived from mining).
405 The difference between the two essentially has to do with how they are caused; specifically,
“ordinary” pneumoconiosis is caused by one substance, whereas mixed-dust pneumoconiosis involves at
least two. See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see generally supra Part I.A (describing the disease).
406 See generally Part IV (addressing some of the causation issues mixed-dust plaintiffs might
face).
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satisfy causation as courts have done in other settings, particularly in the
toxic tort field, as, for instance, with asbestos claims. Classic examples of
this type of “causation relaxation” are Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul &
407
408
Sault. Ste. Marie Railway Company and Summers v. Tice.
This legal phenomenon occurs mostly in cases where courts feel sympathetic towards plaintiffs whose injuries were almost certainly the result of
the defendant(s)’s wrongdoing, but for one reason or another cannot satisfy
407 179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 1920). In Anderson, the court was faced with the difficult question of
whether a railroad should be held liable for the destruction of plaintiff’s property due to a fire originating from one of the railroad’s trains even though there was a good chance that another, unrelated fire of
unknown origin would have destroyed plaintiff’s house just the same. See id. at 45-46. The defendant
argued that under the circumstances, the plaintiff could not satisfy the “but-for” because it was impossible to prove that the damage to his property would not have occurred if the railroad fire had never happened. See id. at 46-47. The court ultimately sided with the plaintiff, and in so doing, approved of the
trial court’s jury instructions, which provided in part:

If you find that other fire or fires not set by one of the defendant’s engines mingled with one that
was set by one of the defendant’s engines, . . . [and if] you should find that the fire set by the engine was a material or substantial element in causing plaintiff’s damage . . . [,] the defendant is liable . . . .
Id. at 46. The rule enunciated by the Anderson court has come to be known as the “substantial factor”
doctrine, and it has since become firmly embedded in the legal bedrock, having been adopted by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts and most jurisdictions. See John D. Rue, Note, Returning to the Roots of
the Bramble Bush: The “But For” Test Regains Primacy in Causal Analysis in the American Law Institute’s Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2679, 2681-83 (2003) (discussing
origin and impact of the “substantial factor” test).
408 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). The dilemma faced by the Tice court was as vexing and interesting as
the one presented by the facts in Anderson, discussed in supra note 407. In Tice, the plaintiff, a hunter,
suffered injuries to his eye and mouth after having been unintentionally shot at by two of his hunting
companions. See Tice, 199 P.2d at 2. A bench trial determined that both of the defendants had acted
negligently in discharging their weapons towards the direction of the plaintiff in their misguided attempt
at hunting quail, and that the plaintiff’s injuries were a “direct result” of defendants’ actions. See id. at
2. Furthermore, the court cleared the plaintiff of any contributory negligence. See id.
The problem, however, was that it was impossible to determine whether plaintiff’s injuries had been
caused by only one of the men’s shots or by both, since the shots had been fired virtually simultaneously, and even if only one of the men had been responsible, the plaintiff probably could not have
proven which of the two men was culpable. See id. This left the court with two unsavory choices:
either allow causation to be proven by an alternative method, or allow the injured and innocent plaintiff
to go uncompensated by the two decidedly negligent defendants. See id. at 2-5 The court chose the
former, and concluded that for “reasons of policy and justice,” it made more sense to shift the burden of
causation to the defendants, in that it was up to each defendant to exculpate himself lest they both face
liability for the plaintiff’s injury; this, instead of imposing upon the plaintiff the formidable task of
proving which defendant had injured him, seemed proper to the court. See id. The impulse to side with
“innocent” plaintiffs over “guilty” defendants is not uncommon. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980) (“[A]s between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the
latter should bear the cost of the injury.”).
The rule set forth in Tice, sometimes known as the “alternative liability” doctrine, is well established in American law, see Rue, supra note 407, at 2694-95, and has been applied in various factual
situations. Notable instances are medical malpractice actions where an unconscious plaintiff was almost
certainly injured due to the negligence of one or few of a select group involved in his treatment, see,
e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944), and products liability cases where the plaintiff was
harmed by a generically defective product and cannot prove which defendant was responsible for the
particular unit that caused his injuries, see, e.g., Anderson v. Somberg, 338 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1975).
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the traditional “but-for” causation test, i.e., that had it not been for defen409
dant(s)’s actions, they would not have been injured. The courts’ dilemma
in this regard is understandable, for as one commentator has noted,
“[t]raditional notions of causation were developed before the existence of
toxic torts was acknowledged. Applying these tests to toxic tort cases is
analogous to placing a square peg into a round hole – [they] just will not
410
fit.”
Being mindful of the similar dilemma faced by plaintiffs in toxic tort
411
cases, courts over time have built upon the doctrines of Anderson and
412
Tice, among others, to create alternative methods to proving causation
413
that are better suited to the unique nature of toxic tort cases.
Among
414
these are variants of the substantial factor test recognized in Anderson, a
409 See, e.g., Lindquist v. City of Jersey City Fire Dep’t, 814 A.2d 1069, 1079-80 (N.J. 2003)
(“[We] recognized that the need for a broader [causation] standard was due in part to the extraordinary
and unique burdens facing plaintiffs who seek to prove causation in toxic-tort litigation . . . .”) (internal
citations and quotations omitted); Gerald W. Boston, Toxic Apportionment: A Causation and Risk Contribution Model, 25 ENVTL. L. 549, 628 (1995) (“The understandable judicial reluctance to preside over
a plaintiff’s failure to sustain the traditional burdens of proof has led to a relaxation of causal standards.”); see generally Rue, supra note 407 (tracing the gradual shift in tort law from the traditional
“but-for” standard to alternative causation tests employed in certain factual circumstances, and also
exploring some reasons for why courts have seen fit to occasionally “bend” the rules of causation).
410 Myra P. Mulcahy, Note, Proving Causation in Toxic Torts Litigation, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1299, 1326 (1983). See Shelly Brinker, Comment, Opening the Door to the Indeterminate Plaintiff: An
Analysis of the Causation Barriers Facing Environmental Toxic Tort Plaintiffs, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1289,
1298-1302 (1999) (outlining problems that arise when traditional notions of causation are applied to
toxic tort cases). Many commentators have commended courts’ relaxation of the causation burden in
toxic tort cases. See, e.g., Simcha David Schonfeld, Note, Establishing the Causal Link in Asbestos
Litigation: An Alternative Approach, 68 BROOKLYN L. REV. 379, 399 (2002) (“[A]s a matter of public
policy, a system must be adopted in which [asbestos] plaintiffs are not left entirely without recourse.
These individuals suffered great harm at the hands of numerous negligent companies and should not be
left to shoulder the accompanying financial burden alone.”); Development of the Law, Toxic Waste
Litigation: IX. Common Law Personal Injury Recovery, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1602, 1603 (1986) (“[C]ourts
have long recognized their obligation to do corrective justice by compensating innocent victims and . . .
to deter wrongdoing by compelling those who create harms to bear the costs . . . .”).
411 See generally Part IV (exploring some of the causation issues mixed-dust plaintiffs might
encounter); see also Schonfeld, supra note 410, at 383 (“To allow for recovery in virtually any asbestos
case, . . . courts [would have had to] relax the standard causation requirements. Noting this dilemma,
many courts have done just that.”).
412 See supra notes 407-08 and accompanying text.
413 See, e.g., Brinker, supra note 410, at 1302 (“In recognition of the uncertainty that surrounds
[causation in] toxic torts . . . , a majority of courts have modified traditional common-law causation
rules in the toxic tort context.”); see generally Joseph Sanders & Julie Machal-Fulks, The Admissibility
of Differential Diagnosis Testimony to Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: The Interplay of Adjective
and Substantive Law, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 107 (2001) (listing some ways in which courts have
attempted to deal with the problem of causation in toxic tort cases); Brian M. DiMasi, Comment, The
Threshold Level of Proof of Asbestos Causation: The “Frequency, Regularity and Proximity Test” and a
Modified Summers v. Tice Theory of Burden-Shifting, 24 CAP. U.L. REV. 735, 738-44 (1995) (tracing the
gradual development of various causation tests applicable to asbestos lawsuits).
414 See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1105 (5th Cir. 1974) (in a
suit against an asbestos manufacturer, court held that causation could be satisfied with a showing that
defendant’s products “contributed substantially” to plaintiff’s injuries); supra note 392 and accompany-
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shifting of burden similar to that employed in Tice, the application of the
416
417
“market-share liability” test, the “frequency-regularity-proximity” test,
418
419
the “inference of exposure” test, the “job site” test, the “fiber-drift”
420
421
theory, and the “role in the occurrence of plaintiff’s injuries” test.
In
addition to these, many commentators have proposed the adoption of tests
422
that are either variations of the above, or different altogether.

ing note (applying similar causation standard); see also DiMasi, supra note 413, at 741-43 (describing
the development of the substantial factor test in toxic tort cases, and attributing the origin of the test to
asbestos cases). Perhaps coincidentally, a comparable, if somewhat weaker, test exists under the FAIR
Act’s no-fault compensation scheme to make out a claim for certain diseases. See supra note 296 (noting
that for many types of diseases, the FAIR Act requires a claimant to show that there was “exposure” to
asbestos).
415 See DiMasi, supra note 413, at 744-48 (outlining the employment of burden-shifting in toxic
tort cases); see also supra note 403 (describing Tice test).
416 See, e.g., Wheeler v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 109 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (allowing
plaintiffs suing for injuries related to asbestos exposure to rely on the market share liability doctrine).
The market share liability doctrine, first recognized by the California Supreme Court in Sindell, 607 P.2d
924, allows plaintiffs who have been harmed as a result of certain types of defective products but who
cannot trace their injuries to a specific manufacturer to sue all of the manufacturers who could have
produced the defective product at issue at the relevant time period. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936-37.
Damages would then be assessed against the defendants in an amount proportionate to their share of the
market of the defective product. See id. at 937.
While the market share liability doctrine has been recognized by many other courts since then, see,
e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Symposium, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL
L. REV. 941, 981 (1995) (stating that “many courts have adopted [the doctrine]”), most courts have been
dubious of the propriety of its employment in toxic tort cases. See, e.g., Schonfeld, supra note 410, at
387 (“[E]ven among those jurisdictions that have considered market share liability in [certain] cases,
there has been great reluctance to expand its application to asbestos litigation.”); see also Shirley H.
Fang, Comment, Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co.: Rejection of Market Share Liability in Lead-Based
Paint Litigation, 43 BUFFALO L. REV. 725, 740-42 (1995) (describing courts’ reluctance to apply market
share liability in other contexts, including asbestos suits).
417 See supra note 394 and accompanying text (describing test and providing an example of an
asbestos case in which the court used it).
418 See, e.g., In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 817-18 (9th Cir. 1992) (adopting
test in asbestos case that allows a plaintiff to recover damages by relying on an “inference of exposure,”
which can be demonstrated by introducing enough evidence suggesting that the products of a particular
defendant were present at the plaintiff’s worksite, and thus that those products might have contributed to
his injuries).
419 See, e.g., Lockwood v. A C & S, Inc., 722 P.2d 826 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (allowing plaintiff
who allegedly had gotten ill from exposure to asbestos in the workplace to survive motion for directed
verdict, even though he had no direct evidence as to which products caused his injuries, or who made
them.).
420 See supra note 393 and accompanying text (explaining test).
421 See Ingram v. Acands, Inc., 977 F.2d 1332, 1344 (9th Cir. 1992) (asbestos case in which the
court held that if “the plaintiff presents evidence that the defendant’s asbestos was present in the workplace, it is the jury’s task to determine if the presence of that asbestos played a role in the occurrence of
the plaintiff’s injuries”).
422 See generally Schonfeld, supra note 410 (advocating a four-pronged alternative approach to
causation in asbestos cases); Berger, supra note 345 (proposing new model for toxic tort cases whereby
plaintiff would only have to prove that a defendant failed to develop and disclose information needed to
assess latent risks, rather than that the defendant caused plaintiff’s injuries); Andrew G. Celli, Jr., Note,
Toward a Risk Contribution Approach to Tortfeasor Identification and Multiple Causation Cases, 65
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a) Applicability of Causation Standards Used in Other Types of
Toxic Tort Cases to Mixed-Dust Claims. The applicability of these numerous tests to mixed-dust claims, like the applicability of pneumoconiosis
423
statutes to mixed-dust claims, is uncertain. One obvious reason for this is
that courts have not yet had many opportunities to apply these tests to
mixed-dust claims, given the relatively scant number of tort cases alleging
424
mixed-dust diseases filed thus far.
Another reason is that some courts
have demonstrated a reluctance to make any further inroads into the already
425
426
“relaxed” causation rules that are employed in toxic tort cases.
Finally, putting aside the somewhat normative question of whether
courts should “borrow” causation tests used in toxic tort cases to resolve
mixed-dust tort claims, it is not clear whether at least some of the tests
could logically be applied to mixed-dust claims. For instance, the propriety
427
of employing tests modeled after the market share liability doctrine or on
428
the alternative liability theory recognized in Tice in mixed-dust claims
might be called into question, since both of these tests require that plaintiffs
be able to at least identify the defendants possibly responsible for their inju429
ries, and this may not always be feasible in mixed-dust claims because of
N.Y.U.L. REV. 635 (1990) (outlining risk-apportionment and risk-contribution approaches to asbestos
cases, under which defendants could be liable for “risk creative behavior,” i.e., making choices that
created unreasonable risks of harm to plaintiffs); Brinker, supra note 410 (describing advantages and
disadvantages of several alternative methods to traditional causation in toxic tort cases, including variations of the market share liability and burden-shifting doctrines); see also supra note 410 and accompanying text (noting other examples of commentators urging or applauding alternative ways to establish
causation in toxic tort cases).
423 See supra notes 404-06 and accompanying text.
424 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
425 See, e.g., supra notes 411-21 and accompanying text (providing examples of how courts have
adopted more lenient causation standards in toxic tort cases).
426 See, e.g., Toby M. Tonaki, Comment, Latent Disease and Toxic Torts in Hawaii: Analysis of the
Statute of Limitations, the Rule Against Splitting Causes of Action and Nonidentification Theories of
Liability, 15 HAWAII L. REV. 137, 174 (1993) (stating that “[some c]ourts are . . . reluctant to apply [the
alternative liability] theory to toxic tort products liability [cases] because plaintiffs must join all possible
tortfeasors in court, and plaintiffs have had trouble proving that they joined all the possible tortfeasors”);
Jordan, supra note 350, at 479 n.38 (noting that “in the past, [some] courts have been reluctant to rely
[solely] upon epidemiological studies to determine causation in toxic tort cases”); Diane Schmauder, An
Analysis of New Jersey’s Increased Risk Doctrine, 25 RUTGERS L. J. 893, 901 (1994) (recognizing that
“[a number of] courts have been [somewhat] reluctant to relax the traditional causation inquiry in the
toxic tort context”); Christopher J. Maley, Survey, Toxic Torts: Class Actions in United States and England, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 523, 526 (1996) (stating that “[h]istorically, [many] judges have
been reluctant to certify class actions in mass toxic tort cases”); supra note 416 (describing some courts’
reluctance to allow market share liability to be used in asbestos cases, a type of toxic tort case). Contra
supra note 411-13 and accompanying text (recognizing that many courts are more than willing to relax
causation requirements in certain types of cases).
427 See supra note 416 (explaining the doctrine and its use).
428 See supra note 408 (providing information on the test and its applications).
429 See Richardson, supra note 345, at 311 n.170 (listing examples of asbestos cases rejecting the
validity of the market share liability doctrine where plaintiffs could not pinpoint neither the products
that allegedly caused their injuries nor the manufacturers of the products); DiMasi, supra note 413, at
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A
the potential difficulty in tracing the origins of plaintiffs’ diseases.
similar issue might arise if a plaintiff in a mixed-dust case attempted to
prove causation by relying on the “fiber-drift” theory, since that would require that the substances responsible for the plaintiff’s injury be identified,
431
a task perhaps easier said than done.
In light of these potential problems in applying causation models previously used in toxic tort cases to mixed-dust claims, only time will tell
whether and how those tests will impact future cases involving mixed-dust
disease. However, in considering the likelihood that these tests will one
day be applied to mixed-dust claims, one should be mindful of the courts’
powers to adapt, if need be, existing legal rules and tests to make them bet432
ter suited for the relatively unique situation of mixed-dust claims, much
as legislatures could change existing ordinary pneumoconiosis statutes to
433
ensure that they would apply to mixed-dust pneumoconiosis as well. One
thing is practically certain: without any sort of leniency by the courts on the
causation requirement, mixed-dust plaintiffs suing in tort would likely face
434
a very heavy burden in winning their cases.
3.

Reducing or Eliminating the Problem of Causation in Mixed-Dust
Claims By Using Settlements or Alternative Methods of
Compensating Victims

One final way through which the potential causation problems facing
would-be mixed-dust plaintiffs might be reduced, or even eliminated entirely, would be to bypass the litigation process altogether, either through
the use of settlements or the creation of statutory or judicially-created compensation schemes. These alternatives to litigation are neither new nor un-

756-57 (describing an asbestos case in which the court “refused to adopt alternative liability . . . because
the plaintiff was unable to identify any of the defendant-manufacturer’s products at [his] work site”)
(emphasis in original); see also supra note 416 and accompanying text (discussing some courts’ reluctance to apply alternative methods of proving causation in toxic tort cases). But see Somberg, 338 A.2d
1, and Sindell, 607 P.2d 924, discussed at supra notes 408 and 416, respectively (both examples of the
majority dismissing dissents’ and defendants’ concerns that not all of the parties that might have caused
plaintiffs’ injuries had been joined as defendants in the actions).
430 See, e.g., supra note 373 and accompanying text; see generally Part IV (analyzing some of the
causation issues mixed-dust plaintiffs might face).
431 See supra note 393 (describing test). As was addressed earlier, mixed-dust cases always involve at least two substances. See, e.g., text accompanying supra note 5.
432 See generally Part IV (describing how the process of proving causation has changed over time,
and related issues thereto).
433 See supra notes 404-05 and accompanying text.
434 See, e.g., supra note 345 and accompanying text; supra note 409 (both capturing the magnitude
of how high an obstacle causation is to some toxic tort plaintiffs, including those who might be considering filing mixed-dust claims).
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435

usual, particularly in the field of “mass torts,” a category to which mixed436
dust might one day belong to.
a) Using Settlements as an Alternative to Mixed-Dust Litigation.
As far as settlements are concerned, it is well known that the vast majority
437
of cases filed end up being settled as opposed to going to trial, and in fact,
among the most notable settlements ever entered into occurred in the field
438
of “mass torts,” including the celebrated 1998 agreement between to439
bacco companies and various states worth hundreds of billions of dollars.
435 As it concerns this Comment, the term “mass tort” refers to a single product or event by one or
more defendants that causes widespread injury to many parties. See Barbara Frederick, Comment,
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Method or Madness?, 27 CONN. L. REV. 237, 257 n.137
(1994); see Steven L. Schultz, Mass Torts: In Re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation: Bankrupt and Backlogged—A Proposal for the Use of the Federal Common Law in Mass Tort
Class Actions, 58 BROOKLYN L. REV. 553, 554 n.3 (1992) (defining mass torts and grouping them into
different categories). There are many who feel that ordinary litigation is just not well suited to mass
torts, and thus advocate special or alternative solutions to the problem. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson,
Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEO. L.J. 1983, 2017 (1999) (“[T]he traditional tort
system simply does not work in mass tort.”); see generally Anita Bernstein, Formed by Thalidomide:
Mass Torts as a False Cure for Toxic Exposure, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2153 (1997) (providing at least eight
reasons for why traditional rules of litigation are ill-suited to the unique characteristics of mass torts);
Joseph M. Guzzardo & Jennifer L. Monachino, Note, Gulf War Syndrom—Is Litigation the Answer?:
Learning Lessons From In Re Agent Orange, 10 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMM. 673 (1995) (highlighting problems that plaintiffs face in mass tort litigation, using the Agent Orange litigation as background); cf.
supra note 410 and accompanying text (noting examples of commentators who share the belief that
ordinary litigation rules should not be used in toxic tort cases, but who advocate changes to the rules,
rather than the altogether replacement of mass tort litigation by the adoption of alternative systems of
compensation). But see John A. Siliciano, Symposium, Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 990, 1012 (1995) (analyzing the supposed problems with mass tort litigation in
American law, and concluding that “[t]he ‘crisis’ of mass torts may, in the end, [simply] be a crisis of
faith”).
436 Even though mixed-dust claims, at least those filed in tort, are relatively few in number today,
see supra note 62, it is possible that mixed-dust claims might one day belong to the category of mass
torts, as the two might share some characteristics, see generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action
and Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REV. 845 (1987) (outlining
the “legal characteristics” of mass torts). Specifically, two factors that mixed-dust claims might one day
have in common with mass torts is the potential for there to be a large number of claims filed, see generally supra Part III (examining potential future increase in the filing of mixed-dust claims), and the
uncertainty about what legal standards and rules would apply in connection with proving causation, see
generally Part IV (analyzing issues related to standards of causation potentially applicable to mixed-dust
claims). See also supra note 15 (positing how the class-action lawsuit filed by Ground Zero workers
may lead to an increase in the number of mixed-dust claims filed).
437 See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, A Traditionalist Looks at Mediation: It’s Here to Stay and Much
Better than I Thought, 3 NEV. L.J. 196, 222 (2002-03) (“[M]ost cases settle or are otherwise terminated
without trial.”); Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound Procedural System: The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 93 (1997) (“[T]he vast majority
of cases—probably over 95%—will terminate or settle prior to trial with or without case management.”).
438 See generally Erichson, supra note 435 (describing settlements, some of which were ultimately
unsuccessful, that arose in mass tort cases involving injurious breast implants and asbestos-related
injuries).
439 See McClendon v. Ga. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 261 F.3d 1252, 1253-56 (11th Cir. 2001) (providing background and details on the agreement). Interestingly, this agreement was “the largest settle-
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Among the factors that might make the use of settlements a desirable way
440
to deal with a potential future influx of mixed-dust claims are that they
441
reduce the private and social cost of litigation and sometimes allow par442
ties to avoid the hassles of litigation altogether, that they serve to prevent
443
the judicial system from being more backlogged than it already is, that
they allow the parties to reach finality in a mutually satisfactory manner
444
while foregoing the risks associated with trial, and that they help companies avoid unwanted negative publicity that is often associated with a public
445
trial.
Of course, not every aspect of settlements are positive; in fact, depending on the circumstances, both the parties involved and society as a whole
446
can be hurt through settlements if they are used inappropriately. For instance, it is not uncommon for wealthy defendants to purposely prolong the
litigation process, particularly through the use of discovery, in order to
447
pressure who is likely to be a poorer plaintiff to settle. At the other end of
the spectrum, there are those who feel that it is defendants who are some-

ment of a civil lawsuit in history.” Jeffrey Abramson, The Jury and Popular Culture, 50 DEPAUL L.
REV. 497, 518 (2000).
440 See generally supra Part III (addressing potential increase in the number of mixed-dust claims
filed).
441 See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Refining the "Presumptive Illegality" Approach to Settlements of
Patent Disputes Involving Reverse Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, 87 MINN.
L. REV. 1789, 1790, 1795 (2003) (noting that settlements are “viewed as [a] social good because [they]
reduce[ ] the private and social costs of litigation”).
442 See Roger S. Haydock, Civil Justice and Dispute Resolution in the Twenty-First Century:
Mediation and Arbitration Now and for the Future, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 745, 754-55 (2000)
(outlining some of the unpleasant aspects associated with litigating disputes).
443 See R. Bryan Morrison, Case Note, To Seal Or Not To Seal? That Is Still the Question: Arkansas Best Corp. v. General Electric Capital Corp., 49 ARK. L. REV. 325, 344 n.131 (1996) (“[O]ur civil
justice system could not bear the increased burden that would accompany reducing the frequency of
settlement. . . . If a large percentage of our cases did not settle, the backlog in our courts would become
totally intolerable.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
444 See Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey Rice, Symposium, Jury-Determined Settlements and Summary Jury
Trials: Observations About Alternative Dispute Resolution in an Adversary Culture, 19 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 89, 99 (1991) (“Parties in personal injury disputes often attempt a settlement [because t]hey want
to . . . decrease transaction costs, avoid the risks of trial, and have a final resolution as early as possible.”); see also supra note 334 (noting the preference for settlements that risk-averse parties have).
445 See, e.g., Andrew K. Craig, The Rise in Press Criticism of the Athlete and the Future of Libel
Litigation Involving Athletes and the Press, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 527, 548 n.202 (1994) (documenting the controversy surrounding the settlement agreement entered between Michael Jackson and a
boy that had accused him of sexual molestation, and noting that many believed Jackson’s settlement
amounted to “buying the silence of his accuser”).
446 See generally Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social
Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997) (outlining positive and negative aspects
of using settlements from a legal, as well as sociological, point of view).
447 See Ethan A. Heinz, Comment, The Conflicting Mandates of FRE 412 and FRCP 26: Should
Courts Allow Discovery of a Sexual Harassment Plaintiff’s Sexual History?, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519,
529-31 (1999) (explaining how some lawyers abuse discovery to “force an unfair settlement or withdrawal from the suit,” and providing the example of such practices in sexual harassment suits).
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times unfairly pressured to settle due to the threat of massive class action
lawsuits, particularly in mass torts, a practice labeled by one court as “judi448
cial blackmail.”
b) Compensation Schemes as an Alternative to Mixed-Dust Litigation. As with settlements, the use of programs that either change or elimi449
nate traditional concepts of litigation have been around for a long time
and continue to flourish today, as demonstrated by some compensation
schemes that were addressed earlier, such as those in the Black Lung Bene450
451
452
fits Act, states’ workers’ compensation programs, and the FAIR Act.
Other notable examples of attempts at curbing mass tort litigation by creating alternative methods of compensation include the now-defunct National
Swine Flu Immunization Program, through which the federal government
“accepted primary responsibility for injuries caused by the manufacture,
453
distribution, or administration of this swine flu vaccine”; the National
Childhood Vaccine Program Injury Act, which established a no-fault com454
pensation program for injuries associated with vaccinations; and the
455
agreement reached in the Agent Orange litigation, which was facilitated
456
through the use of the federal Multi-District Litigation Panel.
448 See, e.g., Paul V. Niemeyer, Comment, Remarks to the Institute for Law and Economic Policy,
39 ARIZ. L. REV. 719, 719-720 (1997) (noting that “[in certain situations,] companies faced even with
the threat of a class action [see] settle[ments] as the only economic alternative”); see generally T. Dean
Malone, Comment, Castano v. American Tobacco Co. and Beyond: The Propriety of Certifying Nationwide Mass-Tort Class Actions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 When the Basis of the Suit Is a
"Novel" Claim or Injury, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 817 (1997) (explaining the compromising situation that
defendants are sometimes put in due to class action suits, and noting that the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals has labeled settlements achieved as the result of threats of expensive and prolonged litigation as
“judicial blackmail”).
449 See generally Perry H. Apelbaum & Samara T. Ryder, The Third Wave of Federal Tort Reform:
Protecting the Public or Pushing the Constitutional Envelope, 8 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 591
(1999) (outlining development of tort reforms through legislation in the United States). Another excellent, but somewhat more theoretical, examination of the issues surrounding legislative tort reform may
be found in Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American Civil
Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (2002).
450 See generally supra Part II.B.2 (describing the act).
451 See generally supra Part II.B.1 (explaining the procedures that must be followed in Kentucky
to initiate a workers’ compensation pneumoconiosis claim there).
452 See generally supra Part II.D.2 (describing the FAIR Act).
453 In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 695, 699 (1980). For more information on the program, see id. and Erichson, supra note 435, at 2020 n.216.
454 See Dan L. Burk & Barbara A. Boczar, Symposium, Biotechnology and Tort Liability: A Strategic Industry at Risk, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 791, 852-54 (1994); Erichson, supra note 435, at 2020 n.216
(both providing information on the act). The current version of the act may be found in Title 42, Sections 300aa-34 of the United States Code (2003).
455 See generally Guzzardo, supra note 435 (providing background information on Agent Orange
litigation, which centered around war veterans’ claims that chemicals used by the military had caused
them various injuries, and why it seemed destined to end in a form other than trial). In the end, the
makers of Agent Orange settled with the veterans for $180 million. See id. at 686 n.86.
456 See id. at 684. In 1968, Congress, through the passage of Title 28, Section 1407 of the United
States Code (2003), created federal multi-district litigation panels, often referred to as “MDLs,” ostensi-
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457

And just as with settlements, the use of programs or schemes as an
alternative to mixed-dust claims would have its own advantages and disad458
vantages. Thus, while one could certainly say that such a strategy would
always be surrounded by controversy, perhaps the more pertinent, as well
more unpredictable, question related to the potential future use of settlements and similar programs as alternatives to mixed-dust claims is whether
the issue is ripe enough to be fully considered at this point.
Finally, although it is the author’s opinion that the potential for a fu459
ture increase in mixed-dust claims is certainly real, mixed-dust claims are
460
still in a nascent stage, and so it is hard to predict to what extent, or even
whether, settlements and other alternative programs to litigation, including
461
legislation like the FAIR Act, will apply to mixed-dust claims. Thus, as
with the earlier predictions concerning the impact that existing statutes
462
dealing with pneumoconiosis and the alternative causation tests employed
463
in toxic tort cases would have on mixed-dust claims, perhaps it could best
be said that the question of how or whether settlements and other alternatives to litigation will apply to mixed-dust claims can only be answered
with time.

bly to facilitate pre-trial proceedings in multi-district litigation (usually meaning class actions), but as it
so happens, cases that are transferred to MDLs usually end up being resolved there. See Judith Resnik
et al., Symposium, Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71
N.Y.U.L. REV. 296, 299-300 (1996) (providing background information on the creation and purpose of
MDLs); Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (outlining some of the functions of MDLs).
MDLs have proven influential in many monumental cases, including Agent Orange litigation, see Guzzardo, supra note 435, asbestos cases, see In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L.
1991), and tobacco-related lawsuits, see In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litig. v. Phillip
Morris, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D. D.C. 1999).
457 See supra notes 441-448 and accompanying text (addressing some positive and negative aspects of settlements).
458 Compare Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative
Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951 (1993) (suggesting that administrative compensation
schemes for mass torts are appropriate under certain circumstances) with The American Law Institute’s
Reporters’ Study on Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 405 (1993)
(questioning the use of such schemes, and concluding that a “review of the experience and design of
administrative compensation alternatives did not persuade us that this option had a marked advantage
over collective judicial processes, at least for the general run of injuries”); see also supra note 435
(recognizing conflicting opinions on the use of alternatives to litigation to address problem of mass tort
cases).
459 See generally supra Part III (examining potential future increase in the number of mixed-dust
claims filed).
460 See supra note 62. But see supra note 15 (recognizing the potential influx of mixed-dust
claims stemming from Ground Zero).
461 See generally supra Part III.B (addressing how the passage of the FAIR Act might influence the
filing of mixed-dust claims).
462 See generally Part IV.E.1.a (discussing the applicability of such statutes to mixed-dust claims).
463 See generally Part IV.E.2.a (examining the possibility that existing causation tests used in toxic
tort cases might also be employed in mixed-dust claims).
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V. CONCLUSION
Mixed-dust pneumoconiosis is a pulmonary disease of predominantly
occupational origins that occurs after a person has been exposed to at least
two or more organic or inorganic toxic substances over an extended period
of time. Cases alleging various forms of this disease have been around
since the 1960s, but the greater portion of the reported cases thus far have
been in the nature of workers’ compensation claims, and not tort lawsuits.
There are definite parallels between the way mixed-dust pneumoconiosis
and asbestos-related diseases are contracted. In addition, existing or pending legislation aimed at curbing the asbestos problem, as well as insurance
exclusion policies that purport to limit insurers’ liability in terms of defending or indemnifying asbestos-related claims, may have an impact on
whether and how much a person may recover for asbestos-related diseases.
Mainly because of these factors, the author posits that in the future, a
significant number of would-be asbestos plaintiffs, whose sheer numbers
have created a backlog in the courts and whose verdicts have led to many
companies declaring bankruptcy, might choose to file their lawsuits under
the rubric of mixed-dust claims in an attempt to bypass unfavorable insurance policies or legislation aimed at solving the asbestos problem. This
conclusion is tempered somewhat by the fact that although mixed-dust
claims have been sporadically filed for several decades, there has yet to be a
boom in the number of such claims filed.
In addition, it is hard to predict in a vacuum how or whether courts
might apply a particular insurance policy to any given set of facts, especially since the language of policies frequently change. A similar challenge
exists as it relates to predicting the role that legislation dealing with asbestos, pneumoconiosis, and the like might have on the filing of mixed-dust
claims. Some legislation, like the Fairness in Asbestos Resolution Act, or
FAIR Act for short, has not been passed yet, so an obvious obstacle exists in
assessing its impact; as for existing laws, many of them, such as those dealing with “ordinary” pneumoconiosis, are perhaps only tangentially related
to mixed-dust, so estimating how, or even if, they would apply to mixeddust claims is tricky. Of course, it is true that legislatures could create new
laws or change those already in the books to ensure that they would apply
to mixed-dust pneumoconiosis as well.
Making an accurate prediction concerning the number of asbestos suits
that might be filed as mixed-dust claims is also made more difficult by the
fact that the small number of mixed-dust claims filed in tort means that the
applicable legal doctrines, particularly those concerning the plaintiff’s burden of proof as it relates to causation, are not yet well-settled. In the past,
courts have not been remiss to adapt traditional ways of proving causation
in exceptional cases, such as those involving toxic tort claims where a
plaintiff cannot pinpoint the specific defendant(s) responsible for his inju-
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ries among a group of many, in order to allow that plaintiff to have his day
in court. At the same time, however, some courts have demonstrated a reluctance to adopt “relaxed” methods of proving causation in certain types of
cases, or against certain types of defendants. Given this, it is likely that the
law concerning mixed-dust tort claims will only be prone to exact ascertainment after a more substantial number of such claims are filed.
Finally, assessing the full magnitude of mixed-dust claims vis-à-vis the
legal system is complicated by the possibility that alternatives to litigation,
such as court-sanctioned settlements or administratively based compensation schemes, might be adopted in the area. These alternative ways to compensate injured persons are neither new nor unusual, particularly in the field
of “mass torts,” to which mixed-dust claims might one day belong. Nonetheless, the impact that such techniques would have on mixed-dust claims is
far from certain, particularly since there are many who question the propriety or wisdom of them. The author further posits, in connection with the
adoption of alternatives to litigation, that unless courts or legislatures act to
reduce some of the burdens that mixed-dust plaintiffs would face in pressing their claims, the mighty obstacle of causation might act to temper any
eventual increase in the number of mixed-dust claims filed.
In arriving at this conclusion, the author began by providing, in Part I,
a brief medical background of mixed-dust claims, namely in terms of what
they are and how they are brought about. Among the topics discussed in
that light was how and where mixed-dust diseases are typically contracted,
as well as some of the varieties of the affliction and the physical effects that
the diseases can have on those affected.
In the next section, Part II, the author examined some workers’ compensation claims involving both ordinary pneumoconiosis and mixed-dust
pneumoconiosis, and in doing so, noted similarities in how courts resolve
the two types of claims, including the very deferential standard that is
shown to lower tribunals’ factual determinations. He then examined state
and federal statutes dealing with ordinary pneumoconiosis and mixed-dust
pneumoconiosis, including a discussion of some of the features these statutes share. The focus of Part II then shifted to the potential impact that
insurance law, particularly pollution exclusion clauses, might have on
mixed-dust claims. Within that context, the author analyzed some of the
key interpretative issues that courts might struggle with in dealing with the
applicability of these policies to particular sets of circumstances. Finally, in
Part II, the author addressed some of Congress’ attempts at finding a legislative solution to the asbestos litigation problem in America, particularly the
FAIR Act. Specifically, some of the Act’s key features that might influence
the number of mixed-dust claims filed were examined.
Part III’s emphasis was predicting how today’s and tomorrow’s insurance law, particularly ever-broadening pollution exclusion clauses, as well
as possible future legislation dealing with asbestos, namely the FAIR Act,
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might impact the number of mixed-dust claims filed. In connection with
the insurance aspect, the author paid special attention to exclusion clauses
that specifically deal with asbestos, as well as how those and other types of
exclusion clauses affect the duties of insurance carriers in terms of defending or indemnifying claims against insureds. As for the possible ramifications that legislation like the FAIR Act would have on the filing of mixeddust claims, the author tackled the issue by focusing primarily on certain
key aspects of the FAIR Act that might influence whether and how some
asbestos plaintiffs might proceed. Among these are that the Act would
serve as the only means by which persons suffering from asbestos-related
ailments could receive compensation, and that some claimants whose injuries were caused or influenced by substances other than asbestos might not
be eligible for recovery under the Act.
In Part IV, the author addressed the role that causation could play in
tort suits or workers’ compensation claims involving mixed-dust diseases,
in part by comparing the elements of causation that might be implicated in
mixed-dust tort claims to those typically encountered in traditional toxic
tort cases, as well as by addressing the central causation hurdles that mixeddust tort plaintiffs might face. Some time was also devoted to likely evidentiary issues that mixed-dust plaintiffs might encounter in their attempts
to introduce scientific and medical evidence pertinent to their case. The
author next discussed some techniques and strategies that a plaintiff seeking
to make out a mixed-dust claim might rely on, including the use of a scanning electron microscope, and then presented examples of how some courts
grappling with mixed-dust claims, both in workers’ compensation and tort,
have addressed the issue of causation. The author then addressed some
ways in which legislatures, mainly through the creation of alternative compensation schemes, and courts, largely by “relaxing” traditional methods of
establishing causation, have made it possible for certain persons to recover
monetary relief for their injuries. In this connection, the applicability of
these existing schemes and judicial doctrines to mixed-dust claims is addressed. In the remainder of Part IV, the author explored the feasibility and
desirability of adopting alternatives to litigation, including settlements and
no-fault compensation schemes, as a way of dealing with mixed-dust
claims.
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